

The Journal of English Cultural Studies

Vol. 9 No. 2 August 2016

Institute for English Cultural Studies

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Teaching and Learning Ethico–ontology from *Light in August* in Globalized Pre–service Education*

Kim, Dae–Joong

1. Introduction: On an Errant Way to Teaching and Learning *Light in August*

This paper explores and examines the meaning of teaching and learning through a critical recounting of my own experience teaching William Faulkner's novel, *Light in August*, to Korean pre–service graduate students from the English Education Department in order to test ethico–ontological pedagogy. While working in the English Education Department in which pre–service graduate students undergo the enormous task of learning how to teach and how to live as a teacher, I have trailblazed a new path of teaching literature to those students who might have regarded literature as incongruous part of curriculum. Through this errant pedagogy, I endeavored to challenge myself, both practically and theoretically, to accomplish the goal of my literary research on ethico–ontology, while also endowing

* This study was supported by 2015 Research Grant from Kangwon National University(C1011953–01–01)

those students with opportunities to think about themselves and to reflect on their future roles as teachers and more broadly as “citizen[s] of the world” (Nussbaum 7).

Also, via this paper, I describe students' differentiated perception and understanding of education, contextualized with the ethical inquiries of humanity and the political inquiries of social justice. The core pedagogy resonates with Martha C. Nussbaum's view of education, ethics and social justice in *Not for Profit* in which she maintains that to avoid the pitfalls of a ferociously competitive world, students need more abilities “with the humanities and the arts: the ability to think critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world problems as a “citizens of the world”; and finally the ability to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person “(7). Critical thinking, regarding oneself as a participant in global/local justice, and having the capacity of empathy defuse the implosion of liberal–democratic, market–based education where only competition matters. Literature in education, imbued with liberal humanism and a market–compromised fantasy of practicality, has lost its power to impart the meaning of justice to the public. Most college students, globally and more specifically in Korea, during literature classes, learn only how to differentiate synecdoche from metonymy, and thus fall short of learning the true social and ethical power of literature. Here, I claim that teaching literature opens and transcends students normal everyday experience to guide them, if painfully, to confront challenging ethical and political questions of education in the differential space created through imagination. William Faulkner's

American South in the 1930s presents a differential space that transcends Korean graduate students experience, and upon which unfolds the shaky ground of humanity and meaning of social justice.

2. The Significance of Imagination as a Pedagogical Tool

Maxine Greene, a prominent pathbreaker of aesthetic education, emphasizes the meaning and significance of teachers' ability to imagine a democratic community through the arts, especially literature (33). Literature does not just expand the capacity of readers' mindset, but it also, through the venue of imagination, enables readers to envision a possible world differentiated from their lives. In other words, from a pedagogical perspective, it, via imagining a possible, different world, reveals a structure of emotion hidden in daily life, even in a classroom.¹⁾ As soon as a student or a teacher in the classroom scans and cognitively maps this structure of emotion through literature, he or she is able to find the nature of obstacles as well as a dim path to hope. With this unexpected pedagogical enlightenment, the student or the teacher disentangles strands of complex emotional structure and is able to participate in flexible, inviting, and sometimes problematic relations with others in the classroom. "Critical thinking and empathetic imagining" (Nussbaum 19) can unfold the hidden purview of education. Fiction can provide the occasion for these habits.

1) Structure of emotion is a term Raymond Williams first introduced to explain historical mood and its base structure in literary work.

One of the examples I delve into in this paper is my teaching experience of William Faulkner's *Light in August* to Korean graduate students. In fact, this class was not the first class in which I taught William Faulkner's works. Previously at a state university in the U.S., I taught one of his *tour de forces*, *The Sound and the Fury* to American students. I selected that specific work for undergraduate English major students not in order to scare them away by revealing how a novel turns out to be a maze or a conundrum one has to delve into to reach a swathed core of humanity. Instead, I used the novel to break through students' staunch and unflinching bastille of stereotypes. I raised an issue of disability and vulnerability analyzing Benjy, a mentally-challenged character in the novel whose animal-like perspective reveals the moral truth of the corrupted Compsons. Students complained of the undecipherable diction and unrealistic descriptions in Benjy's part. I explained how modernistic diction—interior monologue mirroring a pure mind of a human being castrated and maltreated by people—enabled readers to peep into a true meaning of human suffering and vulnerability. I analyzed the emotional structure in which the character was situated and let students compare this with their own experience.

Though most students expressed reluctance and frustration about this comparison, some students shared their own experience of encountering and engaging with such mentally-challenged children. I guided them to engage to the emotional structure in these real experiences and connected it to the imaginary emotional structure in the novel. I asked how Benjy's primitive, innocent voice debunked the true emotions around characters, especially his beloved, Caddy.

Reading and analyzing Quentin's poetic, pedantic and pernicious mind, students also could get a chance to reconsider existential meaning and the peril of modern humanity. Universal love and the all-embracing care of Dilsey, a black female maid, revealed a fundamental morality that could demolish even the bulwark of racism.

Nonetheless, whenever raising the issue of racism, many times I ran into various obstacles due to students' resistance generated by their own structure of emotion. Due to the place and time in which they lived and falling short of understanding how black characters in the novel perceived the world differently from other white protagonists, they mostly tended to return to traditional interpretation of the formalistic structure and dictions instead directly engaging with racism and discrimination. Students had to struggle to break down their prejudices and come to a realization of the universal grounding in vulnerability of all human beings. In the end, some students, though not all, showed unexpected contentment in visiting and realizing the meaning of differential space that a novel could open to them.

Compared to this previous experience, coping with different obstacles, teaching Faulkner's *Light in August* to the graduate students in South Korea was not a simple task. It was far harder first to lead the Korean students to link the understanding of the grim depiction of the South in 1930s in *Light in August* to their own life through an imaginary lens; this being necessary to breach students previous belief on race, nation, gender, and other controversial ideas. In fact, I selected the novel with a pedagogical

aim, ethico—ontological pedagogy, based on the meaning of differentiated space of literary imagination and focused on the meaning of compassion and vulnerability as an ethical topic. Designing the curriculum, I assumed that literary imagination broadens the reach of one's mind to other vulnerable beings, which mirror the readers' own vulnerability.

In an essay, “The Role of Values in Teaching Literature in the High School,” Patrick Welsh discusses how he used *Light in August* in a high school in the U.S in order to link students own life experience to literature. (148). To accomplish this goal, Welsh “made a deliberate effort to link” literature to “their own difficulties” by discussing it “in terms of students' own feelings and experiences” because literature in class was “a source of insight—even wisdom—into the human predicament” (148). Welsh asked a fundamental question of value from a literary work and then linked it to students own life questions. He used *Light in August* for this purpose and discovered that “Joe's struggle to find his place in southern society and the constant injustice that society deals him seems to strike a deep chord in young people” (150).

As Welsh's success story delineates, a good literary work is the best tool to usher students to inhabit unvisited and previously unimaginable spaces and to participate in contention around values and ideas of the structure of emotion that they have accepted without critical awareness or about which they have been entirely ignorant. Nussbaum's emphasis on critical mind and Greene's power of imagination for teaching reveals how literary work can empower students' critical examination of the world around them and their

compassion with other human beings through an imagination that is built in the differential space of reading and discussing a work like *Light in August*.

Through teaching Faulkner's most pedantic and unbearably complex modernist novel, I tried to deliver the idea of the ethics of vulnerability. The ethical theme of vulnerability is a universal ethico-ontological tenet of humanity as well as a differential value because it can be applied to every human being differently while it also necessarily requires human imagination through which one can overcome the parochial limit of one's experience to realize how the pain and peril of others in differential space is universally linked to one's own experience; literary work can trigger a compassion for vulnerability in students minds.

As Nussbaum also shows through reading Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Emile*, "learning of basic human weakness...makes us sociable and turns us to humanity; thus our very inadequacy can become the basis of our hope of a decent community" (34). Then, Nussbaum argues that human beings have to cultivate their compassion through education because they are susceptible to disgust and shame generated through their innate tendency to differentiate friends from strangers. Compassion is natural instinct but it has to be taught to reach real compassion for humanity not discriminating others (Nussbaum 38).

However, how is it possible for a Korean teacher to elicit Korean students' compassion toward those imaginary people in the American South of the 30s? I endeavored to elicit a discussion of ethics and racism in my class. Admittedly, most Korean students,

undergraduate or graduate, are not familiar with racism as a topic, especially its meaning in global space as well as local space. Indeed, while more and more immigrants from South Asia or other nations are arriving, bringing unfamiliar and unforeseeable culturally differential spaces even to schools, South Koreans tend to ignore this demographic change and its significance. As seemingly a racially-homogeneous space South Korea once was, South Korea is in fact getting more and more racially heterogeneous while racial hatred and anxiety increases. Especially for pre-service Korean graduate students who have to teach English to an increasing number of multicultural or multiracial students, compassion and vulnerability are enormously significant.

Thus, I raised several inquiries regarding *Light in August*: how it is possible for Lena Grove, a female, pregnant character, to travel from Alabama to Jefferson, Mississippi; how we can understand Joanna Burden's inexplicable attitude and desire for Joe Christmas; how we should understand Joe Christmas ferocious and chaotic life in terms of race and racism; how we should understand Hightower's shame and physical, psychic alienation; and, what we can learn through this novel in terms of life and ethics. I selected these topics to help students think over political and ethical issues imbued with philosophical inquiries such as gender, race, ethics, and humanity. Discussing those topics, students showed a great deal of compassion to Lena's predicament and said they could not help feeling sympathy toward her situation and amazed at how all the people she met on her way were kind to her. I used this as an example to explain the nuanced difference between sympathy, empathy, and compassion. I

explained to the students that Lena, representing female courage and mother earth, had to come to the community to survive her pregnancy, the most vulnerable situation of humanity. But this compassion was not just a sympathy, a kind of feeling similar to pity, but communal understanding of the fundamental ethical truth of fatality and universality of human suffering.

Race and gender issues were tougher than other issues, though not more difficult than my previous teaching of *The Sound and Fury* to American students. Indeed, students showed frustration and umbrage towards the “taboo-ridden, dark, violent, death-oriented social world of Hightower, Joe Christmas, and Joanna Burden” (Volpe 153). I raised questions of race and gender discrimination regarding this stygian social world and its causes. At first students blamed the characters’ personal defects instead of the social structure; students mostly blamed Joe Christmas’ visceral hatred against blackness and womanhood. To guide students out of this cocooned understanding of the imaginary space in the novel, I linked the discussion of the novel to the U.S. racial history in which blackness or mixed-blood has been demonized and discriminated. I also used atrocious examples of lynching and discrimination, explained Jim Crow law and its effects, and expanded them to other racial issues. I expounded on how those racial stereotypes were critically analyzed in the novel and then asked if it was possible that Faulkner’s description of race fell into racism. Some students responded that Faulkner might not be exiated from this, while others also argued that Joe Christmas was just a trope that disrupted the racial ideology of purity and white supremacy

exemplifying Joe's final castration and ferocious mutilation. We had fertile and sometimes heated discussions around history of lynching and the social background of the novel.

The most begrudging task was to guide students to make connections between the novel's imaginary worlds and their students real world. To accomplish it, I showed how racial hatred had also occurred in South Korea, especially hatred toward half-blooded children in schools. Bullying against those untraditional students in Korea was getting worse and worse. Some graduate students, who were actually teaching at schools, expressed that they felt shocked and even ashamed. Joe's painful stories—as a seemingly half-blooded child, locked in an orphanage, kidnapped by his own grandfather, Doc Hines, who believed that Joe is a devil because of his racial ambiguity, brutally abused by his extremely racist and misogynic foster-father, and finally castrated and lynched by a white fascist—revealed to students how a severe racial system turned a child into a ultimately vulnerable being of suffering.

Students came to a realization that racism and racial hatred were not just personal matters but social problems contextualized with ethical and even ontological significances. Some students expressed anger and frustration because there were not many practical ways to solve these problems. Some students even complained that government and officials in Korea like the U.S. described in the novel had paid no attention to teaching the perilous effects of discrimination and the significance of ethical meaning of otherness in schools. The novel became a tableau where students' imaginations and structure of emotion mapped the reality of Korean society and the

ubiquitously periled humanity in global space. Students agreed that Korean society was not so much different from the imaginary space in the novel since severe cases of racial discrimination, religious bigotry, gender violence, etc. were actually present. The universality of discrimination bridged students limited vision to the global vision of discrimination and the necessity of united efforts to get rid of it.

Hightower's shame and his final epiphany of his admission of human vulnerability when he lied about Joe being at his place when he murdered Joanna Burden was a key moment when ethical compassion pierced through Hightower's obsessive beliefs of the glory of the South during the Civil War. Hightower's obsession with a blood-stained confederate uniform his grandfather once wore during the war is in truth an emblem of the sins of slavery and violence against others—the bi-racial child, black people, women, etc. who became ghosts in the novel. The ethical decision Hightower makes when he helps Lena give birth to an infant exemplifies how human dignity can endure when a subject relinquishes his or her fantastical obsession with the past and realizes the meaning of vulnerability and ontological care (Heideggerian *Sorge*). I led the discussion of the significance of shame and compassion to elicit students' responses in terms of life and ethics, again ethico-ontology.

Contextualizing this ethical understanding of humanity to their own life experience, students could be enlightened that spatial, temporal, and emotional distances between the fictional setting of the novel and their life are not that far apart. Imagination could bridge these two spaces and empowered students' truthful

understanding of ethico-ontological pedagogy in which teaching and learning happen whenever a differential space is opened; a differential space occurred when a teacher helped students critically review their own vulnerability and the ontological meaning of shame caused by the realization that he or she had averted from imagining other's pain.

Then, the last question is how this could happen; namely, how could this happen in real teaching? One of my students, who was then teaching English at a middle school located in a poverty-stricken and rural area in the Kangwon province of Korea, told her own story of a student. She talked about being shocked when a second grade middle school student who had not shown much interest in learning English showed an unusual interest in the issue of racism. The graduate student said that that day she left a scholarly paper in Korean about *Light in August* and racism inadvertently on her desk and the middle school student noticed the article and asked the graduate student to let her read it. Confused but amused by her interest, the graduate student let her student read the article; the next day, the middle school student came to the graduate student and wanted to talk about racism. They discussed what racism was like in the South in the U.S. and story of the novel. Though the middle-school student had never visited a foreign country, she expressed anger and frustration against any hatred toward minorities. The middle-school student also confessed that she had a similar experience of being bullied by other students.

This little narrative unfolds the possibility and practicality of ethico-ontological pedagogy. Critical thinking through the imagination

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of differential literary space, where interstitial encountering of human vulnerability and political engagement with social justice against systematic atrocities such as racism, happens unexpectedly at the moment of teachers “being with and talking with” students.

3. Conclusion: Unending story and its potentiality

In reality, it is almost impossible to think deeply of the ethical and philosophical meaning of humanity and its social context. Literary texts dismantle *doxa* of prejudices to invite reader's participation through imagination, which uncovers the structure of emotion and the critical meaning of life and its universality. In great literary works, characters undergo painful experiences to reach an epiphany concerning humanity and its social meaning. Pre-service graduate students can have the chance of glimpsing this darkness and the revelation of truth. Teaching is like a dance with strangers. To dance with strangers, one has to experience the breakdown of prejudice and feel the partner's vulnerability and ethically truthful communication within the emotional structure of compassion. My experience teaching *Light in August* to Korean pre-service graduate students might not be able to fully recount the whole expanse of this differential pedagogy. But I hope that this personal story can pave a new road to a reconsideration of the potential ethico-ontological pedagogy offers by envisioning a classroom where social justice and ethical understandings of otherness can occur.

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■ **Key words**

Light in August, William Faulkner, Ethico-ontological Pedagogy, Life Ethics, Teaching Literature, Compassion

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■ Abstract

Teaching and Learning Ethico-ontology from *Light in August* in Globalized Pre-service Education

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This paper explores and examines the meaning of teaching and learning through a critical recounting of my own experience teaching William Faulkner's novel, *Light in August*, to Korean pre-service graduate students from the English Education Department in order to test ethico-ontological pedagogy. Also, I try to propose students' differentiated perception and understanding of education contextualized with ethical inquiries of humanity and the political inquiries of social justice. Here, I claim that teaching literature opens and transcends students normal everyday experience to guide them, if painfully, to confront challenging ethical and political questions of education in the differential space created through imagination. William Faulkner's American South in the 1930s in *Light in August* presents a differential space that transcends Korean graduate students' experience upon which unfolds the shaky ground of humanity and meaning of social justice.

■ Key Words

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in Globalized Pre-service Education | Kim, Dae-Joong

Ethics, Teaching Literature, Compassion

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



Bioethics, Moral Education, and the Potential Relationship between Humans and robotics in the Future :

Utilizing the motives of *Avatar* and *Surrogates*

Song, Sun-Young*

I. Introduction

In general, the role of bioethics is “to debate those issues more rationally, to make sure that the onward march of science does not trample down vulnerable populations, to prevent harms from outweighing benefits, to ask whose interests prevail and to raise questions about whether justice is being served by new scientific developments” (Dickenson, 2–3). To the extent that there are huge questions surrounding the boundary of human life in the world, bioethics in general must establish a specifically ‘global bioethics’ that “has two aims: to foreground neglected issues affecting non-western countries, such as outsourcing research, and to debate whether there can be any agreement on genuinely universal values” (17). At the moment, it is argued that as the first and crucial task of bioethics any unjust or unequal practices should be prevented or

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eliminated because of the foundation of bioethics on human dignity. In the plan of global bioethics, for example, UNESCO's Bioethics Programme has endeavored "to put the normative universal texts into practice and thus make the ethical principles a reality" (Solinis, 8).

To establish the justice system of human life and universal values is connected with the rapid growth of new science, technology and biotechnology. With the advance of high technology and engineering, the main question in this paper is considered: "how is the feature of human beings changed over the next twenty or two hundred years (foreseeable or far-off future)?" In particular, the rapid development of robotics makes the question more serious in various fields. A recent example is the twofold attitudes of artificial Intelligence(AI) robotics in the competition of 'Lee, Se-Dol vs Google's AlphaGo' as one of matches between human and robotics. According to Google, AlphaGo "combines as advanced tree search with deep neural networks" (Google Official Blog). By the autonomous algorithms of deep learning, it can move and go to the next position to defeat the human player. It has triggered the negative as well as positive notions of AI in that robots has unexpected power and intelligence enough to defeat or help humans. As one of the current issues related to AI, it is conceivable that one day a feature of human beings can be in a sort of a potential connection with other species or materials due to 'deep neural network' like the human neural system.

For the possibility of a potential relationship as described above, it shows that new technology like AI robotics poses a challenge to

bioethics and its moral education. The conception of relationship is the core of ethics. It is natural to be in the networks of various relations. Beyond any connections with animals or plants, however, in future humans will have any relations to AI robotics. At that point, there are two main questions. Firstly, “what is AI robotics related to humans?” This means whether or not AI robotics has its independent existence of human beings who have developed AI robots. Secondly, “what to be prepared for next generation in terms of a new relationship between human beings and AI robotics?” Concerning the utilization of new technology to human life, there are two dimensions of invasion: physical and mental. Now, for example, we can play and communicate with AI robots like pets by normal and emotional algorithm. In a long-term perspective, however, we might see a new human being who has only the brain connected with AI robotics, instead of human body. The question arises here about what kinds of relationships to various AI robots, and even that there could arise a new form of human beings by the invasion of AI robotics, which would raise a new set of ethical questions. Therefore, the second question is of moral education for next generations.

As a response, I have been interested in the unexpected, unrealizable or imaginary motive of a kind of potential relationship in two movies, *Avatar* (2009) and *Surrogate* (2009). Strictly speaking, it is arguable that those movies are in the category of AI robotics. There are a lot of new technologies that enable us to imagine the future. However, each story is not the main concern of this paper. The utilization of those movies is limited in this paper. The main

attention is paid to the motive of relationship based on human dignity as a common directing point. The main characters in those movies have tried to recover the true human through relationship in the environments of new technology and transcendence. At that point, the motives of those movies are useful in dealing with bioethics that has to reflect human nature and existence in the advance of AI robotics.

To preserve and develop our justice system of bioethics is the main task of moral education. Without any considerations on relationship, it is also impossible to complete the task. By exploring the ontological feature of bioethics, moral education enables us to make the fundamental consideration on relationship of life and existence in moral subjects. Unfortunately, there is no serious reflection on any possibility of a new relationship to AI robotics in the formal and moral subjects in Korean curriculum. Rather, there are only concerns about the advance of technology, and warnings about its potential abuses and misuses to human life. In this paper, therefore, I will compare the possible and new relationships to AI robotics in the future with the contemporary Korean curriculum system of bioethics in moral subjects.

II. Do AI robots have autonomous relationships with humans?

It is not too much to say that any kinds of machine used in daily life is categorized as robots. For example, the vacuum cleaner has been replaced by a robot cleaner, and the functions of the cellular

phone have advanced into those of smart phone that could be connected with things and humans in the networks. A robot cleaner can recognize obstacles and make autonomous decisions and change its directions in the lines. In utilizing smart phones, even more useful is AI-bots can, given your consent, autonomously share huge amounts of information by collecting and utilizing your data as well as others' data in the network of big data. Furthermore, it is expected that we can control our home by utilizing the network of our smart phones, related to IoT (Internet of Things).

In the increase of the new technologies based on AI robotics, a crucial feature comes to us. There is a sort of connection or relationship between human beings and robots. The two do not have equal position in the connection, however, in that the concept of 'robot' is made by human beings. We, humans, use a lot of things including the products of robotics. This means that the understanding of 'robot' is dependent on "the social and cultural perception in which it is embedded" (Capurro and Nagenborg, vii). At that point, to develop and use AI robots is to bring out a potential form of human relationship.

Firstly, AI robots seem to play the role of agents or to be in the middle of it. In Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs), for example, the human nervous system is connected with computers and robotic devices. "Input BCIs are used to deliver signals from external devices to the brain; output interfaces enables one to acquire and process brain signals, which are then used to control external devices" (Datteri and Tamburrini, 38). With regards to a connection of patients with computer system,

BCI brain-to-computer communication protocols require an act of *delegation*, whereby human users transfer partial control of peripheral devices to a computational system. More specifically, the human user delegates both the identification of a high-level action intent and the control of its detailed execution to a computational system. Patients affected by severe motor disabilities trade-off this transfer of partial control for a restored procedural capability to act on their own desires (44).

This shows that AI robotics systems control the patients who need any support even in the human nervous system. Even though the communication between brain and robotic devices are calculated by input or output, it is an undeniable fact that the devices substitute for the control power of human beings in the connection with the patients.

Secondly, there is a characteristic of personification in using AI robots. According to a experiment for 144 children (aged 7–8), they considered robots “as if [robots] have minds of their own and in the same story or discussion” and “as machines that need people to design and operate them”. This means that the children create animate qualities of robots, recognizing their mechanical qualities. It is concluded, therefore, that most important in understanding robots for the children is “how well robots are integrated into society” (Bhamjee, Griffiths, and Palmer, 46–47). As seen above, the conception of ‘robot’ made by humans is the reflection on social and cultural contexts. In the view of Nishida, there is a common culture and context in employing robots: “to ascribe non–organic entities the role of (their) partners of friends, just as Wilson the

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volleyball” in the movie *Cast Away* (2000) (Nishida, 112). Like lovely pets, there are pet robots, their owners communicate with them, and the robots react like live pets.

Thirdly, more specifically, a new form of relationship can be grounded on emotional communication. In the field of medical care robots, surgical robot systems like da Vinci system are to perform surgery of precise movement of controllers by human doctors. Here the system is in the level of physical tools. (It might be expected that the systems can operate only by recognizing the voice of the doctors) (Datteri and Tamburrini, 44). However, AI robotics has come to show a robot system with which patients can have communication. For example, a emotional and social robot like ‘Pepper’ by SoftBank, or ‘NAO’ by Aldebaran Robotics, has been commercialized. We can easily get a lot of videos related to Pepper or NAO with humans like in YouTube.¹⁾ Pepper is to communicate with humans, to teach foreign languages for children in schools, to be a friend when you are alone, to express its own feelings and emotions by humans’ reactions with emotional gestures like humans, etc., even though it cannot clean the house or cook.

Here, then, is a significant problem: is its emotionality the same as that of humans? As Becker wrote,

Robots and virtual agents neither experience the feelings that their

1) Robo Phil, “Pepper Robot Product Overview”,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9YCBET5bQA>. Web. 28 May 2016.
ContraElectronicPL, “Robot NAO Evolution Academic Edition”,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wCap2KaHls>. Web 28 May 2016.

expressions transport in a reduced form, nor do they feel the physiological reactions that frequently correspond to such emotions (racing heart, rise in blood pressure, breathlessness, relaxation) (Becker, 28).

As another example, a person with autism might find comfort in communication with social robots like NAO (see footnote 1). In that case, NAO is a friend of the patient as well as a delegator who can collect and analyze emotional changes in the patient, and can immediately inform human doctors of the data in AI robotics. As Becker pointed out, it is obvious that NAO's emotions and expressions are not real. Nevertheless, the patient trusts NAO's expressions and emotions more than those of humans (This is also dealt with the characteristic of personification).

Viewed in those three aspects of potential relationship between humans and AI robotics, one is basically forced to ask an ontological question: what will constitute a robot in the future? Dependent on our answers, we, humans, will create the different and various forms and styles of human life from the past to the future via the present. In bioethics, in particular, the question has been already supposed of a kind of connection and relationship between humans and AI robotics, without considerable thoughts on the rapid advance of technology. To prevent any disaster that we cannot expect from technology (ex. the invasion of AI robots into human body), at least, one needs to make simple observations about what a robot is.

In the field of applied ethics, it is general that contemporary robots are understood to belong to four categories. Firstly, robots are nothing but machines. Robots are very useful and helpful tools

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for human labours. Secondly, robots have ethical dimensions. This is because the values of humanity are actually embedded in many devices, which is the main goal of their design. Thirdly, robots are moral agents. As artificial agents, the robots can act upon for good or evil without free will, feelings, emotions, etc. Finally, robots will be evolution of a new species. Like in science fiction, robots have their own will and act on by their will beyond human controls (Veruggio and Operto, 4).

In the notion of connection and relationship between humans and AI robotics, it is said that AI robots are autonomous agents within human control. More obviously, the concern of AI robots with humans is changed from negative to positive by the advance of technology. Robots will perform surgery with doctors or act for them, be better friends than humans, and lead patients to be more safe and healthy just by autonomous judgment in the network with humans. In this process, there will be many technological mistakes and errors. Like two sides of a coin, it is inevitable that we, humans, endeavor to overcome both the advantages and the disadvantages of the advance. Nevertheless, a new form of relationship based on autonomy of AI makes the division between humans and robots uncertain in that humans are enhanced like robots and robots are social and emotional like humans.

III. How to keep human dignity in new relationship in future?

By the advance of technology, robotics and information, the gap

between humans and robots will be much closer or disappear in the network. Since the game of go (baduk) between humans and AlpaGo, one of the big issues is the capacity of deep learning just to win the game by itself as an equal player of humans. It is identified, literally, by artificial intelligence whose autonomous judgments have controlled the game. In that sense, it is necessary to imagine the potential relationship between humans and AI robotics in future. Of human dignity, we, humans, need to prepare for different approaches to bioethics by the levels of the relationship.

Concerning the levels of the relationship, two features could be described by the goal and role for keeping human dignity. In the foreseeable future, firstly, the relationship in the network is to sustain or enhance human abilities. There is, at first appearance, no damage of human nature by AI robotics. In this view, the work of bioethics is more practical and prescriptive, for example, to give sorts of guidelines in applying new technologies to humans. As a result, however, human functions are often improved to be stronger, so that there can be an issue of the nature of human dignity. In far-off future, secondly, the relationship is to create a new form or notion of human dignity or a new species, or to be destroyed. As the divided line between them is dependent upon the technological level of AI robotics, there will be complicated issues of ontological and descriptive aspects, for example, of “what is humans?” in bioethics. To explore the two features in this paper, the former of potential relationship is called the practical and prescriptive conception and the latter the ontological and descriptive conception.

In the practical and prescriptive conception, the most representative

is human enhancement by human robots. By the network in present, various (artificially) intelligent robots are utilized in health care service. For surgical intervention, for example, the AESOP system is “to move an endoscope inside the patient’s body under vocal control” (Datteri and Tamburrini, 36). Imagine, however, the advance of AI robotics to do autonomous learning and making–decision. Is the use of new technologies justified to develop human functions or abilities? It might be criticised that the proposals and plans such as Bio–orgs, Cyborgs, Silorgs, Symborges, and Quantum global brain have the ideal of transhuman or superman (TEREC– VLAD and TEREC–VLAD, 69–70). Even though the support of transhuman by robots improve human conditions, it is ended in depersonalization that transhumanism substitute for human spaces in the idea that “it would be regrettable to give up this technologies since it can help us improve our current condition” (73). At that point, the issue of human enhancement by new technologies is related to human nature.

[conservative and restrained voices] all share the concern that biotechnological development will alter human nature in a way that will incur serious negative consequences. In contrast, those who welcome radical technologies, even such as may transform our nature, tend to see this nature either as something needing change to reach fulfillment or as an altogether problematic concept. These people, many excited by the idea of being “posthuman”, believer the wondrous benefits will outweigh any risks and advocate social, political and scientific freedom to pursue this brave new world (Suarez, 74).

Ethical theories, therefore, are still valid and important to consider when we adopt new technologies.

To preserve human nature from transhuman, in terms of practical and prescriptive conception, their use is to be restricted, even though some people strongly desire to have freedom or right to choose to be smarter or stronger. That is to establish the first and firm principle as human nature. But this is not enough to resolve the basic problem of 'what is human nature, and which of these characteristics are agreeable by to all sides of the debate?' Of human nature, it is important to note that the conservative and the progressive require different notions of freedom, rights, etc. For advocates of its modification and enhancement, for example, "intelligence, rationality, self-control and moral excellence" of human nature are enhanced and improved in humanity and human dignity; Among opponents of it, however, there is agreement "that humans are imbued with a given or sacred essence or soul"(Wilson and Haslam, 250-253). The former argues that human nature is dynamic, still evolving, so that enhancement can improve human identity, while the latter it is given and fixed, so that any enhancement can have a loss of humanness (256). Therefore, whether or not human nature is enhanced is in the moral judgment of right or wrong following those different views. The former would be right if the latter is wrong of any actions for human enhancement.

Meanwhile, in the ontological and descriptive approach to the relationship between human and AI robotics, it is obvious that robots are agents to which even human minds can be transferred in networks and communications. As Campebell, et als, describes, for

example, that is a form of “human–machine integration”, “it stands as a kind of far point in anticipating potential developments in the dreams of human–machine mergers that possess unique ethical and metaphysical implications” (Campebell, et als., 235). Even a sort of the form can be beyond physical conditions like some characters in SF movies.

Imagine that you have your own avatar (*Avatar*, 2009) or surrogate (*Surrogates*, 2009). Both are activated as the agents of human beings, strictly speaking, as the forms of human–machine integration in the network, even though their goals are totally different in each movie.

In *Avatar*, it is asked that a being of avatar with the appearance of the Návi is neither a robot nor a human. But it is undeniable that it is designed and does act as an artificial device and an agent for the communication of humans with the members of the Návi. In particular, the avatar under the control of a human is to get a new and differentiated life from humans in the network and communication of the Návi, even though the resource that enables humans to communicate with them is human consciousness not the avatar. This shows an ontological and existential imagination that through the avatar human consciousness, spirit and life can be connected with totally different beings from humans. But it seems not beyond the true life. In the end of the movie, potential relationship between human life and the Návi through the avatar of a human causes the transformation of the human into one of the Návi, to realize the true value of life that it is equally worthy. Concerning the ontological position of the avatar, as seen in the

categories of robots (Veruggio and Operto, 4), it becomes the independent and different species to get its own right, while it had been developed to communicate with (exactly, to conquer) the Návi.

In *Surrogates*, there is a similar feature of the connection between humans and artificial agents like the avatars in *Avatars*, but different is that surrogates are just robots activated in the networks of real humans. That is to say, these devices mediate human relations, not relationship between humans and non-human beings. In the movie, we, humans, just stay at bed connected into the network that enables our surrogates communicated with other surrogates. In this society, any relationship among real humans is much weaker, dangerous and trustless than that among their own surrogates. Necessary are devices and systems with which humans can be connected in the network. In the end, the value and meaning of the true life is lost. Here is the ontological and existential question: where will we find the true humanity? Even though surrogates are activated by the orders of humans and their actions are socialized, the true humanity is formed in meeting face to face that have interrelationship between real people. In other words, surrogates are the biggest obstacles in the true interrelationship of humans.

Concerning the potential relationship between humans and robotics in future, it seems to be a two-fold problem. To realize the true humanity and human dignity, we will choose one of robotics that enables human spirits and lives to be transformed into new species or that should be eliminated to pervade human existence through human face to face interactions. In terms of bioethics, those two motives above give us at least the importance of

ontological and existential reflection on the true humanity and the value of life based on the conception of relationship. This means that we attempt to prepare for certain new views of bioethics for future generations. Since robotics has been advanced, it is conceivable for any kind of coexistence between humans and AI robotics to go even beyond our expectation. Therefore, the new form of relationship between them is to consider one of issues challenged in the moral education of bioethics.

IV. How to teach the coexistence between human and AI robotics in the moral education of bioethics?

Now this is the final question to be considered for the next generations: how do we prepare for the challenging perspective of coexistence or relationship between humans and AI robotics? This is also closely related to the definition of bioethics, literally, 'ethics of life'. If so, whose life is dealt with? According to Campbell, the concern of bioethics is originally "about the morality of doctors and other health care workers, but as science and technology have opened up a myriad of possibilities for changing human life" (Campbell, 1). At that point, the appearance of AI robotics, its invasion of human beings, and their coexistence enables us to return to moral subjects of life in education.

As seen above, the moral status of robots is exactly dependent on the utilization of humans like as moral agents, quasi-autonomous beings or even new species. It is still arguable, however, whether or

not the robots have moral rights. To use Buchanan's words,

[A] being has moral standing if it counts morally, in its own right. For Bentham, sentient beings count morally in their own right. For Kant, only persons, beings with the capacity for practical rationality, have moral standing. On both views, moral standing is not a comparative notion. Two beings can both have moral standing, but one may be of a higher moral status (Buchanan, 209-210).

Without any connection of robotics with humans, it seems impossible that AI robots have moral standing. But in the scheme of Buchanan above, it is arguable that AI robots, for example, with human emotions and social care for humans can have moral standing, only if they are the copies of practical rationality. This means that the ontological conceptions of those kinds of AI robots should be grasped only under the interconnection and interaction with humans. In addition, the related features of AI robotics to humans make it imagined that AI robots with communicative functions and emotions are beyond just machines to enhance human abilities.

Fortunately, it is absolute that the moral status of human beings is the highest. This does not mean that only humans are justified to control other beings, but that humanity and human dignity are respected and realized for the interconnection with them. We, humans, are related to all beings and essentially interact with them. At that point, it is also necessary to imagine that we live with AI robotics in the existential interconnection. To prepare for the future,

therefore, the moral education of bioethics is basically to consider our relationship of AI robotics that can do quasi-autonomous judgments and emotional conversations.

In the moral education, in particular, the most important task is to recognize the concept of relationship. In the moral subject curriculum of Korea, its constituting principle is the four dimensions of interweaving relationship: to oneself, to others, to society-community, and nature-transcendence (Korean Ministry of Education, 7). In this course, the main issues of bioethics are usually in the relationship of I (as a moral agent) to nature-transcendence. In the level of the elementary school, it cherishes and protects human life and nature, loves the true beauty and moral life, and has positive attitudes to moral life, based on the virtue of responsibility. In the level of the middle school, it aims at sustainable future through eco-friendly life and the ethical use of technology and pursues the meaning of life and death and the peace of mind through ethical reflection. That is the common content of bioethics in compulsory education. In the textbook *Living and Ethics* of the high school, the themes of bioethics, including technology and nature, are considered in the sections of 'life and ethics' and of 'science and ethics'. These sections deal with more serious issues and ethical dilemmas like cloning, gene manipulation, animal experiments and animal rights by the development of bio-technology (8-14).

Concerning any relationship between humans and AI robotics, it is not one of the crucial topics in the course. In that one of main goals in moral education is to protect unexpected dilemmas in future, however, it is argued that moral textbooks or curriculums have the

perspectives of future life in which moral agents have any relationship to AI robots. Since ethical existence has been developed in relationship, all things in the interconnection with humans or sentient beings have moral standings and differentiated moral status. In addition, as seen in *Avatar* and *Surrogates*, it is expected that potential relationships and coexistence between humans and AI robotics be interconnected with the conception of nature—transcendence or be returned to the true humanity. At the moment, various utilization of AI robotics in practices might make it natural to be seen as one of partners in future.

How to teach potential relationship between humans and AI robotics, nevertheless, should be under the control of our moral thinking as we, humans, have the highest moral status. It is not about how to testify our super power over all beings and lives, but about how to be the moral agents of responsibility in future challenges,

we are the only species with language, and art, and music, and religion, and humor, and the ability to imagine the time before our birth and after our death, and the ability to plan projects that take centuries to unfold, and the ability to create, defend, revise, and live by, codes of conduct, and—sad to say—to wage war on a global scale. The ability of our brains to help us see into the future, thanks to the culture we impart to our young, so far surpasses that of any other species, that it gives us the powers that in turn gives us the responsibilities of moral agents. Noblesse oblige. We are the only species that can know enough about the world to be reasonably held responsible for protecting its precious treasures. And who on earth could hold us responsible? only ourselves. Some

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other species—the dolphins and the other great apes—exhibit fascinating signs of proto-morality, a capacity to cooperate and to care about others, but we persons are the only animals that can conceive of the project of leading a good life (Dennett, 45).

It is in doubt, therefore, to establish the fixed and unquestionable principle that enables us to prescribe any new relationship. Rather, it seems more urgent to prepare for advanced approaches to the coexistence between humans and AI robotics, including a respect for the intrinsic value of all lives. Fundamentally, moral education of potential relationship in bioethics needs a way to exchange “many views on the part of different actors. This is ‘dialogue procedure’ of bioethical reality, which can be resolved through discussion and agreement” (Solinis, 8). On the ground of humanity, not of anthropocentrism, we will continue to make critical thoughts and decisions on what kinds of robots be produced and how to be interconnected.

V. Conclusion

Is it just imagined or impossible to confirm that we humans are going to coexist with AI robots? Even though we are moral agents of responsibility in the network of human relationship, there is another agent like us, AI robots. By the rapid advance of technology and robotics, these robots can feel human-like emotions, communicate with humans, take care of human patients, enhance human

abilities, and invade human bodies and spirits. As the starting point of this study, at the moment, AI robotics is to cause controversy of the relationship between humans (for example, human patients) and AI robots (for example, social care robots).

Without any human caregivers or nurses, AI robots have abilities to do simple actions for human patients; conversely, the human patients (or the old people) feel more comfortable and safety through AI robots' supports than human care. Therefore, the real and basic issue in bioethics related to technology in future is not the problem of using machine in life, but the perspective of potential relationship between humans and AI robotics.

In this paper, I would pay attention to two features: the relationship to nature–transcendence in *Avatar* and to the true existence in *Surrogates*. In the ontological and existential view, the former gives us another task to define AI robots as independent species and the latter enables us to reflect the understanding of human dignity and the true human face to face. In the prescriptive and normative view, it is arguable whether or not both are justified in terms of the enhancement and improvement of human nature. Therefore, it is noticeable that there are two dimensions in considering the interconnection of humans with AI robotics.

As preliminary to new future life, it is necessary to deal with the potential relationship between humans and AI robotics in the moral education of bioethics. In particular, the curriculum of moral education in Korea is based on the conception of relationship to oneself, to others, to society–community, and to nature–transcendence. Considering the advance of robotics nowadays, it is never mere

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fantasy to envision a meaningful relationship between humans and AI robotics. At least, it is time to deal with the perspective of any new relationship in the moral education of bioethics. And the most effective way in moral education is to establish the critical foundation by dialogue procedure that students discuss and agree in complicated bioethical issues and dilemmas.

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■ Key words

AI robotics, *Avatar* and *Surrogates*, humanity, human nature, relationship, moral education.

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Bioethics, Moral Education, and the Potential Relationship between Humans and AI robotics in the Future :

Utilizing the motives of *Avatar* and *Surrogates*

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This paper aims to explore the potential relationship between humans and AI robotics and to suggest its challenge to the moral education of bioethics. To understand the advance of new technologies and AI robotics, I would utilize the motives of *Avatar* and *Surrogates*. In the ontological and existential view, the former gives us another task to define AI robots as independent species and the latter enables us to reflect the understanding of human dignity and the true human face to face. In the prescriptive and normative view, it is arguable whether or not both are justified in terms of the enhancement and improvement of human nature. At that point, the real and basic issue in the moral education of bioethics related to technology in future is not the problem of using machine in life, but the perspective of potential relationship between humans and AI robotics. In Korea, the curriculum of moral education is based on the conception of relationship to oneself, to others, to society-community, and to nature-transcendence. It is time to deal with the perspective of any new relationship in the moral education of bioethics to

establish the critical foundation by a dialogue procedure in which students discuss and agree in complicated bioethical issues and dilemmas.

■ Key Words

AI robotics, *Avatar* and *Surrogates*, humanity, human nature, relationship, moral education.

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



Dissolving Boundaries* :

Ethical Issues Surrounding Powered Prosthesis from Analyzing the Cybathlon and Advanced Prosthetic Technologies

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I . Introduction

A noticeable championship, called ‘the Cybathlon’ will be held in Zürich, Swiss on 8th October 2016 for the first time. Cybathlon is a neologism of ‘cyborg’ and suffix ‘-athlon’ from ancient Greek ‘âthlos(contest)’, signifying ‘cyborg contest’. Cyborg is a short term for ‘cybernetic organism’, which means a person who has electronic or bionic prosthesis. Although the Cybathlon is a championship for disabled athletes, it is not regarded as ‘the Paralympic Games’ which is held every two years after the Summer and Winter Olympic Games by ‘able-bodied’ athletes. Both the Paralympic Games and the Cybathlon are for athletes with a range of physical disabilities. However the main focus of this contest is not only the disabilities

* This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government.
(NRF-2014S1A5B8063466)

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but also the latest assistive technologies such as powered prosthesis, sensor technology, exoskeleton, 3D printing, mechanical engineering, biological engineering, and the Internet of Things(IoT).

There are six disciplines in the 2016 Cybathlon: 'Brain-Computer Interface Race', 'Functional Electrical Stimulation(FES) Bike Race', 'Powered Arm Prosthesis Race', 'Powered Leg Prosthesis Race', 'Powered Exoskeleton Race' and 'Powered Wheelchair Race'. In those six games, we will pay attention to the powered arm and leg prosthesis race as well as the powered exoskeleton race. These three disciplines are designed to use a prosthetic solution, which is attached on a human body functioning like a lost or damaged human body part while maintaining external human appearance. The bio-signals like eye movement, brain waves or electromyogram signal are used for the interaction systems of this equipments. (Jung 527)

In this study, we will analyze the newly organized cyborg contest to research up-to-date prosthetic technologies and trends. Also, the prospect of prosthesis will be analogized. In addition, we will encounter some ethical issues about post-human beings with human body-shaped prosthetic equipment, which could rehabilitate disabled people and even in some case could enhance non-disabled-humans' performances. The meaning of disabilities in this study is restricted within physical disabilities and thus excludes mental disabilities.

If a disabled person with the help of advanced technology could be even faster, more accurate, more powerful and more beautiful than a non-disabled person, then we can ask non-disabled people to use prostheses for the better performance or better appearance. The boundaries between the disabilities and the non-disabilities will be

dissolved by modern prosthetic technologies.

The aim of this study is to raise ideal ethical questions about enhancing human performance or appearance with powered prostheses in order to find the possibilities of dissolving boundaries through prosthetic devices. When presenting ethical questions properly, we could also expect the optimal solutions and answers in the near future.

II . Cybathlon and Prosthesis

2.1. Analysis on Prosthesis

Prostheses have been used over tens of thousands of years. The origins of prosthesis derive from a geographic diversity of advanced civilizations, such as India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Preliminary applications were oriented both toward restoration of function and cosmetic appearance (LeMoyné 2). Ironically military demands were a huge engine to develop the prosthetic technologies. Between minefields, booby traps, gunshot wounds and tropical infections, the loss of limbs is an inevitable part of war. (Rawlinson) There were always big demands for advanced prosthetic technologies after every war. For example, for the first time scientists attempted to apply engineering techniques derived from military–industrial research to veterans artificial limbs. In late August 1945, just two weeks after the World War 2, Paul E. Klopsteg, chairman of the National Research Council's Committee on Prosthetic Device, announced a

research program into ‘power-driven’ artificial limb that resembled the ‘real thing’ by ‘introducing power, either hydraulic, pneumatic, or electric’, to prosthetic limbs. (Ott et al. 55, Ball)

The robot technology is also a good patron of modern prosthesis. Recently mechanical-, bionic-, sensor-, wireless-, and powered technology as well as artificial intelligence (A.I) have made prosthesis smarter and stronger. The powered machine and A.I. ‘can share resources’, ‘are accurate, eidetic and photographic memory’, and ‘can always do their best’. So the powered prosthesis is not subsidiary anymore, but it could exceed human performance. (Kurzweil 351) In the Cybathlon we could notice these advanced prosthetic technologies.

2.2. About Cybathlon and Prosthetic Technologies

The Cybathlon is devised by Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETH Zurich) and by professor Robert Riener at Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Robotics. The Cybathlon is aiming at ‘academic and industrial co-research’, at ‘promoting discussion between developers and disabilities’ and finally at ‘giving robotic assistive aids also to the general public’. The Cybathlon is a form of a small athletic contest, but a scientific symposium will be held as well to present and to discuss recent technological advances of the latest in assistive devices. (Homepage Cybathlon/About us)

We are focusing on ‘Powered Arm Race’, ‘Powered Leg Race’ and ‘Powered Exoskeleton Race’ in the Cybathlon. These three events

are using prosthetic methods to replicate function of lost limbs or lower limbs. Each race has various participants (teams) from many countries and in a team there are at least one technology provider, who supports a prosthetic device and one handicapped pilot, who wears and controls the prosthesis and the pilot should have defined lesion or amputation. (Cybahlon 1) Each race is finished for a pilot if she/he has solved (or failed) each task of the six tasks or if the time limit is reached. To rank the pilots, first of all, the number of solved tasks is determinative. Each task has a different difficulty and requires a lower or higher challenge to be solved. Thus, to rank pilots that have solved an equal number of tasks, the task challenge points will be determinative. (Cybahlon 3) The pilots are asked to solve as many tasks as possible within a given time limit. Most tasks represent everyday activities, like sitting down and standing up, walking, running, carrying bags or cutting bread. (Cybathlon 13–47)

In the Cybathlon many cutting-edge technologies are allowed, e.g. body powered system, surface or implanted electrode systems, sensory or motor nerves, actively driven (powered) joints, electronic and/or mechanical connection to the prosthesis, input device or automated gait intention detection systems, any type of actuation, functional electrical stimulation systems and hybrid systems. These days powered prosthesis with IoT, 3D Printing, tactile intelligence, sensor technologies can make the disabled athletes locomote, perform and live like their able-bodied counterparts.

III. Meaning of Cyathlon

3.1. An Alternative Plan for Dissolving Boundaries Between Disabled Olympic Games and Non-disabled Olympic Games

The perception of dividing people is usually focused on differences rather than equality. At first, this dividing process starts with simple differentiation, e.g. someone is short or tall. Then, this plain value-neutral difference is gradually distinguished by more complex and discriminative appearance or status of people. This distinction makes people divided into 'disabled', 'elderly' or 'foreigners' and the difference between this groups (or grouping) becomes or seems to be untouchable and unconquerable in a daily basis.

While we have been studying people or making strategies for people, we have formed a particular group of people, so-called 'disabled'. This distinction makes the different rules and strategies that are separately applied to non-disabled and disabled people. The original purpose of this division was intended to help people with disabilities and enhance the quality of their lives. However, the division unintentionally seems to be completed by making a contrasting laws, organizations and facilities for the purpose of isolating them. Unlike the original intentions, this distinction, people with disabilities and their able-bodied counterparts, has strengthened the discrimination against people with disabilities. The dichotomy between disabled and non-disabled people may not properly express the variety (types and levels) of disabilities, furthermore the dichotomy implies the assumption that they are already different. It

will be able to be classified according to the problem faced by each of the individual rather than to distinguish according to the status as disabled and non-disabled people to improve the awareness of people with disabilities. Another solution is to vary the characteristics of the human through the new classification, such as cyborg. The Cybathlon is a good example of the latter.

In the Cybathlon, there are alternative good reasons to mitigate the boundaries of disabled and non-disabled people in two aspects. The first one is that the technical group and the wearer (disability) are participating in the contest together. This is a cooperative game with the person, who wears a prosthesis and who have developed the device, such as an artificial limb. If a certain team wins, the medals will be awarded to both the developer and the wearer.

The second one is that the Cybathlon could give a chance to sort people by the participants of an event, not by the typical conditional group of people, alike 'disabled' and 'non-disabled' people. Then, the point of view could be changed from the object (the same group of people) to the pure event (the art of game). A good paragon is the South African sprint runner, Oscar Pistorius, who was the first athlete to compete at both Paralympic and Olympic Games with artificial limbs. In other words, people with disabilities could join the game with the help of high technological prosthesis. Furthermore, we can imagine that not only the athletes with disabilities, but also non-disabled athletes could be supported equally by high technical prosthesis or exoskeleton, if it gives them a better performance.

According to the development stage of the prosthetic technologies,

it would be an unfair competition for people with disabilities or non-disabilities. If the prosthesis is not advanced enough compared to the body part of non-disabilities, the game will be harder for the players with disabilities, however if the prosthesis is sufficient, the competition will be tough for the non-disabled players. Depending on the technology development of body implants, it will be detrimental to the game with disabilities or non-disabilities. There would be also a big meaning, if science and technology make non-disabled people disadvantageous.

After all, the evolution of these implant body gives possibilities to be provided with a new opportunity on the inborn body. It can also alleviate the distinction between disabled and non-disabled people. But on the other hand there will be also a big risk, that eventually the worth of the body could be dependent on capital. Earlier, Bertolt Meyer raised several interesting questions about prostheses, i.e. "who is entitled to prostheses that have the price-tag of a luxury car?", "Soldiers who lose limbs while serving get the latest technology, but what about civilians who lose an arm in a car accident?". (Weired) In fact, the use of technology cannot be separated from capital. However, not only the technology but also most everything nowadays is related to capital market. The positive side of technology must not be overlooked and what we need is another debates about fairness and equality.

3.2. The Change of Evaluation Standards

Let's assume that we have two photos of Audrey Hepburn. One

photo pictured young Audrey Hepburn and the other one did old Audrey Hepburn. What happens, if we show these two photos to people and ask them which Audrey Hepburn do they prefer or think more beautiful. Many people will answer that old Audrey Hepburn is also beautiful.

Is it really true? Is the old Audrey Hepburn more beautiful than the young Audrey Hepburn? The favorable judgment to the old Audrey Hepburn maybe not caused only by her appearance, but due to other values which were acquired a posteriori instead of getting old look. It is not immoral to judge a person by appearance, but it is wrong to judge people only by appearance. The appearance could be one of the parameter, but not absolute one.

Like the appearance, disability is only one of the inconvenience that a person must endure, but everyone even a non-disability has some sort of inconvenience to endure. It is said that, being physically disable could be inconvenient compared to non-disabled people. However, evaluation standards for the human should have diversity. If the standards are diversified, alienated humans will be reduced. Partial physical weakness would not automatically lead to weakness in another aspect.

3.3. Bodies and Prostheses by Functional Perspective

A student, named JC who studied art has lost an arm from an accident. The new prosthetic technology has presented him with a artificial hand, which can tattoo. The prosthetic arm was made by French artist JL Gonzal, who used an existing prosthesis as the

base of the arm, before he added the metal and tattoo machine, allowing it to easily be picked up and used as needed by the artist. It's incredible how steadily JC is able to use the machine – so much so that he's even able to absolutely ace realism. (Metro) A human hand, like one a currently non-disabled people has, is excellent in terms of performing complex and multiple tasks compared to a prosthetic hand. But the single functional prosthetic hand, like the tattoo prosthesis, could be excel in comparison with a human hand. Also Professor Hugh Hurr at MIT, who is a rock climber, engineer and biophysicist, had to be amputated below both his knees by an accident during climbing, but by using specialized prostheses, Herr climbed at a more advanced level than he had before the accident. (Osius)

We can predict that the future technology could realize a more dominant prosthesis than a human hand. The original body will present as a basic form, and prostheses will replace or complement to the original body part for therapeutic, aesthetic enhancement or functional improvements. The features and role of our body itself will be expanded with the help of future technology.

IV. Conclusion

Nowadays almost every human body is composed not only of flesh and bones, but also of many foreign materials such as silicon, plastic, contact lenses, artificial heart valves, hairpiece and artificial tooth. (Shim 178) Like these foreign materials, the modern prosthetic

technologies are dissolving boundaries between people with disabilities and able-bodied counterparts. Elise Roy, as a disability rights lawyer and design thinker said “When we design for disability first, you often stumble upon solutions that are better than those when we design for the norm. When we design for disability, we all benefit.” (IEET) Engineers, inventors and designers are making better prostheses for disabilities, but these could help everyone in the near future. The representative instance is the elevator. Although elevators were installed for rights of disabilities' or senior citizens' mobility, many people use the elevators these days as well.

In general dominant ethical debates that appear in bioethics and human-related enhancement are reliability, authenticity and autonomy. Reliability and autonomy are the question of being safe and controllable. In this discussion, a debate of authenticity will have major significance. We can raise a question on authenticity: ‘if a person with a powered-prosthesis sets a better record, should we admit it?’ The ethical issues raised by this debates are left to the next challenge.

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■ Key words

Cyathlon, Cyborg, Ethical Issue, Powered Prosthesis, Dissolving Boundaries

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■ Abstract

**Dissolving Boundaries:
Ethical Issues Surrounding Powered Prosthesis from
Analyzing the Cybathlon and Advanced Prosthetic
Technologies**

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The first Cybathlon will be held in October 2016 and this contest is designed for developing prosthetic technologies. In this study, we analyzed the Cybathlon and from this analysis we researched advanced prosthetic technologies. In addition, we ascertained some ethical issues about post-human beings with prosthetic equipment, which could rehabilitate disabled people and even serve to enhance non-disabled people.

Disability is only one of the inconveniences that a person must endure, but everyone has some sort of inconvenience to endure. We found the possibilities of dissolving boundaries between people with disabilities and their able-bodied counterparts through the Cybathlon and prosthetic devices. The features and role of our body itself will be expanded with the help of these future technologies. Engineers, inventors and designers are making better prostheses for disabilities, but these could help not only disabled people but also every non-disabled people. The dominant ethical debates that

appear in bioethics and human-related enhancement are reliability, authenticity and autonomy. Reliability and autonomy are the question of being safe and controllable. In this study, we want to raise a question on authenticity: 'if a person with a powered-prosthesis sets a better record, should we admit it?'

■ Key Words

Cyathlon, Cyborg, Ethical Issue, Powered Prosthesis, Dissolving Boundaries

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



Species membership in claiming rights :

Critique of Elizabeth Anderson's essay “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life”

Hwang, Hyun-Kyu

I. Introduction

In this paper, I am going to criticize the claim that species membership matters in deciding what rights one can claim, which is a claim made by Elizabeth Anderson in her essay, “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life.” In the essay, she makes two main points. The first is that species membership matters in deciding whether one can claim positive right to human provision, and the second is that species membership matters in deciding whether one can claim negative right to life¹⁾. In this paper, I will focus on

1) Elizabeth Anderson claims that it is unreasonable to demand a moral agent to recognize negative right to life to creatures who cannot form reciprocal relations with the agent, and have interests that are very harmful to the agent. Since some nonhuman animals incapable of reciprocity have interests that are very harmful to humans, Anderson claims that it is unreasonable to demand a moral agent to recognize negative right to life to these nonhuman animals. Anderson goes onto (implicitly) claim that human beings are capable of reciprocity or do not have interests that are very harmful to other

criticizing her first claim about the relationship between species membership and positive right to human provision.

Justification for her first claim is that only members of 'our' group has positive right to the group's provision while beings who are not included in 'our' group cannot claim positive right to the group's provision. Since species difference decides who gets to be included in 'our' group and who gets left out, Anderson concludes that species membership decides who can claim positive right to human provision. I will claim that Anderson's premise that species difference decides who gets to be included in 'our' group is unjustified. I will also claim that even if we grant that this premise is true (after modifying the premise), the structure of Anderson's argument would force her to accept a ridiculous conclusion. Since Anderson would not be able to agree with this ridiculous conclusion, I conclude that Anderson's claim that species membership makes difference in who gets positive right to human provision is unjustified.

II. Speciesism and Elizabeth Anderson

In the animal rights literature, one of the most crucial debates is

humans. Anderson claims that, therefore, it is reasonable to demand a moral agent to recognize negative right to life to human beings. Anderson concludes that this argument shows that difference in species membership makes a difference in deciding who gets negative right to life. In this paper, I will not delve into Anderson's claims on the relationship between negative right to life and species membership.

centered on the issue of 'speciesism,' Peter Singer defines the word speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species." (Singer, 2002:6) The term speciesism is often used alongside the term racism to support the claim that just as racism is unjustified, speciesism is also unjustified. As Jennifer Hurley eloquently states, the "belief that humans are inherently superior to all other living things is not so different from a white supremacist's assertion that whites are a superior race and thus entitled to dominate other races." (Hurley, 1999:25) Hurley is claiming that just as difference in skin color cannot make a difference in who is superior, difference in species membership cannot make a difference in who is superior.

But is this claim true? Could not there be a significant difference between species (e.g. human vs. dolphin) that makes it the case that difference in species membership does make a difference in who is superior? Richard Bulliet writes that when "[a]sked today what separates humans from animals, most people raised in western cultures include in their reply some or all of the following: speech, reason, large brains, upright posture (bipedalism), the opposable thumb, the use of tools, cooked food, cooperative social life, or the prolonged nurturing of young." (Bulliet, 2005:47) Could one or more of these differences between humans and nonhuman animals (or these differences between species *Homo sapiens* and other species) make it the case that difference in species membership makes a difference in who is superior?

Elizabeth Anderson says 'yes' to this question. To be more

precise, Anderson claims that difference in species membership makes differences in what rights one can claim.²⁾ Anderson claims in her essay “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life” that some people are “mistaken in equating speciesism with racism,” (Sunstein& Nussbaum, 2004:289) Anderson claims that even though skin color does not make a difference in what rights one can claim, difference in species membership does.

My thesis paper is going to criticize Anderson for making this unjustified conclusion. I am going to claim that Anderson has failed to justify her conclusion in her essay, and therefore until she comes up with another argument, there is no reason to believe that species membership makes a difference in who gets which rights. My thesis is mainly focused on criticizing Anderson's claim that species membership makes a difference in who can claim positive right to human provision (Anderson also makes the claim that species membership makes a difference in who can claim negative right, but I will not deal with her arguments on negative right in this paper). I am going to conclude by claiming that her arguments are unjustified

2) Even though talk of giving nonhuman animals some set of ‘rights’ is deemed as natural to Anderson, not everyone agrees with her on this position. As Gary Francione states, “[a]lthough virtually all modern animal advocates describe their various positions as embodying ‘rights’ views in their fund-raising literature and in the media, many leaders of the movement now explicitly dismiss the importance of rights notions.” (Francione, 1996:32) As can be seen from this statement, giving nonhuman animals ‘rights’ is a very controversial issue in its own right. But I will not focus on this debate in my present paper, and would assume that giving nonhuman animals some set of rights is natural and acceptable as Anderson claims.

and therefore that Anderson has not succeeded in justifying her conclusion that species membership makes a difference in who gets positive rights.

III. Positive right to human provision

(1) Peter Singer vs. Elizabeth Anderson

Having the positive right to human provision means that a being has a right to be nurtured and taken care of by other human beings. To know exactly what Anderson's position is on this issue of the positive right to human provision, we should first examine the position taken by Peter Singer. Both Peter Singer and Elizabeth Anderson agree that wild animals, such as dolphin, do not have the positive right to human provision while human infants have positive right to human provision. But they have different views concerning why dolphins do not have positive right to human provision while human infants do have the positive right to human provision. Singer claims that what humans are obligated

“to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do: concern for the well-being of children growing up in America would require that we teach them to read; concern for the well-being of pigs may require no more than that we leave them with other pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room to run freely. But the basic element - the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those interests may be - must,

according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.” (Singer, 2002:5)

Singer's main point is that dolphin's interest should count as just as valuable as that of human's. John Kleinig also agrees with Singer, claiming that he “believe[s] rights—possession to be grounded in interests, and it is clear that in some intelligible sense animals possess interests. All animals have a welfare that may be advanced or threatened, and to that extent it is in their interests that certain conditions prevail.” (Kleinig, 1991:109) Kleinig is also echoing Singer's claim that animals' interests should give birth to rights to preserve and promote those interests. But that does not mean that dolphins should have all the rights that humans have. For example, it would be preposterous for someone to claim that dolphins should be given the right to vote. This is not because dolphins are morally inferior, but because dolphins have no interest in voting. But dolphins do have interest in not suffering just as human infants do. As Elisa Aaltola claims that “it is quite possible that, based on their unique cognitive abilities and senses, animals are capable of types of suffering human beings cannot fathom.” (Aaltola, 2012:20) Singer, therefore, would claim that dolphins have right not to suffer just as human infants do.

Using this argument in the case of the positive right to human provision, we can see Singer's argument more clearly. Singer claims that dolphins have no interest in human provision while infants have interest in human provision. Therefore, dolphins do not have positive right to human provision while human infants do. What is

important in Singer's argument is that species membership has no impact on determining who has positive right to human provision. Dolphins are not deprived of the positive right to human provision because they are dolphins (and therefore not included in species *Homo sapiens*). Dolphins do not have the positive right to human provision because they do not have interest in human provision. Thus, Peter Singer, with this argument, concludes that difference in species membership does not make difference in who can claim positive right to human provision.

Anderson, of course, disagrees with Singer's argument. Anderson agrees with Singer in that only human infants, but not dolphins, have the positive right to human provision. But the reasoning for this claim is different from that of Singer. Anderson starts her reasoning by hypothesizing a situation in which dolphins do develop an interest in human provision. She asks us to imagine a situation in which a "particular pod of dolphins in the ocean would starve if we did not feed them, due to a sudden collapse of their usual sources of food." (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284) Anderson claims that even in this type of situation, dolphins do not have the positive right to human provision. Anderson claims that what this shows is that even if dolphins do have interest in human provision, dolphins cannot claim positive right to human provision. Anderson claims that dolphins do not have positive right to human provision even when they have interests in human provision when she states that "[e]nvironmentalists might take an interest in feeding the dolphins, to preserve a valuable participant in the oceanic ecosystem. But this is an attitude toward a collective (the whole pod) that does not

necessarily extend to each dolphin in the pod. This would remain so even if we had a moral *obligation* to preserve the species... Out of sympathy, we might also want to feed the dolphins. But this is not the same as according each dolphin a specific moral right to our provision.” (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284)

Anderson claims that the reason dolphins do not have positive right to human provision is not that dolphins do not have interest in human provision. The reason dolphins do not have positive right to human provision is that dolphins are not ‘our’ member from the perspective of human society. She claims that an “essential commitment of any society is the collective provision of goods to its members.” (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284) She goes onto claim that being “born to a member of society does make one a member of that society.” (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284) What she is claiming here is that a society has the obligation to provide right to provision for its own members, but has no obligation to provide right to provision for members outside the group (which is equivalent to saying that only members of the society has positive right to the group's provision). And since human infants are born as members of human society, human infants ‘are’ members of human society while dolphins ‘are not’ members of human society since dolphins are not born to a human society. Thus, she concludes that human infants have positive right to human provision because, from the perspective of human society, human infants are ‘our’ members, while dolphins do not have positive right to human provision because dolphins are not ‘our’ members. To see her argument more clearly, I will reconstruct her argument in the following way:

1. 'Our' member has the positive right to the group's provision while beings that are not 'our' member do not have positive right to the group's provision.
2. (From the perspective of human society) Human infant is 'our' member, while dolphins are not.

Conclusion: Human infants have positive right to human (or human group's) provision while dolphins do not.

I will claim that premise 2 is unjustified. I will also claim that even if we grant that premise 2 is justified after modifying the premise 2, premise 1 forces Anderson to accept a ridiculous conclusion. Since Anderson would not be able to accept that ridiculous conclusion, I will claim that this argument does not work, which means that Anderson's conclusion (that human infants have positive right to human provision while dolphins do not) does not follow. I will conclude by claiming that Anderson is not justified in claiming that species membership makes difference in who gets positive right to human provision.

(2) Criticizing Anderson's premise 2

Let us first take a look at premise 2. Premise 2 says that (from the perspective of human society/group) human infant is 'our' member while dolphin is not 'our' member. How does Anderson justify such a premise? Anderson claims that premise 2 is justified because being born to a society makes one a member of that society. Since human infant is born to a human society, that automatically

makes the infant a member of the human society. She states that there is a “species-specific moral entitlement that humans have: *automatic* inclusion in human society, with the positive rights that accompany this.” (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284) In this regard, Anderson claims that infant is ‘our’ member (which means that infant is a member of ‘our’ society, which is human society). By the same logic, dolphins are not ‘our’ members because dolphins are not born to a human society. When we combine this premise with premise 1, we do get the conclusion that human infant has positive right to human provision while dolphins do not. David DeGrazia describes a view that is similar to what we have just seen from Anderson's view. This view asserts that “[h]umans are different from animals simply on account of being human – that is, member of *Homo sapiens* species. By definition, this species difference is a fact that uniquely identifies all and only humans, and it is morally important. It is not that some trait associated with normal members of the species – such as rationality or moral agency – grounds unique moral status; simply being human does.” (DeGrazia, 2002: 23) As you can see, Anderson is certainly not alone in claiming that difference in species membership does make a difference in who gets what kind of moral treatment, or in this case, positive right to human provision.

I will criticize Anderson by claiming that premise 2 is unjustified. It is unjustified because there is no reason why we must divide the groups or societies along the lines of species. David DeGrazia agrees with me when he states that the

“claim that falling within a certain genetic range (being a member of our species) is necessary and sufficient for full consideration is just exceedingly odd, especially when we consider the presumably gradual emergence of new species from old. Assuming that *Homo erectus* is the species from which we evolved, it seems highly arbitrary to suggest that if some members of that hominid species somehow survived today, their interests would deserve less consideration than the interests of all *Homo sapiens*. Indeed, a clear genetic line between “them” and “us” is more something to draw than something to find. There was no magic moment when *Homo erectus* mutated into *Homo sapiens*.” (DeGrazia, 1996:58)

Here, we can see that David DeGrazia is claiming that dividing up the groups along the lines of species is odd and unjustified. We can just as legitimately divide the groups by genus, phylum, kingdom, or even biosphere. Ronald Sandler also agrees with me, claiming that group membership divided by species is, morally speaking, arbitrary. He states that

“[t]he same is true of species membership. Members of the species *Homo sapiens* really are biologically different from those who are not members of the species, and there is a genetic explanation for this. But that is not sufficient to establish that it is a nonarbitrary basis for moral status differentiation, any more than it is for skin color or sex. *Homo sapiens* species membership is a justified basis for moral status differentiation only if it constitutes or tracks something morally significant. However, it does neither. There is nothing ethically significant that obtains for all and only members of the species *Homo sapiens*.”(Sandler, 2012:161)

If dividing the groups along the lines of genus, phylum, and kingdom is just as legitimate as dividing the groups along the lines of species, then dolphin can be called one of 'our' members when the groups are divided along the lines of phylum (or subphylum to be more exact) so that all vertebrates form a single group as members in the group of vertebrata. While it is true that human infant is born to a human society, it is also true that human infant is born to a vertebrate society. This makes human infant a member of human society but at the same time a member of vertebrate society. Just as a human society will look at a human infant as 'our' member, a vertebrate society will look at the same infant as 'our' member, too, and rightfully so. Likewise, dolphins are viewed as 'our' member by vertebrate society. Then, dolphins and infants can call each other members of the same group since both are members of the group vertebrates.

Since there is just as legitimacy to the group vertebrates (which is one of the groups divided along the lines of phylum) as there is to the group *Homo sapiens* (which is one of the groups divided along the lines of species), I will claim that Anderson is not justified in calling only infants 'our' member and calling dolphins not 'our' member. This is because even from the perspective of human society, dividing groups along the lines of phylum is just as legitimate as dividing groups along the lines of species. This forces human society to acknowledge that dolphins should legitimately be called 'our' members since dolphins and humans both belong to the phylum (or subphylum) vertebrata. DeGrazia seems to support my view when he states that "why assume that the human/non-human

divide is crucial? Why not consider all hominids plus the Great Apes to occupy the charmed circle? Or all primates? Or mammals? While we're at it, why not all vertebrates? Since species is not the only biologically meaningful grouping, it becomes clear that we must turn away from claims of self-evidence and towards developed arguments for and against equal consideration." (DeGrazia, 2002: 24) Andrew Linzey also echoes the same sentiment when he claims that "saying that we should put humans first because we are human is clearly not an impartial standpoint." (Linzey, 2009:33)

Anderson's premise 2 is unjustified because dolphin is 'our' member just as an infant is 'our' member when we legitimately divide the groups in another way. Richard Ryder puts this point clearly when he claims that "[s]ince Darwin, so I argued, there has been no justification for the moral gulf we impose between ourselves and our evolutionary relations... Considerations of... [S]pecies difference [is] morally irrelevant. What matters morally, we asserted, is the other's distress and pain, regardless of species." (Singer, 2006:89) If what I have argued so far is true, then Anderson's conclusion that only human infants, but not dolphins, have positive rights to human provision is unjustified because it is just as reasonable to claim that just as humans have obligation to provide right to provision for human infants, humans have obligation to provide right to provision for dolphins, too, who are 'our' members when the groups are legitimately divided along the lines of phylum. Mary Midgley also agrees with me when she says that "species-barrier, as we now find, is not even accepted in the same form by all human communities." (Hargrove, 1992:135) With this statement,

Midgley is supporting my view that groups divided along the lines of species is not that clear-cut, and therefore designating dolphins as not 'our' member while designating human infants as 'our' member is not justified. Considering the arguments that have been put forth, I will claim that Anderson's premise 2, which says that (from perspective of human society) human infant is 'our' member while dolphin is not is unjustified.

How would Anderson respond to my criticism? I believe she would have to agree with me that dolphin is 'our' member as much as human infant is 'our' member when the groups are divided along the lines of phylum, and not along the lines of species. Thus, she cannot argue that dolphin can never be called 'our' member. What she could do, though, is to make the argument that the division of the groups should be made along the lines of species because what we are talking about is positive right to 'human' provision. Since 'human' or '*Homo sapiens*' is a group divided along the lines of species, and since we are talking about what positive right a member possesses within that particular group (which is human society), Anderson could argue that only human infants have positive right to 'human' provision, while dolphins do not. She would, thus, agree that if what we were talking about was positive right to 'vertebrate' provision, then the groups should be divided along the lines of phylum, and therefore dolphins and human infants would both be included as 'our' members, and therefore would be able to claim positive right to 'vertebrate' provision. But since this is not the case (because we are talking about positive right to 'human' provision), dolphins cannot be included as 'our' member and

therefore cannot claim positive right to human provision. Thus, the main point made here in Anderson's reply is that dividing along the lines of species is justified in this case, where we are talking about positive right to 'human' provision. Thus, what Anderson can do to make her argument work is to modify the premise 2. Premise 2 originally claims merely that human infant is 'our' member, while dolphins are not, from the perspective of human society. This can be modified to make premise 2 justified.

Premise 2*: (From the perspective of human society) Human infant is 'our' member, while dolphin is not when dividing along the lines of species.

This premise 2* is justified since it is true that human infant is 'our' member, while dolphin is not when dividing along the lines of species because infant and dolphin do belong to different species. And since Anderson has already justified the reason we should divide along the lines of species in this case (this case refers to the case in which we are talking about who gets positive right to 'human' provision), Anderson can claim that combined with premise 1, she could justify her conclusion that only human infants can claim positive right to human provision while dolphins cannot.

At first glance, her reply seems powerful. But I will claim that she faces another problem, which will ultimately force her to give up her argument. I agree that premise 2* is justified. There is no question that only human infant, but not dolphin, is included as 'our' member when dividing along the lines of species. Her claim that dividing groups along the lines of species is justified (since we are talking

about who gets rights to 'human' provision, and not 'vertebrate' provision) is questionable. But for the sake of the argument, I will grant her that this claim is justified. Since this claim is essential in making her conclusion justified, let us call this claim as premise 3. Now her argument looks like this,

1. 'Our' member of the group has positive right to the group's provision while beings that are not 'our' member of the group do not have positive right to the group's provision.
- 2*. (From the perspective of human society) Human infant is 'our' member, while dolphins are not when dividing along the lines of species.
3. Dividing along the lines of species is justified when we are concerned with who can claim positive rights to 'human' provision.

Conclusion: Human infants have positive rights to human provision while dolphins do not.

I will claim that even if premises 2* and 3 are justified, accepting premise 1 forces Anderson to accept a ridiculous conclusion. And since Anderson would not be able to accept this ridiculous conclusion, Anderson would have to give up premise 1, and giving up premise 1 would mean that Anderson's conclusion that only human infants have positive right to human provision while dolphins do not does not entail. Let us see why accepting premise 1 would lead to a ridiculous conclusion.

(3) Criticisms toward premise 1

I will now explain why premise 1 is unjustified. Until now I have talked about groups that are more inclusive than the group 'species' (e.g. phylum). Now, how about a group that is less inclusive than the group 'species?' Race, sex, nationality would satisfy this condition. Let us think about race. A black infant is a member of a black society by being born to a black society just as a human infant is a member of a human society by being born to a human society. As you will be able to see soon, Anderson's argument can lead to a ridiculous conclusion when the argument is used in the context of races, and not species. The problem can be observed when we change the words human infants and human society to black infants and black society and change the word dolphin to white infant and the word species to races in Anderson's argument. According to premise 2*, (from the perspective of black society) black infant is 'our' member while white infant is not when dividing the groups along the lines of races. And according to premise 3, dividing the groups along the lines of races is justified when we are concerned with who can claim positive rights to 'black' group's provision. If we accept premise 1, which says that 'our' member has positive rights to the group's provision while beings that are not 'our' members do not, then we have to accept a ridiculous conclusion that black infants have positive rights to black group's provision while white infants do not. I do not think Anderson would be able to commit herself to this kind of conclusion. Therefore, Anderson has to either accept the fact that her argument does not work or should find a

way to claim that human's obligation is to provide positive right to human provision for human group, but black's obligation is not only to provide positive right to black group's provision for the black group, but also to provide positive right to provision for human group as a whole. Thus, Anderson should justify the claim that black's obligation is to provide provision for a larger group (which is human group), while human's obligation is to provide positive right to human provision only for the group itself (which, of course, is the human group itself).

But if it, indeed, is true that black's obligation is to provide positive right to provision for a larger group, then premise 1 is false. This is because premise 1 claims that only 'our' member has right to the group's provision, which means that group's obligation to provide positive right to provision is directed only at its own group. Thus, if black group has obligation to provide positive right to provision for a larger group (and not just the group itself), then it means that premise 1 is false. Anderson claimed that dolphins do not have positive rights to human provision because premise 1 said that human has obligation to provide positive right to human provision only for human group's own members. Thus, if premise 1 is true, then black group has obligation to provide positive right to black group's provision only towards black infants. Thus, Anderson would fail to justify the claim that black's obligation is to provide provision for a larger group, while human's obligation is to provide provision only for the group itself because this statement contradicts premise 1 since premise 1 claims that a group's obligation is to provide positive right to provision for only its own group. And, as we

have seen, if premise 1 is true, that leads Anderson to accept a ridiculous conclusion which claims that black infants have positive right to black group's provision while white infants do not. Thus, I will claim that premise 1 is unjustified, and that her argument does not work.

(4) 'real' vs. 'unreal' groups

But Anderson has one more way to save her argument from becoming futile. If she wants premise 1 to be true, but at the same time avoid the absurd conclusion that black group has obligation only to black infants, Anderson must claim that groups divided along species are 'real' groups, while groups divided along races are not 'real' groups. If she can justify this claim, then she can claim that premise 1 is true, and at the same time claim that black's obligation is to provide right to provision for human group as a whole and not just for black group only. To see why this is the case, a little bit of explanation is needed. If groups divided along the lines of species are 'real', while groups divided along the lines of races are not 'real', then it means that human group and dolphin group can be legitimately separated while black group and white group cannot be legitimately separated. This means that while it is still possible to designate human infant as 'our' member and dolphin as not one of 'our' member, it is now impossible to designate black infant as 'our' member and white infant as not one of 'our' member (since groups dividing black and white infants are not real, black and white infants now must belong in the same group).

If this is the case, then black group now has the obligation to provide right to provision not only for black infants but also for white infants. This is because white infant should be designated as 'our' member for the black group. Thus, premise 1 being true is now no longer a problem for Anderson because black group now has obligation to provide right to provision for human group as a whole even though premise 1 says that a group's obligation to provide right to provision is only for the members of its own groups. Since premise 1 is true, and black group having obligation to provide positive right to provision for human group as a whole is, indeed, a conclusion that Anderson wants (which means that Anderson does not have to agree to a ridiculous conclusion that was mentioned above), Anderson seems to be able to claim that her argument and conclusion are justified.

I will refute her claim by arguing that Anderson is mistaken yet again. My argument is that Anderson cannot claim that groups divided along the lines of species are real while groups divided along the lines of races are not. Anderson claims that being born to a human society is the reason why human infants get the positive right to human provision and dolphins do not. Anderson's view can be seen where she states that "possession of morally significant capacities alone does not make one a member of human society, with claims to social provision. Being born to a member of society does make one a member of that society, however. This is why infants and other humans without developed potential or recoverable rationality have moral rights to provision." (Sunstein & Nussbaum, 2004:284) Thus, it is easy to see that what's important for a being

to claim positive rights to provision is whether one is born to a society or not. Now, Anderson has to acknowledge that black infant is born into a black society while white infant is not and cannot be born to a black society.

Some people could claim that black adult and white adult can give birth to a mixed infant, but human and dolphin cannot give birth to a mixed infant. They could claim that what this shows is that species difference is real while racial difference is not real. But this is clearly wrong because there are many cases in which animals of different species give birth to a mixed infant (e.g. lion and tiger). This does not mean that species difference between lion and tiger is not real. Therefore, the claim that species difference is real while racial difference is not real is not justified.

Moreover, even though it is true that black adult and white adult can give birth to a mixed infant, there is no question as to whether there is a real difference between black and white races. As Ronald Sandler claims, “[d]ifferences in skin color and sex among human beings are factual differences. People really do have different colored skin and there really are two different sexes. Moreover, these are explained by genetic differences between people.” (Sandler, 2012: 161) Simply put, it is genetically impossible for black parents to give birth to a white infant, and vice versa. Thus, white infant cannot be born to a black society, just as dolphin cannot be born to a human society.

Anderson, as seen above, claims that one is a member of a group only if one is born to a group. If dolphin and human have real group distinction because dolphin cannot be born to a human society, then

black and white have real group distinction because white infant cannot be born to a black society. Thus, racial groups are just as real as species groups. Thus, Anderson fails in making the claim that difference between species groups is real, while difference between racial groups is not. Therefore, Anderson fails in her attempt to justify premise 1 while also avoiding the ridiculous conclusion that we have seen above.

To conclude, premise 1, which says that only 'our' member has positive right to the group's provision and beings that are not 'our' members do not, leads Anderson to accept a ridiculous conclusion that only black infants, but not white infants, can claim positive right to black group's provision. Since Anderson cannot accept this ridiculous conclusion, Anderson has to accept that premise 1 is false and therefore that her argument does not work.

What is important to note is that I am not claiming that Anderson's conclusion that only human infants have positive right to human provision while dolphins do not is wrong. My focus is not on whether wild animals, such as dolphins, have positive right to human provision or not. It could be that some other justification does indeed make it the case that Anderson's conclusion (which is that human infants have positive right to human provision while dolphins do not) is correct. Or it could be that both human infants and dolphins have positive right to human provision as there are scholars like Steve Sapontzis who argue that even wild animals, such as dolphin, should have positive right to human provision. Sapontzis claims that "we are morally obligated to prevent predation whenever we can do so without occasioning as much or more

unjustified suffering than the predation would create, and we are also morally obligated to attempt to expand the number of such cases.” (Sapontzis, 1987:247) It could even be that both human infants and dolphins lack positive right to human provision.

In the thesis, I have not dealt with this question of deciding which among these conclusions is indeed correct. My focus is rather on whether difference in species membership makes a difference in who gets positive right to human provision or not. My claim is just that Anderson's argument does not justify her conclusion that only human infants, but not dolphins, have positive right to human provision because all her premises are flawed in some ways. Thus, I will conclude by claiming that Anderson has failed to justify her claim that species difference makes a difference in whether one can claim positive right to human provision or not.

IV. Conclusion

Although I have not dealt with Anderson's claim that difference in species membership makes a difference in who gets negative right to life in this paper, I believe my paper has shown that Anderson has not justified her claim that difference in species membership makes a difference in who gets positive right to human provision. I believe my conclusion in the paper can open up further areas of research. One obvious area would be to find out whether Anderson has more success in justifying her claim that difference in species membership does indeed make difference in who gets negative right to life. Also,

now that we have established that Anderson's essay has not justified her claim that difference in species membership makes difference in who can claim positive right to human provision, future research can focus on whether there could be other ways of justifying her claim that difference in species membership does make a difference in who can claim which rights. Also, if it, indeed, is true that difference in species membership does not make a difference in who can claim positive right to human provision, then we have to ask ourselves what positive rights animals can claim. Do humans have obligation to feed dolphins when they are starving? Do rabbits have the right to be protected from predators by human provision? If not, what would be the justification? These are all questions that would further enrich the debates currently existing in the animal rights literature, and I believe my thesis can serve as a starting point in opening up these issues.

(The Academy of Korean Studies)

■ **Key words**

Elizabeth Anderson, specie, animal rights, Homo sapiens, Ethics

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■ Abstract

**Species membership in claiming rights:
Critique of Elizabeth Anderson's essay "Animal rights and
the values of nonhuman life"**

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In this paper, I criticize Elizabeth Anderson's claim that species membership matters in deciding what rights one can claim. In her essay "Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life", Elizabeth Anderson claims that species membership matters in deciding whether one can claim positive right to human provision. Justification for her claim is that only members of 'our' group have positive rights to the group's provision while beings that are not included in 'our' group do not have positive rights to the group's provision. Since species difference does indeed decide who is included in 'our' group and who is left out, Anderson concludes that species membership decides who can claim positive right to human provision. I claim that Anderson's premise that species difference decides who is included in 'our' group is unjustified. I also claim that even if we grant that this premise is true (after revising the premise a little bit), this revised version of premise would force Anderson to accept a conclusion that would be unacceptable. Since Anderson would not be able to accept this ridiculous conclusion, I conclude this paper by claiming that Anderson's claim that species membership makes difference in who

gets positive right to human provision is unjustified.

■ Key Words

Elizabeth Anderson, specie, animal rights, Homo sapiens, Ethics

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



Moral Growth in *The Scarlet Letter*

Kang, Jun-Soo

I. Introduction

The background of *The Scarlet Letter* is New England regarded as an ideal place by Puritans. This novel made Nathaniel Hawthorn a great writer in the 19th century. Hawthorn was a typical descendant of the Puritans. Hawthorn was immersed in the Puritanism during his childhood in New England. His intimate knowledge of Puritanism allowed him to produce *The Scarlet Letter* which is the psychological romance of Puritan concepts. He had a special concern for the problem of Good and Evil, and of Sin in Puritan society of the 17th century.

Hawthorne's ancestor, William Hawthorne who came to Massachusetts as an assistant magistrate, tried to persecute the Quakers. He was the most zealous judge in the general court in Boston (Horton 48). Later, he was dismissed by the governor from his military command and had to give a public apology (Turner 60). He left a stain of ignominy on his name when he exerted his

influence to sentence some Quakers to death and participated in overpowering the native Indians. The New England Puritan's descendant, Hawthorne was hurt by his ancestors' wrong faith. So he was deeply interested in the true faith and the problem of human sin.

The Puritans in New England who had strong moral consciousness could not avoid endless agony because of conflicts arising between natural instincts and faith. The Puritans with great prejudice and intolerance distinguished all human beings as saved or damned. The Puritan mind was one of the toughest the world has ever had to deal with. No matter how often or how the worst and would have expected no better, it is impossible to conceive of a disillusioned Puritan (Miller 60).

Hawthorne tried to write Puritanism as an instrument of repression and coercion rather than functioning as a source of divine love and brotherhood within the community by describing the negative impact about it. As Puritanism's central idea is the quest for self-awareness through the pain and darkness of the soul, it has been almost eliminated even though it existed as a catalytic force of the American people's mind (Gerber 82). The Puritans prohibited any sinful acts of deriding and slandering others, which is contrary to the teachings of the Scripture. Therefore, keeping the conventions was the most important task of the citizens. Also, the Puritans imposed a heavy penalty on those who failed to observe their moral conventions.

The moral law of Puritanism in Boston was equal to the commandments of God. The harsh treatment of Puritan leaders

toward sinners was not that of the religion of love. This is the reason why that Hawthorne leads us to the issue of men's judgment on men, which was imposed on people who failed in observing Puritanism in a seemingly utopian society. For example, Hawthorne's portrayal of Hester reminds us of her having a premonition about the judgment from the Puritans. Hawthorne reveals his view that Hester suffered from the whole miserable severity of the Puritan code of law in Boston society where the authority of the governors were regarded with the same awe as divine institutions. But Hawthorne had a warm heart toward all human beings which made his view greatly different from Puritans. Hawthorne criticizes the Puritans in *The Scarlet Letters* as follows:

..... as befitted a people amongst whom religion and, law were almost identical, and in whose character both were so thoroughly interfused, that the mildest and severest acts of public discipline were a like made venerable and awful. Meagre, Indeed, and cold, was the sympathy that a transgressor might look for from such bystanders at the scaffold. (*The Scarlet* 55)

Hawthorne was extremely sensitive about the fanatical roles played by his paternal ancestors in the early days of New England. A deep family guilt settled upon him, and this guilt undoubtedly promoted him to critical attacks in his literary works on the rigors of Puritanism(Connolly 8–9). On the other hand, Agnes McNeil Donohue adds Hawthorne's ambivalent attitude as follows:

Hawthorne's repressed Calvinism ordained the profound irony that forced

him into ambiguity, conditioned his aesthetic distance and his authorial voice, ordained the alternate choices of endings or interpretations,... This irony discloses a signal ambiguity in Hawthorne,... his attitude toward humanity's moral nature. (1-2)

Even though Hawthorne wrote this novel with Puritanism as its spiritual background, there is the reason that Hawthorne has the ambivalent attitude about Puritanism. Although Puritanism becomes the American branch of Calvinism, it also have its name to a characteristic way of life. And for Hawthorne, Puritanism was also associated with the American struggle for political liberty (Schawartz 36). Tragic aspect is that human instincts and creative ideas must be controlled by individuals under the rule of strict Puritan society. Of course, this tragic result came from the Puritan leaders who wanted to accept the tradition of Puritanism. Therefore, this paper tries to focus on sin and suffering main characters, Dimmesdale and Hester experience, and examine the process of their moral growth.

II . Inner agony and awareness of sin

The Scarlet Letter shows the situation of the era with the background of a dark and strict Puritan society in America. Also it is evaluated as a masterpiece that established tradition of American novel literature and raised the level of America literature to world literature by describing solitary psychology of a criminal with elaborate

composition and deep theme.

Dimmesdale shows that his life became the proof of corruption against the authority of Puritan society, from which he closes himself from the relationship with the divine sources of those virtues. Roy R. Male says, “as a symbol of guilt, Chillingworth is leech, draining his patient (Dimmesdale) of nerve, will and physical energy” (150).

Chillingworth burned all his energy away in revenge of Dimmesdale. Hawthorne tried to describe moral's development of men who suffer from their sin because he who had strong affection for human beings wanted to emphasize the moral values of human in this work. When man abandons charity, he comes to lose his faith and hope from his point. Hawthorne describes Dimmesdale's essential sin as follows:

It is the unspeakable misery of a life so false as his, that it steals the pith and substance out of whatever realities there are around us, and which were meant by Heaven to be the spirit's joy and nutriment. To the untrue man, the whole universe is false, - it is impalpable, - it shrinks to nothing within his grasp. (*The Scarlet* 121)

Of course, Dimmesdale begins to be free from the sins of adultery and hypocrisy. Because he knows that confession with Hester on the scaffold is the only way to make sure the meaning of his suffering and life. Finally he confess as follows:

“ye, that have loved me! - ye, that have deemed me holy! - behold me here,

the one sinner of the world! - at last! - I stand upon the spot where, seven years since, I should have stood; here, with this woman, whose arm, more than the little strength wherewith I have crept hitherward,....." (*The Scarlet* 195)

Dimmesdale was so courageous as to confess his sin openly and then die, so to speak, his sin led into ruin for him. But his sin also led to realize his consciousness. Hawthorne tried for showing moral's growth through his suffering. Hester urges Dimmesdale to be free from his bondage as follows:

"Give up this name of Arthur Dimmesdale, and make thyself another, and a high one, such as thou can wear without fear or shame. Why shouldst thou tarry so much as one other day in the torments that have so gnawed into thy life! - that have made thee feeble to will and to do! - that will leave thee powerless even to repent! Up, and away!" (*The Scarlet* 157)

Hester's intention to obtain the universal love causes her disgrace. On the contrary, Dimmesdale, whose sole purpose was dedication to a social and religious code, is not so conscientious about his love toward God. Hyatt H. Waggoner explains the symbol of Hester's name as follows:

"Hester" is the modern form of "Esther" : and the Old Testament Esther is gifted with beauty, strength and dignity. Courage and loyal, she defends a weak and oppressed people. (*The Scarlet* 145)

Hawthorne regarded Puritan society as tending to lead citizens of

Boston toward the uncontrollable impulses of utter heresies and blasphemies. Because all Puritan citizens had to control their human instincts and creative ideas under the rule of their strict Puritan society, the human interrelationship had to be maintained even though they were condemned to be sinners. Of course, Hawthorne was aware that the imperfectly created human cannot assume the role of God's judgment because of humanity's original sin. Hawthorne criticizes the Puritans as follows:

They were, doubtless, good men, just, and sage. But out of the whole human family, it would not have been easy to select the same number of wise and virtuous persons, who should be less capable of sitting in judgment on erring women's heart, and disentangling its mesh of good and evil, than the sages of rigid aspect towards whom Hester Prynne now turned her face. (*The Scarlet* 65)

The Puritans in *The Scarlet Letter* were closely interrelated with the doctrine of predestination. The Puritan concept of predestination is pervaded every corner of *The Scarlet Letter*. The definition of predestination is a belief or doctrine that everything that happens has been determined by God and man cannot change it. According to the Puritan view, some are chosen by God to be saved and others are to be damned.

The theory of predestination does not allow one's having a free will. From this perspective, Hester's unacceptable conduct of adultery was determined before she acted. According to this theory of predestination, God has decreed in advance that certain souls will

be saved, Hester mentions the universality of sin in *The Scarlet Letter* as follows:

Again, a mystic sisterhood would contumaciously assert itself, as she met the sanctified frown of some matron, who, according to the rumor of all tongues, had kept cold snow within her bosom throughout life. That unsunned snow in the matron's bosom, and the burning shame on Hester Prynne's, - what had the two in common? Or, once more, the electric thrill would give her warning, - "Behold, Hester, here is a companion!" (*The Scarlet* 80)

The true Calvinist seek conviction of sin as a preparation for a promised salvation. Hawthorne, the humanitarian heretic, sees it as an admission to the brotherhood of man and cares little for what may happen in an after life (Spiller 62). Hawthorne's view of salvation is based on the Scripture. He views that the origin of Dimmesdale's sin was his separation from God. In the cases of Chillingworth and Dimmesdale, they thought they had free will, whereas Hester behaved as if she were completely bound by fate.

Fate is absolute and nobody can alter one's course of life. The starting point of Dimmesdale's depravity began as he tried to build the world around himself. Part of Chillingworth's sin was his unwillingness to recognize himself as a sinner. However, other Puritan leaders thought that every person should be regarded as containing an evil that should be condemned. David Lavin explains "A" as follows:

The red letter "A" that the heroine is obliged to wear on her bosom

represents her adultery, but as the first letter of the alphabet it may also stand for the original sin of Adam, in which Puritans believed all men participated,..... The first letter was illustrated by this verse: In Adam's fall, we sinned all, we all sinned with Adam, at the beginning. (*The Scarlet 33*)

To purge the evil forces in Puritan society, they persecuted individuals, held trials, and executed the convicted persons. Since God ordered everything in the world according to the principle of love, Hawthorne knew that the Puritans had failed to be elected by God(Dillenberger 100). Hawthorne says, "Forgive, and leave his further retribution to the Power that claims it!"(*The Scarlet 140*).

Hester had her own desire and will to act when she first appeared on the scaffold in the early chapters. But God seems to bring Hester to a hard trial to change her uncompassionate mind into an extraordinarily compassionate and understanding one. Her breast, with its badge of shame, was but the softer pillow for the head that needed me. She was self-ordained a Sister of Mercy. (*The Scarlet 156*)

The first scaffold scene shows Hester who suffers from ignominy because of her sin of adultery but does not lose her pride or think that she committed an unpardonable sin. Richard Chase mentions 'A' as follows:

We can say that with certainty what the scarlet A stands for. It stands for adultery or since it is not adultery in that interests Hawthorne, it stands for the inevitable pains on all human life. (80)

After she is ostracized by the Puritans in Boston, however, she is changed into a charitable woman who practices God's love. By letting her to suffer from her sin and realize her human weakness, God makes her to accept and follow spontaneously His plan predestined for her. *The Scarlet Letter* suggest that Hester, who was utterly unworthy of salvation, was given an opportunity to be called by God. Hawthorne mentions the changed meaning of 'A' in the end of this work as follows:

Never afterwards did it quit her bosom. But, in the laps of the toilsome, thoughtful, and self-devoted years that made up Hester's life, Scarlet Letter ceased to be a stigma which attracted the world's scorn and bitterness, and become a type of something to be sorrowed over, and looked upon with awe, yet with reverence too. (*The Scarlet 200*)

Hawthorne describes Hester as a good woman who was oppressed by an obsessed society rather than as a shameful sinner. Young Chul Kim refers to the problem of human being's flaws as follows :

The factor which distinguishes Puritanism most from Humanism is the sense of evil, which is the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong in human nature, that under the surface of apparent harmony, there is a principle of disorder, and that in spite of all the idealistic conception of a perfect state, tragic reality confronts us at every turn. The idea of the depravity of human nature is the most significant theme in Hawthorne's fiction: in his profound and piercing characterization, all the figures, no matter how high or noble they may be, bear a tragic flaw that oppresses their minds; and despite the classical and

well-balanced structure of fiction, all the events inexorably point toward an imminent catastrophe of personal fortune, or an eventual downfall of a carefully constructed society. (52)

According to Hawthorne's view, Dimmesdale's insanity is a sign of his not being elected by God. The psychological effect of the unconfessed guilt of Dimmesdale is seen in the second scaffold scene. We see the influence of somnambulism after which he acknowledges his sin on the platform of the scaffold. His insanity reveals itself and he cannot restrain himself when he screams unconsciously and involuntarily in this work. His madness becomes worsen because of Chillingworth's continuous condemnation and instigation on his conscientious cowardice. Dimmesdale has a vivid vision of his death on the scaffold watched by the citizens of Boston, including elderly leaders of the community, which causes him to be ashamed. His moral cowardice causes him psychological suffering. Joel Porte mentions Dimmesdale's deed from the point of inevitability as follows:

The Scarlet Letter that conveyed through Dimmesdale's performance is the inevitable one: sin, suffering, and ineluctable human tragedy. (111)

Hawthorne believed that moral growth cannot occur without sin and suffering (Male 9). After all, Dimmesdale's psychological disability makes him wander into the sphere of moral ground that provides him with the posture of a moral invalid who deserves pity, but his final confession was a token or a psychological relief not a

reconciliation with God, not a spiritual atonement (Chorely and Cohen 28).

The proof that Puritanism influenced *The Scarlet Letter* is that their decision-making comes not from faith but from human reason. The Puritans themselves placed more faith in the intellect than in nature or emotion. They had a distrust of decision making reached only by the intellect. The Puritans had a tendency to perceive the necessary as a result of spontaneous decisions coming from the heart. For example, Dimmesdale's preaching does not appeal to the mind. Instead, his greatest sermon speaks to the heart.

But this very burden it was, that gave him sympathies so intimate with the sinful brotherhood of mankind; so that his heart vibrated in unison with theirs, and received their pain into itself, and sent its own throb of pain through a thousand other hearts, The people knew not the power that moved them thus. They deemed the young clergyman a miracle of holiness. (*The Scarlet 118*)

Hawthorne describes Dimmesdale's Election Sermon as follows:

According to their united testimony, never had man spoken in so wise, so high, and so holy a spirit, as he that spake this day. (*The Scarlet 190*).

The Puritans stressed an active conscience. The active conscience is closely related with an intuitive knowledge of Good and Evil. Dimmesdale might have known that God gave man a psychic ability

to understand right and wrong conscience. In addition, Dimmesdale did not deny the intuitive knowledge that guarantees one's living somewhere forever (Lahay 41). Therefore, there is no doubt that even Dimmesdale tried to rid himself of his guilt by putting his faith with God. While describing the meaning of 'A' to Dimmesdale, Arlin Turner says, "With what a ghastly rapture, as it were too mighty to be expressed only by the eye and features" (59). And Waggoner analyzes the name of Dimmesdale as follows:

The minister's first name, Arthur, tends to suggest that devotion to high ideal associated with King Arthur. His last name falls naturally into two parts, with the root of the first part, with the root of the first part, "dim," suggesting both weakness and darkness, and the second part, "dale," suggesting, in its meaning of valley, the heart, of which Hawthorne is so frequently reminded by any hollow, opening, or cavity. (145)

Dimmesdale believed that spontaneous decisions coming from the heart, not from the power of reason, guarantee salvation. It seems that one has to have the spontaneous experience of the world, which is superior to the knowledge gained from books, as a path to wisdom and preparation for life. The Puritan influence can be seen in the heart of Hester who acted naturally and spontaneously. For example, Hester reveals Dimmesdale that Chillingworth is her former husband and asks his forgiveness (*The Scarlet 157*).

The Puritan leader such as Governor Bellingham couldn't understand the value of the spontaneous love of Hester. They believed that Hester's appearance of inner assurance should be seen from the

conduct of Hester, which in turn took on a symbolic value. They couldn't easily give credentials to the one who gives the divine love more importance than strict moral behavior. The governors of Boston were afraid of Hester who professed an incorruptible love but who did things that failed the moral standard of that time. The magistrates and judges were afraid of Hester's adultery as a symbol that might negatively influence the myriads of people in Boston.

The Puritan influence on the Boston society revealed in this work is that it causes man's isolation. According to the Puritan view, isolation is a sign of God's disfavor. The Puritan leaders used isolation as a way to punish the citizens who had done wrong. In this work, the unforgiving attitude of Chillingworth caused Dimmesdale, Hester and himself to be isolated. Hawthorne portrays that the judgment of God led Hester into isolation among the Puritans. Isolation was a sign of one's total depravity caused by their environment. Dimmesdale praised God and forgave Chillingworth at his last moment as follows:

God knows; and He is merciful! He hath proved his Mercy, most of all, in my terrible affliction. By giving me this burning dark and terrible old man, to keep the torture always at red-heart! By bringing me hither, to die this death of triumphant ignominy before the people! Had either of these agonies been wanting, I had been lost forever! Praised be his name? His will be done! Farewell! (*The Scarlet 196-97*)

Dimmesdale prayed for Chilingworth in spite of his evil deed. Dimmesdale succeeded in overcoming his inner agony through the

acceptance of love and confession of sin. He also shared brotherhood with Chillingworth.

Chillingworth clearly reveals his character to us by deliberately avoiding reconciliation with the community. He tries Hester and Dimmesdale to remain in isolation. It means that he is afraid of their salvation by receiving forgiveness from the Puritan leaders. He had to frequent his meetings with Dimmesdale so that the latter should not be forgiven and thus saved. This was Chillingworth's method of destroying Dimmesdale's life.

He(Dimmesdale) had been driven hither by the impulse of that Remorse which dogged him everywhere, and whose own sister and closely linked companion was that Cowardice which invariably drew him back, with her tremulous gripe, just when the other impulse had hurried him to the verge of a disclosure. (*The Scarlet 122*)

Chillingworth says, "I must needs look deeper into it. A strange sympathy betwixt soul and body! Were it only for the art's sake, I must search this matter to the bottom!" (*The Scarlet 115*). Dimmesdale describes Chilingworth's deed for revenge as follows:

"I freely forgive you now. May god forgive us both! We are not, Hester, the worst sinners in the world. There is one worse than ever the polluted priest! That old man's revenge has been blacker than my sin. He has violated, in cold blood, the sanctity of a human heart." (*The Scarlet 154*)

Chillingworth does indeed judge Dimmesdale. He is so intent on

taking vengeance that he spends his waking hours trying to destroy the minister's sanity. Hawthorne considered it as the unpardonable sin. Chillingworth eventually destroys himself and metamorphoses himself into a devil. Hester criticizes Chillingworth's attitude as follows:

“You tread behind his every footstep, You are beside him, sleeping and waking. You search his thoughts, You burrow and rankle in his heart! Your cluch is on his life, and you cause him to die daily a living death” (*The Scarlet* 137)

David Levin describes Chillingworth's deed as an unpardonable sin because it is the violation of another soul, another heart simply for the purpose of finding out how it would react (14). On the contrary, Hester was saved by seeking reconciliation after being isolated. She was in isolation from the common experience of mankind and this experience rectified her aberrant thought.

The strict authority of Puritan law was exemplified in the scaffold, prison and cemetery scenes in *The Scarlet Letter*. Hawthorne wanted to show how Puritan society was flawed and devastating effect these flaws could have. Also, he attempted to portray how the concealed sins of men were the main targets of the Puritans. Hawthorne realized that social regeneration is necessary in a society since he had seen the effects of Puritan leaders imposing the Mosaic law, the ancient tradition, in the Boston society. The result of their misapplication of Mosaic law caused a lot of unnecessary pain and suffering. Rather than basing their society on love, understanding

and responsibility, “the Puritan’s religion is expressed in their rites—acts of persecution, oppression and cruelty” (Kaul 34).

The strict Puritan society was the source of the social sin of Hester and she was helpless being isolated with her small fluttering wings trying to get out of the social net. Hester expresses her suffering as follows:

“I have thought of death,” said she, - “I have wished for it, - would even have prayed for it, were it fit that such as I should pray for anything.” (*The Scarlet* 71)

Hester felt the burden of shame and anguish in her spirit. So she had not felt the freedom, until the stigma gone (*The Scarlet* 159). She intentionally committed her sin knowing that she would be faced complete isolation from society by the Puritan leaders. Hester abandoned her former wealth and family since she knew that isolation is a sure sign of God’s salvation (Norman 25–26). That is, The Puritan’s intention of creating the perfect ideal community in Boston led Hawthorne to write the opposite aspect about it.

Except for that small expenditure in the decoration of her infant, Hester bestowed all her superfluous means in charity, on wretches less miserable than herself, and who not unfrequently insulted the hand that fed them. It is probable that there was an idea of penance in this mode of occupation. (*The Scarlet* 78)

Like this, Hester comforted and counselled the poor, as best she

might. On the contrary, the Puritan leader's intolerant attitude towards people who committed the crime of adultery is shown in their acts towards Hester and Dimmesdale. From the perspective of Puritan leaders, Hester is regarded as a sinner even though she relies on her faith in God. Hester explains the reason why she comes back New England in the end of the work as follows:

But there was a more real life for Hester Prynne, here, in New England than in that unknown region where Pearl had found a home. Here had been her sin; here, her sorrow; and here was yet to be her penitence. She had returned, therefore, and resumed, - of her own free will, for not the sternest magistrate of that iron period would have imposed it, - resumed the symbol of which we have related so dark a tale. (*The Scarlet 200*)

Hester has donned so as an affirmation of life, and her sin incarnates those rights of personality that society is inclined to trample upon (Lewis 112). Hester has won the unwilling respect of her fellow after seven years of disgrace (Fogle 145). After Dimmesdale's death Chillingworth seemed to lose his strength and energy. After all, within the year, Chillingworth's decease took place and he bequeathed a very considerable amount of property to little Pearl, the daughter of Hester (The Scarlet 199). Leon Howard says, "Unpardonable sin is a sense of pride that springs from possessing perverted knowledge which is accompanied by egoism and inhumanity" (104).

IV. Conclusion

Nathaniel Hawthorne was a typical descendant of the Puritans. He had a special concern for the problem of Good and Evil, and of Sin in Puritan society of the 17th century. He was interested in moral, religious faith and humanity because of his environmental influence. Hawthorne suggests situation of the era with the background of dark and strict Puritan society in New England through *The Scarlet Letter*. It's very important for us to understand Calvinism in it. The core tenets of Calvinism are human depravity, salvation and human predestination. Hawthorne was interested in the true faith, human love and the sin.

Puritanists regulated New England society and emphasized God's authority too far in *The Scarlet Letter*. Puritanism dominated men's lives with its dogmas that claims to ensure men's happiness, but it sometimes oppressed men's lives. Particularly, Puritanists' cruel punishment on the sinners showed that Puritanism was not based on love and compassion. Hawthorne felt the necessity to reevaluate the Puritan's conviction that infringed upon human rights and the problem of their abused power.

Hawthorne has been generally considered to be a writer who searched for inner life of humanity and its sinfulness. The scene in which Dimmesdale makes the public confession of his sin and dies in Hester's arms shows his moral growth because he has suffered from guilty consciousness and hypocrisy under religious dogmas. The Puritans who had great prejudice and intolerance distinguished all human beings as saved or damned. However, Hawthorne had different view from Puritans toward all human beings. He believed

in the fact that man is originally imperfect. And Hawthorne tried hard to find out the true value of human being from morality. For example, he described Hester as a good woman who was oppressed by obsessed society rather than as a shameful sinner and Dimmesdale as a spiritual growth who was so courageous as to confess his sin openly and then die.

Before his dying confession of his sin in front of the people on the scaffold, Dimmesdale had an ambivalent inner conflict between his intellect desire to follow religious practices and his innermost yearning to satisfy his own selfishness. However, Hawthorne described Chillingworth who was a typical Puritanist as an unpardonable sinner because he had burned all his energy away in revenge of Dimmesdale in *The Scarlet Letter*. Hawthorne who had strong affection and love for human beings tried to emphasize the moral values and moral growth of human through their suffering. In other words, human nature is the most important value in his view.

Even though men cannot substitute God in judging their sins, the action Chillingworth tried to judge Dimmesdale is an unpardonable sin in Hawthorne's view. Dimmesdale is a victim of the Puritan thoughts rather than a sinner. Therefore, Hawthorne described Chillingworth as an evil agent without any forgiveness for Dimmesdale because he wanted to try to view men's sin as an understanding and compassionate eyes. However, the fail to escape from New England by Hester and Dimmesdale demonstrates Hawthorne's uneasiness to try subversive and innovative attitude of his main characters on Puritan society. Though Hawthorne had ambivalent attitude like this, it is clear that he does not follow the Puritan tradition in

understanding human beings. When Hester returned from Europe to her old cottage alone after years after Dimmesdale's death she tried to serve poor women in trouble and give her duty to work for women's liberation.

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■ **Key words**

moral growth, *The Scarlet Letter*, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Puritanism, sin, a sense of pride

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■ Abstract

Moral Growth in *The Scarlet Letter*

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the main characters' moral growth in *The Scarlet Letter* by Nathaniel Hawthorne. The background of this novel is the 17th century. The theme of this work is the psychological effect and result of prejudice, and the sense of pride.

Hester, the worst sinner in the early Puritan society, committed adultery, and Dimmesdale is not only Hester's adulterer but also a hypocritical sinner. His flaw is his inability to publicly acknowledge that he committed adultery with Hester and is the father of Pearl. Dimmesdale hated himself for that sin, and he accomplished victory over his weakness after seven long years of struggle. After he delivered a magnificent sermon, he confessed on the scaffold to his sin. As the time passed, the severe condemnation of hers changed into praise because Hester had experienced and lived a true moral development for expiation of her sin.

However, Chillingworth had burned all his energy away in revenge of Dimmesdale. He eventually destroyed himself and metamorphosed himself into a devil. After all, Dimmesdale and Hester experienced moral growth through sin and suffering, and they became the elected persons. On the other hand, Chillingworth became the

deserted person by committing unpardonable sin which is a sense of pride.

■ Key Words

moral growth, *The Scarlet Letter*, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Puritanism, sin, a sense of pride

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



Cultural and Domestic Memory in Seamus Heaney's Bog Poems

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I

Seamus Heaney's early work is closely related with memory from the personal memories in *Death of a Naturalist* to the explorations of the relationship between memory and place-names in *Wintering Out* and *North*. The notion of bogland can be a metaphor and repository for memory extensively and gradually. In his 1974 essay "Feeling into Memory," Heaney claims the following.

I began to get an idea of the bog as the memory of the landscape, or as a landscape that remembered everything that happened in and to it... Moreover, since memory was the faculty that supplied me with the first quickening of my own poetry, I had a tentative unrealized need to make a congruence between memory and bogland and, for want of a better word, our national consciousness. (P54-5)

We can find the political dimensions of his claim. For him, the bog

can stand in for national memory or historical consciousness. This is complicated by his comment in an interview with Edward Broadbridge that “The word ‘remember’ is a potent word in Irish politics. Remember 1690 if you're an Orangeman, Remember 1916 if you are a republican” (Broadbridge 9). Heaney recognizes the different and contradictory political uses of the rhetoric of memory. Yet, at the same time he assumes that a singular national memory exists in the Irish landscape at the sub-textual level of the bog.

Heaney connects the use of the bog with a metaphor for a national consciousness to the Jungian concept of the collective unconscious. For C. G. Jung, the collective unconscious, “as the ancestral heritage of possibilities of representation, is not individual but common to all men, and perhaps even to all animals, and is the true basis of the individual psyche” (Jung 67). However, the bog in Heaney's expression does not strictly correspond to a Jungian landscape. For Jung, the archetypes that form the collective unconscious “are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree. A primordial image is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience” (Jung 84).

Jungian landscape would only remember the form or outline of everything that happened to it. What the bog in Heaney's notion provides is a medium that remembers everything. It will reveal everything to the adept excavator or investigator. The bog offers a mythological access to the past itself, rather than an articulation of the accidental presence of the past – what Thomas Docherty terms

“anamnesis” (219). Like Glob's photos of the bog bodies, his bog suggests the myth of lurid access to restored past.

The bog bodies reveal the horrific, partial nature of what the bog remembers, unexpectedly interrupting into the present. While appearing to preserve the past, the bog also radically transforms it. For instance, skin is turned to leather and flesh evaporates, some material entirely disappears. The bog discloses a horrific memory of the past, at the same time reveals a horrific recreation of a past. Rather than the bog is a warehouse of memories, it is a kind of film offering horrible sequences of memory. Part of the horror of the bog bodies is their timelessness, the manner in which they appear to have been preserved in spite of the passing of time. Existing outside the normal passing of time, the bodies bring with them their own radically different internal historicity, which hinders the sense of continuity and the historicity of the present. Christopher Salvesen described memory as the relationship between the subject and time, not between the subject and reality (35–6). The bog bodies thus also offer a challenge to how we understand and represent memory.

This is the challenge that Heaney's poems attempt to face. The poems attempt to reach an agreement with the bog bodies, developing and examining an ongoing negotiation between the present and the past, enacting different strategies for re-envisioning and describing the past. In fact, the bog poems offer different reconstructions of the same event, different ways of remembering or recalling memory traces. And memory emerges from these negotiations and strategies as a range of processes of retrieval. The person remembering an object is in some way entering into the unknown. So, it is not an

archaeological process of revealing discrete or complete memories, but rather a creative or interpretative process of narrating memory traces in terms of the context of retrieval. It is also not a means of discovering a finished past, but of representing the ongoing trace of the past or the presence of the past. In the context, this paper deals with bogs poems of Heaney such as "Kinship," "The Bog Queen," "Tollund," "The Tollund Man" and "The Grauballe Man." through meanings of cultural and aesthetic memory.

II

Heaney is intensively aware of their cultural history and origins. It is through this awareness that he can expose the complexities of national hatred and violence, which are the negative derivations of cultural identity within fractured societies. Hence, the Irish poet deals with and reflects on the 'collective memory' concerning the cruelties that have been committed in the past. Heaney, in his bog poems, was inspired by P. V. Glob's book, *The Bog People*, which deals with sacrificial victims excavated from the peat bogs. Heaney uses "the unforgettable photographs of these victims" as one of his materials for creating poetry (P 57). For him, the landscape has memory of its own, which needs to "resurface" in order for social healing to occur. This concerns with Heaney's "idea of bog as the memory of the landscape, or as a landscape that remembered everything that happened in and to it" (P 54). Daniel Tobin indicates that the opening lines of "Kinship", "offer a commentary on the idea

of bogland as Jungian ground, a center that houses the hieroglyphs of the culture and delves into its origins” (126–7). Here, Heaney discovers himself stepping like this,

through origins
like a dog turning
its memories of wilderness
on the kitchen mat (*N*40).

Tobin indicates that these lines represent a “deflation” of Heaney’s “bardic pretension by portraying himself in the less than grandiose image of a dog no longer game for the hunt” (127). But what he does not notice is the irony of a supposedly ‘domesticated’ dog lying lazily on the kitchen mat, but still unconsciously remembering the hunting instincts of its ancestors. Heaney, like the dog, also finds himself recalling ‘memories of wilderness’ and acts of violence committed by his ancestors that continue to occur in his contemporary Ireland. Elmer Andrews also indicates that Heaney, in “recognizing his separation from origins”, can only hope to still experience them “on an instinctual, pre-conscious level” rather than be on “a merely purposeful, rationally-pursued quest” (93). Heaney is considered to be sensitive to the fact that there are no simple and rational solutions regarding the conflict in Northern Ireland. By delving into the instinctual and pre-conscious energies of the Irish landscape, he attempts to uncover the deeper immediate issues. For instance, Andrew Foley argues that Heaney, by reflecting on Iron Age atrocities, “was able to move beyond the surface details of current

events in Northern Ireland and employ a symbolic mode which laid bare not only the savage tribal instincts of the perpetrators of the violence, but also the archetypal barbarity of the conflict itself" (73–4).

Therefore, it is important to note that Heaney not only pries into the origins of his culture's ideologies, the "centre that houses the hieroglyphs of culture" (Tobin 127), but also explores the non-rational and 'animal' instincts that are far older than the construction of culture itself. For example, Jung indicates the similarity of animal behaviour patterns to those of humans, which occur in situations when "you are seized by an emotion or by a spell, and you behave in a certain way you have not foreseen at all" (Walker 7). As Steven F. Walker points out, this type of "unpremeditated act stems from the 'suggestive effect' of an archetype" (7).

In "Kinship", the word 'kitchen' as a symbol of domesticity implies a 'hearth', 'fireside' or 'gathering place' which can be regarded as the holy family and cultural centre. So, the dog dreaming on the kitchen mat gives one a sense of ancestral continuity. Both dog and master would have sat near the fireside in prehistoric times implied by the word 'wilderness' surrounded by other members from their community. One can see from this that the dog, like the kitchen, also represents a symbol of family life and community. This is an important point that Tobin's rather simplistic formulation of "a dog no longer game for the hunt" seems to overlook (127). The image of the 'kitchen' can also be seen as a reminder of one's 'primitive' need to consume food. Therefore, one of the things implied in "Kinship" is that human 'killing instincts', like those of the dog, are not easily

tamed despite the presence of civilization. The themes of 'origins' and 'consumption' are also found in the following words of "Kinship."

I grew out of all this
like a weeping willow
inclined to
the appetites of gravity. (*N*43)

Elmer Andrews indicates that 'appetites' implies "both nurture and insatiable demand", and 'gravity' reveals "both an elemental principle of physical order and a suggestion of anxiety and death" (95). It is also evident that the above lines refer to the Mother Goddess, or Nerthus, as it is "the appetites of the goddess who swallows the faithful, reclaiming them for her ruminant ground" (95).

Throughout "Kinship" the Mother Goddess is depicted as both a horrifying and dignified figure. She is an "insatiable bride" who swallows "our love and terror" (*N* 41–5). She was also "the goddess of the ground who needed new bridegrooms each winter to bed with her in her sacred place, in the bog, to ensure the renewal and fertility of the territory in the spring" (*P* 57). Thus the Mother Goddess can be regarded as a double figure, which is both devouring and regenerative, or which composes and decomposes. Henry Hart says that the "effects" of Nerthus "are bafflingly murderous and regenerative" (94). These different aspects of Nerthus relate to the cycles of the seasons and Irish history. "The mothers of autumn / sour and sink" (*N*43). Later in "Kinship" the speaker indicates that

“Our mother ground / is sour with the blood / of her faithful” (*N* 45).

The political and social climate of Ireland has ‘soured’, and Heaney in his role as a poet, like “Hamlet the Dane”, is the “smeller of rot” (“Viking Dublin: Trial Pieces”, *N* 23). Therefore, Heaney detects the “rotten” aspects of his Irish culture’s inherited ideologies, as well as ‘rotteness’ referring to the misrepresentation of the Northern Ireland crisis by the British colonial news media. The words ‘rotteness’ and ‘sourness’ also imply a potential for transformation to take place both socially and poetically. This is revealed in “Kinship” with the line: “a windfall composing / the floor it rots into” (*N* 43). The ‘windfall’ represents a “stripping down” like the “Ground that will strip / its dark side” (*N* 41), as well as implying unexpected good fortune or the ‘riches’ of composing poetry. However, ‘composing’ also suggests a calming down, reconstruction, reconciliation and social renewal.

Hence, the Mother Ground can be viewed as a figure who represents transformation and transmutation, which is symbolized by the “mutation of weathers / and seasons” (*N* 43). One can also see this ‘alchemical’ process taking place in “The Tollund Man” where the “dark juices” of the goddess’s fen “work on” and transform her sacrificial victim into “a saint’s kept body” (*WO* 47). Thus, the goddess converts the Tollund Man into a holy figure to whom Heaney considers delving, thereby risking blasphemy, “to make germinate” dead flesh (*WO* 48). Foley states that Heaney, through the Tollund Man, “seeks to consecrate the land, transforming the ‘cauldron bog’ of hatred and violence into ‘Our holy ground’, and

praying to 'Him' to make the victims of the ongoing conflict 'germinate' into something new and positive" (65). The themes of reconciliation and social transformation are important to Heaney. In "The Tollund Man," 'germination' (*WO* 48) refers not only to social renewal but also to the 'germination' of poetry in the poem that is rooted in ancient depths.

This theme of 'germination' is related to the following line in "ferments of husk and leaf" (*N* 43). Both 'germination' and 'fermentation' give an impression of transformation like the fermentation of wine, and are symbolic of the 'magical' effect of creating poetry. In "The Bog Queen", the queen's brain darkens like "ajar of spawn / fermenting underground" (*N* 32). It is agreeable that Tobin indicates that what ferments underground, besides the Bog Queen's brain, "is the archetypal pattern that spawns the atrocities of contemporary Ireland" (126). However, Heaney's use of the word implies that it is his own brain that is 'fermenting underground' in the sense of mental contemplation and the creation of poetry. In this way, the mother ground is also the 'ruminant ground' which is a place for meditation and composing poetry, "the cooped secrets / of process and ritual" (*N*40-41). Heaney 'composing' and meditating on the past represent important means to unite social divisions through art.

III

"The Tollund Man" is a kind of trilogy, the first part describing

the poet's reaction to a photograph of the bog body, the middle part describing the sectarian murder of labourers and four brothers in Northern Ireland, and the final part imagining the poet visiting Jutland, where the bog body was discovered, and empathizing with the body. The Tollund Man mediates the image of Northern Irish dead, as the narrator suggests that he could "pray / Him to make germinate" (*WO* 64) the bodies of the victims of the troubles. It is the personal interaction between the narrator and the body offers the momentum of the poem. The narrator in the poem actually recognizes the body as himself. Paul Ricoeur suggests that "the remembered past and the present moment of recall overlap without being identical: the past is not known, but re-known, as it were - recognized" (Changeux and Ricoeur 144). The construction of the poem forces the reader to ask repeatedly who is being referred to.

Naked except for
The cap, noose and girdle,
I will stand a long time,
Bridegroom to the goddess (*WO* 64)

In the fourth stanza, only the third line refers to the narrator. The construction, however, asks the reader to place the narrator to some extent in the position of the Tollund Man. The effect of this subjective decline is to personalize the memory of the Tollund Man, to render the bog body's experiences part of the narrator's fragmentary or episodic memory.

As an irruption into the historical, geological and political

assumptions lying behind the violence in Northern Ireland, The Tollund Man provides an interpretative strategy. It is a way of arranging with this violence and of constructing a less violent future. The purpose of remembering the past through the mediation of the Tollund Man and remembering him is to promote a change from an unsatisfied past and present into a desired future for Northern Ireland. The poem's mood is futuristic and conditional. The past tense descriptions of the fates of the Tollund Man and the Northern Irish dead are surrounded by predictions and avowals on the part of the narrator. Examples can be "Some day I will go to Aarhus", "I will stand a long time", "I could risk blasphemy", "Something of his sad freedom", "Should come to me" and the closing "I will feel lost, / Unhappy and at home" (*WO* 65).

A repetitive version of Irish history is dependent on the narrative of Irish history being incomplete when Ireland is complete the repeated cycles. The aim of "The Tollund Man" is not quite the end of Irish history, but rather an escape from Irish history and subsequent radical reformation of Irish history. The intervention of the Tollund Man interposes and mediates an Other. The Tollund Man offers a context that is both historically and geographically Other to the conflicts of Irish history. Eugene O'Brien has commented about it,

He[Heaney] is not being forced to inhabit a position inside one of the contextual binary oppositions of nationalist-unionist; republican-loyalist; Catholic-Protestant or, at a broader level, poetry-politics and the tongue being governed as opposed to being self-governing. Instead, in these poems, he is

deconstructing the received relationship between the aesthetic and the political by firstly reversing the binary and secondly by reconstituting the whole structure in order to redefine the role of the poetic text within the political context. (O'Brien 99)

The escape from history in the bog poems is an attempt to avoid sectarian positions, and re-define the relationship between the poetry and politics through the spectrum of Jutland. The escape is imagined in the final stanza, when the narrator foresees that he will feel "lost, / Unhappy and at home" (*WO* 65) in the "old man-killing parishes" of Jutland. The 'home' of this final stanza is double-edged. Namely, it is the recognition of violence in Jutland, but also the recognition that this violence is over. It is a home beyond violence. Thus, the end of the poem enacts an escape from history and a return to history being 'lost' and at 'home' simultaneously, the end and a new beginning for history. The escape from Irish history at the end of "The Tollund Man" is, crucially brought about by the utterance of a different or new language. The narrator hopes like this.

Something of his sad freedom
As he rode the tumbriel
Should come to me, driving,
Saying the names
Tollund, Grauballe, Nebelgard' (*WO*65)

The narrator in the poem arranges with the past, to share in the

experience of the Tollund Man by repeating or reciting the place names, in the hope that this act of repetition will become one of liberation. The metaphor of repetition as liberation was part of Heaney's teaching method when he was at Carysfort College, a teacher training college in Dublin. Heaney tried to get his students "to read about twelve to twenty poems a year" in the hope that they would come to "know the poems within themselves", and so "open the students into trust in their own personality, into some kind of freedom and cultivation" (*Viewpoints* 59–60). The repetition of history is then realized to be not a forced presence but actually an opportunity to change the present according to desire rather than rationality.

IV

The repeated place names in "The Tollund Man" open the poem to a further debate which the traces of the past in the landscape can be appeared. The debate is continued in *Wintering Out* in the place name poems "Anahorish", "Broagh" and "Toome." The need to address the context of memory and the past, and to renegotiate the relationship between the present and the past informs Heaney's next bog poem, "The Grauballe Man." When the narrator describes the Grauballe Man lying "perfected in my memory" (*N* 29). From this 'perfected' memory, the poem moves on to two final images, the "Dying Gaul" and the "actual weight / of each hooded victim, / slashed and dumped" (*N* 29). The image is not 'perfected', but a

conditional state, part of a process of remembering and a sequence of historical motifs. As the image of the preserved bog body transforms into other, thematically linked images it suggests itself as an instance of an unfolding of memory.

The uncovering of memory allows for a different transition between the past and the future. In "The Tollund Man," the catalyst for future development is a masculine attitude towards sexual reproduction. The narrator wanted the bog body to 'germinate' the Northern Irish dead, to radically alter the landscape of the present. In "The Grauballe Man" it is the bog body itself that is the medium for future change, as the Grauballe Man is described in feminine terms such as his hips "the ridge / and purse of a mussel" (N 28). In this image, with its switching of gender roles, as Thomas Docherty notes, the body is "pregnant and what he is pregnant with is, of course, the presence of a future" (1215). The key to the Grauballe Man's 'pregnancy' is his liquidity, his shifting nature, the sense that he is always 'becoming.' From the first conditional description of the body ("As if he had been poured / in tar"), a range of liquid images characterize the body ("the river of himself", "purse of a mussel", "an eel arrested / under a glisten of mud") (N 28). This liquidity makes space for "the spectres of past and future possibility" (Middleton 195) and acknowledges that writing involves "responsibility toward the future, since it involves the struggle to create openings within which the other can appear," and as such is a medium which can "come to transform what we know or think we know" (5). The liquidity of "The Grauballe Man" allows for an "eternally suspended future" (Levinas 138), which is always on the

verge of existence, but which will never arrive. However, the liquidity of the imagery used to describe the Tollund Man reveals the difficulties of describing him. The crucial stanza of the poem holds on this difficulty.

Who will say 'corpse'
to his vivid cast?
Who will say 'body'
to his opaque repose? (N29)

It asks questions similar to those posed by the place-name poems of *Wintering Out*, "Broagh", "Anahorish" and "Toome." We consider how we can describe the past and what language we create to depict the past. The difficulty is that although non-textual forms of memory and memorialization do exist the very presence of the bog bodies suggests one type of non-textual memory, there is no means of configuring or interpreting the memory outside language. Even if you do not go as far as to suggest that memory is inherently textual, then the question remains as to how you approach memory outside the text. This is what is at stake when Jacques Derrida claims that writing "founds memory" and is not simply a "supplement" to it (228) or when Frederic Jameson claims that "history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious" (35). In "The Grauballe Man", Heaney poses the questions, but does not approach an

answer. This may be picked up later in the poem “Tollund” in *Spirit Level*. In “Tollund”, “Things had moved on” (*SL* 69). The past has become commercialized, integrated into the modern world.

The scarecrow's arms
Stood open opposite the satellite
Dish in the paddock, where a standing stone
Had been resituated, and landscaped,
With tourist signs in futhark runic script
In Danish and in English. (*SL* 69)

The re-situation of the past, and the memorialization of the past as a commodity for consumption primarily for tourists rather than for any nationalist celebration or consumption, is presented as a good thing. The past is not ignored, but acknowledged as both a facet of the present with the juxtaposition of the scarecrow and the satellite and a commodity negotiated by the present, with the resultant impression that the scene “could have been a still out of the bright / ‘Townland of Peace’” (*SL* 69). The presentation of the past is part of this commodification. The ‘signs in futhark runic script’ mark and circumscribe the historical otherness of the location and the use of the redundant ‘runic’ in the description serves to doubly name the text.

In the Jutland of “Tollund,” the narrator discovers a radically different attitude to the past and memory. The otherness of Tollund Moss comes from its very stereotypical normality, its ample grounds and tranquil peacefulness. Although the narrator claims that “It

could have been Mulhollandstown or Scribe" (*SL* 69) this is more willful than actual, despite the 1994 IRA cessation that offered the backdrop to this poem. The continuity between the Northern Ireland and Jutland is manifest primarily at the level of the bog itself, through the use of the word "grags" from the Irish word grág, to describe the withered tree stumps which emerge from the bog. And at the same time the word suggests the bog's own biological historicity. This linguistic continuity serves to emphasize the differences in the relationship towards the bog far from being a nightmarish storehouse of memory. The bog and its history are celebrated and memorialized while they are acknowledged as being present.

This memorialization with the landscaping and re-situation of historical relics has an unexpected outcome. Nicholas Andrew Miller indicates "a reflection of the irreducibly fragmentary and shifting nature of memory," (Miller 24) when the past is memorialized and objectified, the dynamic nature of human access to the past risks being lost.

Memorials of all kinds risk displacing the constantly mutating historical perception of individuals with a more or less static notion of 'memory', an objectified version of history for which the physicality of the memorial itself stands. The protean instability of the historical object fades before the memorial's authoritative stance as textual marker; its confinement of historical perception to the modality of the en-graved. (Miller 24)

However, in "Tollund", the memorialization of the past allows the narrator to avoid being constrained themselves by a faded past. The

repetition of the Irish bog as something strangely different, as something “Hallucinatory and familiar” (*SL* 69), is once more liberating. The poet and his wife, ‘at home beyond the tribe’, are ‘footloose.’ Where the poet had played Hamlet to the ‘ghost’ of the Grauballe Man, it is the poet and his wife who are here “ghosts who’d walked abroad” (*SL* 69). Rather than being constrained by the past, the poet is free to be the past to experience the presence of the past on his own terms, rather than those dictated to him by a obsessed approach to memory or cult of memory. For the poet, the past is now involved in a series of negotiations with the present, a “give-and-take of free debate” (Changeux and Ricoeur 151).

The most obvious outcome of this free debate is the narrator’s ability to reclaim the name of Sinn Fein, meaning “We Ourselves”, from its political connotations, as the poet and his wife feel “Ourselves again, free-willed again, not bad” (*SL* 69). This redress is part of the movement of the poem as a whole to re-situate Irish history in the peaceful present of Western European history. For example, the poem presents itself as occurring after the event being the Troubles of Northern Ireland. The sense of release in the poem is certainly evident, but it is also joined by a sense of continuity. The eventuality of the past as well as its status as an event in the present is not and cannot be finished, rather the poet’s attitude to the past has changed radically. Heaney’s attitude to the past is now more subdued, domestic and private including his wife in the peaceful pastoral scene. History and memory to him may be started and played out now on a domestic level, rather than a national level.

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■ **Key words**

Seamus Heaney, bog poems, memory, “Kinship”, “The Tollund Man”,
“The Grauballe Man”

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■ Abstract

Cultural and Domestic Memory in Seamus Heaney's Bog Poems

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This paper deals with Seamus Heaney's bog poems and the meaning of cultural memory. He delves into the bog, examines its past and history, develops its present situation and negotiates between the present and past, not missing its originality. In fact, the bog poems suggest different reconstructions of the same event, different ways of remembering or recalling memory traces. And memory emerges from these negotiations and strategies as a range of processes of recovery. The person remembering an object can enter into the unknown. So, it is a creative or interpretative process of narrating memory traces in terms of the context of retrieval, rather than an archaeological process of revealing discrete or complete memories. It is also a means of representing the ongoing trace of the past or the presence of the past, rather than of discovering a finished past. In the context, poems such as "Kinship," "The Tollund Man," "The Bog Queen" and "The Grauballe Man" can be applicable to memorial images of Irish bog. Heaney's attitude to the past has changed radically in the bog poems. The poet's attitude to the past is so subdued and private, as exemplified by the inclusion

his wife in the peaceful pastoral scene. Irish history and memory is considered to be originated and completed on a domestic dimension rather than a national dimension.

■ Key Words

Seamus Heaney, bog poems, memory, “Kinship”, “The Tollund Man”, “The Grauballe Man”

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일



The Comparison of Villains in Shakespeare's *Richard III* and *Hamlet*

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I. Introduction

With this year marking the 400th anniversary of the death of Shakespeare (1564–1616), the greatest English writer in the world, it may as well be meaningful to look closely into his masterpieces and the themes in them in order to redefine the significance of his works in the modern history. Shakespeare has created a total of 37 plays for 25 years between late 1580s to early 1610s. His masterpieces, which range from historical play, comedy, tragedy and to tragi-comedies, are all equally excellent. Shakespeare's work period can be divided mainly into four stages.

In the first stage (1590–1595), Shakespeare's works were mainly the small-scaled comedy of wits and not-too-serious historical plays that advocated the ruling government at the time. In the second stage, which was from 1596 to 1600, his works moved from simple, small plays to high quality mature plays that often required serious insights and were imbued sympathized with pathos. In

addition, the historical plays during this period developed into a more serious kind of play, which is more entertaining and insightful with more historical facts and creative fiction. It was during the third period (1601–1608) when Shakespeare created his reputable four tragedies and more serious and insightful plays in a row, which, in turn, marked this period as the era of Shakespeare's tragedy. In terms of the story, Shakespeare investigated about the fate and death of a human, as well as the nature of evil. His plays during this period, politics-wise, reflected the turmoil in England back then, which went through an upheaval before and after the death of Elizabeth I. The last period, 1609–1613, somewhat shows the mild maturity of Shakespeare in his late years in the era of post-romanticism. As the plays end up in a reverse after the tragic events all turn out to be happy ending in comedy, it is also called the era of tragic-comedy. The common feature in this era is that the tragic reality is portrayed in the first and ideal ending comes in the end.

In terms of the theme, historically, Shakespeare's historical plays go against the ethics and political philosophy of the Tudor Empire (Zesmer 128). While the playwrights during the Renaissance period had tried to alleviate one's pride in the country and to give ethical morals in their historical plays, Shakespeare's historical plays, in late 20th century, rather dealt with the political agenda. In the meantime, the fundamentals of Shakespeare's tragedies are the disaster and catastrophe triggered by human actions, and the main cause behind these actions is one's character (Bradly 6). For that reason, *Hamlet* (*Hamlet*, 1601–2) is often interpreted as the tragedy

of a character.

The main objective of this thesis is to define Shakespeare's genuine message he delivered through the evil actions of two characters – Richard of *Richard III* (*Richard III*, 1592–3)¹⁾ in Shakespeare's 1st period, the period of historical plays, and Claudius in *Hamlet* from the 3rd period, the period of tragedy – by comparing and contrasting the two characters.

The similarity between the two pieces is that both Richard and Claudius killed their brothers and deceived others to be throned, and they even recklessly commit adultery to achieve this goal. In addition, their conflict with the prince that was to be throned makes the two characters look alike.

II . The villain character of Richard in *Richard III*

The main subject of this play is the closure of War of the Roses (1455–1485), which was a civil war between the two royal families – Lancaster family and York family – who fought against each other for the authority during the middle ages.²⁾

The act starts with the monologue of Richard, the main character, revealing his current status, psychological status and future plans to the audience. He moans about his current status where he gets

1) Quotes hereafter are indicated as numbers in the row of act, chapter and lines in the bracket.

2) This is a war that occurred between the Duke of Lancerster and Duke of York over the throne. The name – Roses – come from Lancasters' red rose ensign and Yorks' white rose ensign.

neglected due to his physical handicap despite Richard's huge role in helping the York family, where he belongs to, defeat the Lancaster family to *get the authority*. He says

Richard But I that am not shaped for sportive tricks,
Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass;
I, that am rudely stamped and want love's majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,
And that so lamely and unfashionable
That dogs bark at me as I halt by them —
Why, I, in this weak piping time of peace,
Have no delight to pass away the time,
Unless to see my shadow in the sun
And descant on mine own deformity.

(1.1.14-27)

In compensation for his inferior complex, he shows strong will to become the King no matter what it would take. He decides to become a villain himself ("I am determined to prove a villain", 1.1.30) and starts to hate the relaxation and dryness of the present in which the war is over. With his oldest brother King Edward IV being sick, he comes with a plot of killing many people who are in the higher rank than he is for King succession. Then, Richard puts

this plot into action with huge impulse.

First of all, he drives a wedge between Duke Clarence, his second brother, and King Edward to shut Clarence in the Tower of London. He then orders an assassinator to kill him. In this process, Richard makes a plot and tell he would help Clarence come out of the jail by persuading the King. Then, he lays the blame and responsibilities on Queen Elizabeth. While already having finished a plot of “To set my brothers, Clarence and the King, In deadly hate, the one against the other” (1.1. 34–35), Richard shows hypocrisy, deceiving others that he does not know anything about the event. Like the saying that an act is not about revealing one's ego, but an act of concealing it (Goldman 74), Richard seems to be a perfect actor to achieve his goal.

Next comes a woman named Anne, who is the widow of Edward Prince, who is the son of Henry IV. Richard allures Anne with all possible wits when she lined up in the array during her father-in-law's funeral and succeeds in getting married to her. This is indeed a meaningful marriage as he needs Anne to get nearer to the throne.

Richard For then I'll marry Warwick's youngestdaughter,

What though I killed her husband and herfather?

The readiest way to make the wench amends

Is to become her husband and her father,

The which will I, not all so much for love

As for another secret close intent

By marrying her which I must reach unto. (1.1. 154-60)

Standing against the curse of Anne, he witfully tells Anne not to be sad because her husband and her father-in-law rest in peace, rationalizing his deed. He even says that every tragedy and death are caused by the beauty of Anne. Richard says to Anne that everything is a fact and even hands a knife over to Anne and says that he can even die in her hand, deceiving Anne as if he is genuine. As seen in the line, “And I no friends to back my suit at all But the plain devil and dissembling looks? And yet to win her, all the world to nothing!” (1.2. 239–41), he ridicules not only others but his own conscience, feeling victorious over everything. He also promises he would not let Anne live long.

After King Edward died of an illness, Richard then imprison the Prince and York – the sons of the deceased – and kill them. Then, he acquires to be the Good Protector (Neill 27), going as far as the throne. Now, Richard then starts killing all the people that come as obstacles in his plot including Hastings, one by one. Buckingham appoints a role for Richard and adjusts his actions, devising a plot where it makes seem Richard unavoidably has to become the King. He even marries Young Elizabeth, his niece, to empower himself. Regarding this, Queen Elizabeth, Buckingham's sister-in-law, acts as if she accepts his request with no hesitation, but plots something for the future.

In Act 5, Scene 3, Richard arrives Bosworth Field and sets up the army camp one side of the stage, while Richmond also builds a barracks on the other side. Richmond and sets up another barracks. When he goes to bed after praying, the ghosts killed by Richard

appear one by one, forecasting a wretched ending for Richard and victory for Richmond. At this point, Richard gets feeble due to the nightmare and gets shaken. At last, Richard dies in the war and Richmond becomes Henry VII and marries Elizabeth of York family. Due to this marriage, the war between the Lancasters, who are symbolized as red roses, and the Yorks, the white roses, comes to an end. The entire act concludes with the start of Tudor empire with Henry VII becoming the first King.

III. The villain character of Claudius in *Hamlet*

A ghost appears in the beginning of the play to present the grave mood. The ghost is actually the late king, who is Claudius' real brother and Prince Hamlet's father. The ghost of the late king explains to his son how he got killed by Claudius' evilness and says a revenge will be taken.

Hamlet didn't completely trust the fact at the beginning. But, he confirms the integrity of the ghost to his friend, Horatio. But, Hamlet says to Horatio, "If his occulted guilt/ Do not itself unkennel in one speech, It is a damned ghost that we have seen, And my [Hamlet's] imaginations are as foul/As Vulcan's stithy" (3.2.75-79), if Claudius' guilt is not revealed during the Murder of Gonzago play. That Hamlet somewhat predicted about the guilt of Claudius, his uncle, even before he meets the ghost implies that Hamlet believes in the possibility that the evil tries to delude Hamlet to get him in trap to make him to hell in the end.

In the coronation ceremony, the present King Claudius says:

King Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother's death
The memory be green; and that it us befitted
To bear our hearts is grief, and our whole kingdom
To be contracted in one brow of woe;
Yet so far hath discretion fought with nature
That we with wisest sorrow think on him,
Together with remembrance of ourselves,
Therefore our sometime sister, now our queen,
Th'imperial jointress of this warlike state,
(1.2. 1-9)

When the late king, his own brother, was sleeping in the gardens, Claudius poisoned his ears to death and married his sister-in-law to acquire the position. Concealing this fact, Claudius deceives Hamlet by acting as if he really loves Prince Hamlet, his nephew. The evidence that Claudius killed his brother is proven through the play "The Murder of Gonzago" ordered by Hamlet to the actors.

[The trumpets sound. A dumb-show follows]

Enter a King and a Queen, very lovingly, the Queen embracing him and he her. She kneels, and makes show of protestation unto him,

Anon comes in another Man, takes off his crown, kisses it, pours poison in the sleeper's ears, and leaves him. The Queen returns, finds the King dead, makes passionate action. The Poisoner with some, Three or Four comes in

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again,

They seem to condole with her; The dead body is carried away.

The Poisoner woos the Queen with gifts. She seems harsh awhile, but in the end accepts his love.

(Dumb-show in 2, 2. 128-9)

With this non-verbal play, the audience gets to know about the incident. Not able to withstand the play staged, Claudius exclaims "Give me some light. Away." (3.2.255) and leaves the place. Hamlet now is certain that Claudius has killed his father due to the reaction from the king's embarrassing action with the play, but he doesn't get into action immediately. After the play is finished, Hamlet sees Claudius praying on his way to meet his mother, Queen Gertrude.

King Oh, my offence is rank, it smells to heaven;
It hath the primal eldest curse upon't -
A brother's murder! Pray can I not,
Though inclination be as sharp as will,
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent,
And, like a man to double business bound,
I stand in pause where I shall first begin,
And both neglect. What if this cursed hand
Were thicker than itself with brother's blood,
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens
To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy
.....
My fault is past. But oh, what form of prayer

Can serve my turn? 'Forgive me my fowmurder'?
That cannot be, since I am still possessed
Of those effects for which I did the murder -
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen.
(3.3.36-55)

Although Hamlet comes an opportune time to take revenge, he doesn't get into action. That is because the ghost is believed to ask for a vendetta, which refers to the revenge among the families, the folk tradition that has been handed down in England for hundreds of years. The ghost entreats revenge by appealing the father-son affection (1.5.23). In addition, another reason Hamlet delays his revenge is the Christian spirit. In no cases would a Christian permit the killing of a human including suicide. The order of the ghost, "Taint not thy mind nor let thy soul contrive..." (1.5.85), is a good example of the human nature of English during the Renaissance period.

Hamlet Now might I do it pat, now he is a-praying,
And now I'll do't, [Draws his sword]
And so he goes to heaven;
And so am I revenged, That would be scanned:
A villain kills my father, and for that
I, his sole son, do this same villain send
To heaven,
(3.3.74-8)

To Hamlet and his audience, the crime Claudius has committed is understandable enough in terms of the ethical concept of the popular culture that represents the generation. However, in terms of the Christianity perspective of Hamlet and the audience, the revenge is considered a sin (Rabkin 4).

Despite the distress of Hamlet, who has good conscience and speculations, Claudius does not regret or confess his crime even during his prayers.

The king finally decides send Hamlet to England and tells Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to put Hamlet on the ship the very night. "Delay it not. I'll have him hence tonight. Away! For Everything is sealed and done/ That else leans on th'affair. ... By letters conjuring to that effect, The present death of Hamlet. Do it, England ... Till I know'tis done, Howe'er my haps, my joys werene'er begun" (4.3.54–68). Even in this line, one would discover that Claudius still commits crimes without penitence. His prayers are vain and lies. It is that Claudius is displaying a sense of fear due to the possible retribution of his past crimes.

Even as the play draws to the end, the King makes Laertes to fight against Hamlet with the poisoned sword and tries to make Hamlet drink poison. During this time, both people got hurt by fatal poisoned sword; the queen drinks wine, which is the poisoned alcohol. When she faints, the King lies that she got choked by the blood. The Queen, however, says, "No, no, the drink, the drink! Oh my dear Hamlet! ... I am poisoned" (5.2.304–5), showing the last motherhood of trying to keep her son from death. Almost everyone, except for Horatio, dies in the end.

IV. Comparison of the two villain characters

As we've seen in the character analysis, both Richard and Claudius are similar in that; they are the brothers of the current and late kings; commit adultery; and try to kill their nephews. It is also distinctively shown that they commit anything to get throned. In other words, the villain character is their fundamental, which makes the two characters look alike. However, although they are both the villains, there is a bit difference in their momentum or nature.

First of all, Richard aims to become the villain himself and tells his plot to the audience from the start of the play. He also carries his plot into action quite well. With the Machiavellian nature, he is strong at scheming and talks lies very well according to the situations. Sometimes, he makes the audience laugh with his wits. As said earlier, he accepts all the curses of Anne and still appeals his love for her, saying:

"I do mistake my person all this while! ... I'll be at charges for a looking glass/ And entertain a score or two of tailors/ To study fashions to adorn my body." (1.2, 257-62).

With such lines, he seems to be attractive to make the audience stand on his side. The audience somehow agrees upon his villain deeds and even cheers for him. Richard is adept in acting like he is supporting the counterpart outside but giving damages in reality like the Vice that appears in the ethical plays of the Middle Ages, and he shows all these villain deeds to the audience to have them

enjoy with him (Scragg 53–454). The audience, in fact, wants Richard to succeed his sly plot in their mind.

Likewise, Richard, who reveals self-satisfaction, confidence and desire for aspiration, is a villain throughout. He doesn't get shaken and doesn't show a sign of penitence. Richard only shows to be a bit weak due to the nightmares in Bosworth before he dies. "Give me another horse! ... I did but dream ... Richard loves Richard; that is, I and I. ... My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, And every tongue brings in a several tale...And every tale condemns me for a villain. ... And wherefore should they, since that I myself / Find in myself no pity to myself?" (5.3.181–207). But he pulls himself and becomes brave again later on.

On the other hand, Claudius shows himself praying from time to time, showing that he is regretful to some extent. However, I, the writer, believe that such actions make him look more hypocrite and more villain. If he really was regretful, he should have took down all the things he seized unethically – throne, Queen and ambition. Even in the end, he changed his mind and did not stop his plot of killing Hamlet, which is an unjustifiable deed.

The two characters have similarity in that they show carefulness in achieving what they want. Meanwhile, Richard is a total villain that keeps his promise, but Claudius shows more of cowardness by ordering Polonius, the premier and Ophelia's father.

Both of the characters do not commit crimes not because of others but because of themselves for throne. Their spontaneous deed can be a key; if Richard pledged himself to behave well from the first place rather than becoming the villain, he would have kept the commitment

successfully.

Being good-natured one, as a result, depends on their attitude of mind respectively. All entities whatever such as good and evil in the world are thus empty of unconstructed existence. It seems that this is the real focus of Shakespeare's plays.

V. Conclusion

Fulfilling one's selfish desires and ambition, regardless of what it takes, may be a natural principle in the human society to the end. Such characters of these plays appear in all of four tragedies of Shakespeare in different characters. For that reason, Bernard Spivak said the nature is the goddess of Edmond and Iago (Spivak 87).

In conclusion, the devil and the good are essentially one. These two emotions are innate in ourselves, and what kind of a person would be totally depends on one's commitment. The end point of the good is a villain, and the villain is the good; they are all 'emptiness'. This is the genuine message Shakespeare tried to deliver, regardless of the west or the east, and this is also about creating the Renaissance type human that wants to be purified in this impurity. Hamlet, who speculated hard to purify himself as ordered by the ghost of his father, is the character that represents this kind. This is the real message that Shakespeare has delivered, which is the truth beyond the time and space. It is also the reason why Shakespeare is still admired as the playwright and poet up until now.

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■ **Key words**

villain, good, vice, human nature, free will, hermaphrodite, emptiness.

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■ Abstract

The Comparison of Villains in Shakespeare's *Richard III* and *Hamlet*

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare two villains, Richard and Claudius, in the works of Shakespeare, *Richard III* and *Hamlet*. For this purpose, two writers focused their interests on the human nature such as good and evil, and discussed the common points and differences of the characters.

Richard III is one of Shakespeare's political historic plays. The protagonist, Richard makes decision that he will completely be an evil man from the first to the end. In the process of depriving crown, he never wavered from his purpose. On the other hand, Claudius in *Hamlet* has his brother, late king and Hamlet's father killed and also tries to kill Hamlet. Nevertheless, in an effort to repent his sin, he pres to God several times. This is a small but nevertheless important change compared to Richard. These behaviors, however, are his disguised and disturbed appearances.

After the veil was uncovered in the end of the plot, he revealed his hypocritical entity. From this view of the characteristic comparisons, this is an attempt to explore the nature of human's good and evil. Throughout Richard's behaviors, we could see that his consistent

bad things draw a conclusion that his attitude of mind can make good-hearted person on his own. This leads to the concept of 'emptiness' that good and evil essentially are one. In other words, all ambiguous entities whatsoever in the world are empty of unstructured existence and it is the point of view of Shakespeare.

■ Key Words

villain, good, vice, human nature, free will, hermaphrodite, emptiness.

■ 논문게재일

○투고일: 2016년 7월 22일 ○심사일: 2016년 8월 12일 ○게재일: 2016년 8월 31일

『영어권문화연구』 발간 규정

제1조 (학술지 발간의 목적과 성격)

- (1) 동국대 영어권문화연구소(이하 ‘연구소’라 칭함)는 영어권 문화와 문학을 연구하고 교육하는 학자들의 연구활동과 정보교환을 촉진하기 위해 정기적으로 학술지 『영어권문화연구』(*The Journal of English Cultural Studies*)를 발간한다.
- (2) 본 학술지는 영어권문화연구와 관련된 논문들을 게재함을 원칙으로 하며 논문의 내용은 영어권의 인문, 철학, 문학, 문화 연구나 학제적 연구의 범위 안에 포괄될 수 있는 독창적인 것이거나 그러한 연구에 도움이 될 수 있는 것이어야 한다.

제2조 (학술지 발간 일정)

- (1) [학술지 발간] 학술지는 매년 6월 30일과 12월 31일 연 2회 발간한다.
- (2) [원고 접수와 심사] 원고는 수시 접수를 원칙으로 하며 기고자에게 게재 희망호를 명시하도록 요구한다. 논문 접수 마감은 1권은 3월 15일, 2권은 7월 15일, 그리고 3권은 11월 15일로 하고 이때까지 접수된 논문에 대해 해당호 게재 여부를 위한 심사를 진행한다. 기한 보다 늦게 투고된 논문들에 대해서는 편집회의를 통해 심사 여부를 결정한다. 투고 및 심사일정은 다음의 표와 같다. 투고 및 심사 일정에 변경이 필요할 경우에는 편집회의를 통해 결정한다.

호	투고 마감	심사	수정본 접수마감	심사 완료
1권	3월 15일	3월 16일 ~ 31일	4월 10일	4월 15일
2권	7월 15일	7월 16일 ~ 31일	8월 10일	8월 15일
3권	11월 15일	11월 16일 ~ 30일	12월 10일	12월 15일

제3조 (학술지의 발간규정에 대한 심의 및 제/개정)

- (1) 학술지의 발간규정에 대한 심의 및 제/개정은 편집위원 2/3이상의 동의를 얻어 편집위원회에서 확정하고 편집위원장이 이사회에 보고한다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 31일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2013년 10월 31일부터 시행한다.

『영어권문화연구』 편집위원회 운영 및 심사 규정

제1조 (편집위원회의 설치목적과 구성)

- (1) 연구소에서 발행하는 학술지 『영어권문화연구』의 편집과 출판에 필요한 업무를 담당하기 위해 편집위원회를 설치, 운영한다.
- (2) 편집위원회는 학술지에 수록될 논문의 심사 및 발간에 관한 제반 사항을 수행한다.
- (3) 편집위원회는 편집위원장과 편집위원들로 구성한다.
- (4) 편집위원장은 연구소 운영위원 중에서 선임한다.
- (5) 업무수행의 효율성을 위해 편집위원 중에서 편집 간사를 선임할 수 있다.
- (6) 편집위원회는 10인 내외로 구성한다.
- (7) 편집위원은 학문적인 조예가 깊고, 연구소활동에 적극적으로 참여하는 회원 중에서 전문성, 대내외적 인지도, 경력사항, 연구실적, 연구소기여도, 지역 등을 고려하여 이사회에서 선임한다.
- (8) 편집위원은 연구실적이 우수한 상임이사나 회원 가운데서 추천을 받아 이사회 2/3 이상의 동의를 얻어 연구소장이 임명한다.
- (9) 편집위원의 임기는 최소 2년으로 하고 연임할 수 있다.
- (10) 편집위원회는 연구소에서 추진하는 기타 출판 사업과 관련하여 연구소이사회에 요청이 있을 경우, 이를 지원하도록 한다.
- (11) 편집위원은 전공 영역을 고려하여 투고 논문을 세부 전공에 맞게 심사할 수 있도록 각 분야의 전문가들로 고루 선정한다.

제2조 (편집위원회 구성원의 임무)

- (1) 편집위원장은 『영어권문화연구』의 편집과 출판에 관련된 제반 업무를 총괄 조정하고 편집위원회의 원활한 운영을 도모한다. 또한, 학술

지와 관련하여 제반 대외 업무를 수행한다.

- (2) 편집위원장은 학술지의 편집 및 출판회의를 주관하고, 원고를 두고 받아 관리하며, 심사를 진행한다. 편집회의에 투고된 원고를 보고하면서 각 논문마다 전공분야에 맞는 심사위원을 추천받아, 해당 논문에 대한 3인 이상의 심사위원회를 구성하여 규정에 따라 심사를 진행하고 관리한다.
- (3) 편집위원은 편집위원장의 요청에 따라 편집회의에서 논문심사위원을 추천하고 위임받은 논문에 대한 심사를 수행한다.
- (4) 편집위원장과 편집위원은 연 2회 이상 학술지의 편집방향과 특성에 대해 협의한다. 특히 특집호를 기획할 경우, 편집위원장은 편집위원 전원의 의견을 수렴하고 편집위원 과반수 이상의 동의를 얻어 예정 발행일 8개월 전까지 편집계획을 수립하고 연구소의 이사회에 보고한다.

제3조 (원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)

- (1) [접수 및 관리] 원고는 공정한 투고 시스템을 사용해 모집한다. 투고된 원고의 접수 및 심사와 관련된 제반 사항과 절차는 편집위원장이 총괄한다. 편집위원장은 접수된 원고마다 투고자의 인적 사항, 논문 투고 및 심사 현황, 출판 등 사후 관리를 일람할 수 있는 원고 대장을 작성하여 관리한다.
- (2) [심사 송부] 논문의 심사는 심사의 합리성, 투명성, 공정성을 위해 투고자와 심사자의 인적 사항을 공개하지 않고(blind test) 인비로 진행한다. 편집위원장은 접수한 논문의 저자에 관한 모든 사항을 삭제한 후 심사위원회에 송부한다.
- (3) [심사위원 위촉] 각 논문의 심사위원은 그 논문에 적합한 전공분야 3인의 편집위원으로 연구 기여도, 심사경력 등을 고려하여 편집위원회의 편집회의에서 선정하여 위촉한다. (편집위원 중에 해당분야 적

임자가 없을 시에는 다른 회원에게 심사를 위촉할 수 있다.)

- (4) [심사 일정] 심사위원은 심사를 위촉받은 후 20일 이내에 심사 결과를 심사결과서와 함께 편집위원장에게 통보한다.
- (5) [심사 기준] 논문심사는 1) 학회게재 형식 부합성, 2) 내용의 창의성, 3) 논지의 명확성, 4) 논증과정(문단간 연계성, 인용근거의 정확성, 구성의 밀도, 문장의 명증성, 설득력 등), 5) 주제의 시의성, 6) 논리적 논지전개, 7) 학문적 기여도와 같은 논문의 질적 심사와 8) 논문 형식, 9) 참고자료의 적합성, 10) 영문초록과 주제어가 적절한지 등과 같은 형식 평가를 중심으로 평가한다.

심사자는 평가결과를 연구소의 심사결과서 양식에 따라 서술식으로 평가하고 종합평가 결과를 ‘게재 가’, ‘수정 후 게재’, ‘수정 후 재심사’, ‘게재 불가’ 중 택일하여 판정한 후 논문심사결과서를 편집위원회로 송부한다. ‘게재 가’ 판정이 아닐 경우 그 이유나 수정-보완 지시 및 게재 불가 사유를 구체적으로 서술하도록 한다.

- (6) [게재 판정] 논문의 게재여부는 해당 분야에 학문적 조예가 깊은 전공자 3인으로 구성된 심사위원회의 심사결과를 기준으로 결정한다. 심사위원 2인 이상이 ‘게재가’ 혹은 ‘수정 후 게재’로 평한 논문만을 원칙적으로 게재 대상으로 한다. 각 논문에 대해 2인 이상의 심사위원이 ‘게재 불가’로 판정하면 그 논문은 해당호에 게재할 수 없다. 그 구체적인 판정기준은 다음과 같다.

가) 게재 가 : 논문 심사 결과 편집위원(심사위원) 3인 중 2인 이상의 “게재 가” 판정이 나왔을 경우.

나) 게재 불가 : 논문 심사 결과 편집위원(심사위원) 3인 중 2인 이상의 “게재 불가” 판정이 나왔을 경우.

다) 수정 후 게재 : 사소한 문제점들이 있어 약간의 수정이 필요한 경우로서, 심사위원 3인 중 2인 이상이 “수정 후 게재” 혹은 그 보다 상위의 종합평가결과로 판정하는 경우.

- 라) 수정 후 재심사 : 크고 작은 문제점들이 많아 대폭적인 수정을 한 후에 재심사가 요구되는 경우로서, 심사위원 3인 중 2인 이상이 “수정 후 재심사” 혹은 그보다 하위의 종합평가 결과로 판정하는 경우.
- (7) [심사 결정 및 보고] 편집위원장은 심사위원 3인의 논문심사 보고가 완료되면 편집위원회를 소집하여 심사보고서를 검토한 후 게재 여부를 최종 결정한다. 편집위원장은 해당 논문에 대한 편집위원회의 결정을 투고자에게 통지하며, 이때 심사위원 3인의 심사평 사본을 심사자 인적 사항을 삭제한 후 첨부한다.
- (8) [논문 수정 및 재심사] 심사위원이 ‘수정 후 게재’ 또는 ‘수정 후 재심사’로 판정한 때는 수정해야 할 사항을 상세히 적어 논문 필자에게 즉시 통보하여, 빠른 시일 내에 수정 보완 혹은 재심을 위해 다시 제출하도록 한다. 재심사는 1차 심사 위원 1인이 참여하고 2인의 신규 심사위원을 위촉하여 진행한다. 재심사의 경우 심사위원 2인 이상이 ‘수정 후 재심’이나 ‘게재 불가’로 판정하면 그 논문은 해당 호에 게재할 수 없다.
- (9) [심사결과 통보] 접수된 모든 논문은 연구소 일정에 따라 40일 이내에 필자에게 그 결과를 통보한다. 게재가 확정된 논문은 필자에게 우선이나 전자우편으로 게재 확정을 통보하고, 논문의 집필자가 학술지 발행 전에 <논문 게재 예정 증명서> 발급을 요청하면 편집위원장은 이 증명서를 발급한다. ‘게재 불가’로 판정된 논문은 집필자에게 <게재 불가 통지서>를 발송한다. ‘수정 후 게재’나 ‘수정 후 재심사’로 판정받은 논문은 편집위원(심사위원)의 심사평과 함께 수정 후 다시 제출할 일시를 적시하여 수정제의서를 발송한다.
- (10) [심사결과에 대한 이의 신청] 논문 심사결과에 이의가 있을 경우, 편집위원장에게서 심사결과를 통보받은 후 5일 이내에 서면 혹은 전자메일로 이의신청을 할 수 있다. 논문 제출자의 이의 신청이 접수

되면 편집위원회는 해당 심사위원에게 재심을 요청하고, 해당 심사위원은 5일 이내에 재심사 결과를 편집위원회에 통보한다. 단, '게재 불가'로 판정된 논문은 투고자가 이의를 제기하는 경우 편집위원회 2/3 이상의 동의를 얻는 논문에 한해 재심을 진행한다.

- (11) [수정제의 수용원칙] 논문 집필자는 편집위원회의 수정제의를 있을 경우 이를 존중하는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 단, 수정제의를 수용하지 않을 경우 반론문을 서면이나 전자우편으로 편집위원장에게 반드시 제출한다. 수정제의를 수용하지 않고 재심요구도 없는 경우와 답변이 없는 경우에는 편집위원회에서 해당 논문의 게재를 거부할 수 있다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 18일부터 시행한다.

『영어권문화연구』 편집 및 교정 기준

1. 논문의 구성

- (1) 제목 : 제목은 논문보다 큰 글자(14 포인트)를 사용하고 부제목 (12 포인트)이 있는 경우에는 주제목 다음에 콜론을 찍고 부제목을 쓴다. 작품제목은 영어로 쓴다.

예: 브라이언 프리엘의 휴머니티 이념: Translations를 중심으로

(2) 논문의 소제목

로마 숫자를 원칙으로 하고, 다음의 방법으로 표기한다.

- 서론부분: I. 서론 (영문논문의 경우, I. Introduction)
- 본론부분: II, III, IV. . . (구체적 소제목 명기는 저자의 필요에 따른다)
- 결론부분: V. 결론 (영문논문의 경우, V. Conclusion)

(3) 필자이름

- ▶ 논문 서두 우측 상단에 위치. 한글 성명을 쓴다.
예 : 홍길동
- ▶ 논문 본문 마지막, 주제어 전에 소속 학교 명칭을 넣는다.
예 : 동국대
- ▶ Abstract 경우에는 영문 성명 아래 영문 학교 명칭을 쓴다.
예 : Hong, Kil Dong (or Kil-Dong)
(HanKuk University)
- ▶ 영문 성명은 Hong, Kil Dong으로 한다.
- ▶ 공동필자의 경우: 맨 앞에 위치한 필자가 제1필자이고, 그 다음의

공동필자는 가나다 순 (영어 이름의 경우 알파벳순)으로 기재한다.

(4) 참고 / 인용 문헌(References / Works Cited)

본문이 끝난 뒤 반드시 인용 문헌(11 포인트)이라는 제목 하에 참고 및 인용 자료의 서지사항을 열거하고 인용 문헌이 끝나면 200 단어 내외의 영문 요약을 붙인다.

(5) 영문 요약

논문제목(14 포인트)은 영어로 쓴다. 제목 1줄 밑 오른쪽 끝에는 필자의 영문이름을 쓴다.

예: Myth-seeking Journey in Brian Friel

Hong, Gil Dong
(Dongguk University)

The theme of rebirth in Brian Friel is well expounded in many aspects : . . .

Its main objective is. . . .

(6) 주제어

본문이 끝나면 2줄을 띄고, 한글 논문인 경우 “주제어”를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 한글로 명기한다. 그리고, 영문초록이 끝나고 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 영어로 기입한다. 영어 논문의 경우 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 영어로 기입한다.

(7) 본문

본문의 글자 크기는 10 포인트로 하되 줄 사이의 간격 비율은 160으

로 한다.

2. 한글 논문에서의 외국어 사용

- 고유명사의 경우 작품명은 우리말로 번역하고 인명은 우리말로 옮겨 적되 교육인적자원부 제정 외국어 발음 규정을 따른다.
- 처음 나오는 모든 외국어는 괄호 속에 원어를 제시하되, 두 번째 부터는 원어제시가 필요 없다. 작품명과 번역된 저서명은 처음에 번역한 제목을 『 』 안에 쓰고 이어서 () 안에 원어 제목을 병기하고, 그 다음에는 번역된 제목만 쓴다. 한글 논문 제목은 「 」 안에 쓴다.

예: 『욕망이라는 이름의 전차』(A Streetcar Named Desire)

3. 강조와 들여쓰기 (Indentation)

- (1) 본문 중에서 강조하고자 하는 부분이 있을 때에는 방점 혹은 밑줄을 사용하지 아니하고 ‘ ’ 안에 쓰며, 인용문 중 강조 부분은 원저자의 명기에 따르고, 논문 필자의 강조는 이탤릭체로 쓰며 인용문 끝 출처 표시 다음에 한 칸을 띄고 (원문 강조) 혹은 (필자 강조)를 명시한다.

- (2) 모든 새로운 문단은 두 글자만큼(타자 철자 5칸) 들여쓰기를 한다.

4. 인용 및 출처 밝히기

모든 인용문은 한글로 번역하고 바로 뒤의 괄호 안에 원문을 덧붙인다.

- (1) 직접인용의 경우

- 한글로 된 번역본에서 인용할 경우에는 “ ” 안에 인용문을 쓰고 이어서 () 안에 출처를 밝히고 괄호 밖에 마침표를 찍는다.

예: 레이몬드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이, “주인공은 죽지만 비극의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다”(55-56).

- 외국어 원본에서 인용할 경우 “ ”안에 한글로 번역된 인용문을 쓰고 이어서 ()안에 원문을 쓴 후에 적절한 문장부호를 사용하고 출처를 밝힌다.

예: “역설적으로, 오늘의 등장인물들은 저급하다고 여겨질 수도 있는 열정을 통해서 자신들의 위대함을 구축한다”

(Paradoxically, O'Neill's characters achieve their greatness through passions that might be thought of as base. 428-29).

예: “어제의 고통”(yesterday's pain, 471)

- (2) 간접인용의 경우 출처는 문장의 마지막에 칸을 띄우지 않고 바로 이어서 ()안에 쪽수를 밝히고 괄호 다음에 마침표를 찍는다.

예: 레이몬드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이 주인공은 죽지만 비극의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다고 할 수 있다(55-56).

(3) 독립인용문

- 두 줄 이상의 인용의 경우 독립인용을 원칙으로 하며 이 때 독립인용문의 위쪽과 아래쪽은 한 줄씩 비워 놓는다. 독립인용문의 첫 줄은 어느 경우에도 들여쓰기를 하지 않으나 두 개 이상의 연속된 문단을 인용할 경우 두번째 문단부터 들여쓴다. 또한 독립인용문은 본문보다 작은 9 포인트의 글자를 사용하고 전체적으로 좌우를 5칸 정도 본문보다 들어가게 한다.
- 괄호를 사용하여 독립인용문의 출처를 밝힌다. 본문중 인용과 달리 인용문 다음에 마침표를 찍고 한 칸 띄 다음 괄호를 시작한다.

예: 길을 가다 영희를 만났다고 그가 말했다. (15)

(4) 인용문중 논문 필자의 첨삭

- 인용문의 중간부분을 논문필자가 생략할 경우 마침표 세 개를 한 칸 씩 띄운다.

예: 길을 가다 . . . 만났다고 그가 말했다.

길을 가다 영희를 만났다. . . . (뒤를 완전히 생략하는 경우에)

- 인용문의 대명사나 논문의 맥락에 맞춰 의미를 논문 필자가 지칭하여 밝힐 때 대명사나 어구 다음 []안에 쓴다.

예: In his [John F. Kennedy's] address, "new frontier" means . . .

(5) 구두점과 인용문

- 따옴표와 함께 마침표(또는 쉼표)를 사용할 때 마침표(또는 쉼표)는 따옴표 안에 오는 것이 원칙이지만 출처를 병기하여 밝힐 때는 '출처 밝히기' 원칙에 먼저 따른다.

예: 인호는 "영어," "불어"에 능통하다고 "철수가 주장했다."

레이몬드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이 "주인공은 죽지만 비극의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다" (55-56).

5. 영문원고 및 영문요약을 제출하기 전에 반드시 영어를 모국어로 사용하는 사람의 교정을 받은 후 제출한다.

6. 서지 사항

- (1) 인용 문헌이라는 제목 하에 밝히되 모든 출전은 저자 항목, 서명 항목, 출판 배경 항목, 쪽수 항목 등의 순서로 적는다. 그리고 항목 내

의 세부 사항은 MLA 최신판의 규정을 따른다.

(2) 단 한국어로 번역된 외국 문헌을 명기할 경우 다음의 순서에 따른다.

- 저자 항목: 원저자의 한국어 발음 이름 중 성, 성표, 이름 순으로 기재한다.

- 번역자 항목: 번역자 이름을 쓰고 “역”을 붙인다.

- 서명 항목: 번역된 책 명을 겹낫표 안에 쓰고 괄호 안에 원서 명을 이탤릭체로 쓴다.

- 출판 배경 항목: 번역서의 출판 도시, 출판사, 출판 연도 순으로 쓴다.

예: 윌리엄스, 레이몬드, 이일환 역. 『이념과 문학』(Marxism and Literature). 서울: 문학과 지성사, 1982.

(3) 하나의 문헌에 관한 서지항목의 길이가 길어서 한 줄 이상이 될 때 두 번째 줄부터 6칸 들여 쓰도록 한다.

예: Lewis, C. S. “View Point: C. S. Lewis.” Twentieth Century Interpretations of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Ed. Denton Fox. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 110-22.

(4) 외국문헌 서지목록에 국내문헌도 함께 포함시킬 때는 국내문헌을 가나다순에 의해 먼저 열거한 다음 외국문헌을 알파벳 순으로 열거한다.

(5) 외국대학 출판사의 경우 University는 U로 Press는 P로 줄여쓴다. 외국출판사의 경우 Publishers, Press, and Co., 등의 약호는 모두 생략하고 하나의 머리 이름만 쓴다.

예: Harper, Norton, Houghton, Routledge 등.

예외로 Random House로 표기한다.

- (6) 같은 저자의 2개 이상 출판물을 명기할 때는 두 번째부터 저자이름은 다섯칸의 밑줄로 처리한다. (_____.)
- (7) 공동저자의 경우, 맨 앞에 위치한 저자가 제1 저자이고, 그 다음의 공동 저자는 가나다 순 (영어 이름의 경우 알파벳 순)으로 기재한다.
- (8) 기타 상세한 논문 작성법은 MLA 최신판을 따르고 그 기준을 한국어 논문 작성법에 응용하도록 한다.

『영어권문화연구』 투고 규정

1. [학술지 발간] 매년 6월 30일, 8월 31과 12월 31일 연 3회 발행하며, 한글논문은 앞부분에 외국어 논문은 뒷부분에 게재한다.
2. [원고 제출시한] 1권은 3월 15일, 2권은 7월 15일, 그리고 3권 11월 15일까지 편집위원장에게 투고 예정논문을 제출한다.
3. [논문의 내용] 투고 논문의 내용은 영어권의 인문, 철학, 문학, 번역, 문화 연구나 학제적 연구의 범위 안에 포함될 수 있는 독창적인 것이거나 그러한 연구에 도움이 될 수 있는 것이어야 한다.
4. [기고 자격] 논문투고 자격은 원칙적으로 영어권문화연구에 관심 있는 대학원 박사과정 이상의 전공자나 연구자로 한다. 다만 석사과정생의 경우는 지도교수의 추천과 연구소장의 결정을 필요로 한다.
5. [원고 작성 및 기고 요령] 『영어권문화연구』 원고 작성 및 기고 요령을 따른다.
6. [편집요령] 『영어권문화연구』 편집 및 교정 기준에 따른다.
7. [심사기준] 『영어권문화연구』 발간 및 편집위원회 운영 규정 제4항(원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)을 적용한다.
8. [논문 게재료] 논문 게재 시 연구비를 지원 받은 논문은 20만원, 일반 논문은 10만원을 논문 게재료로 납부하여야 한다.
9. [저작권 소유] 논문을 포함하여 출판된 원고의 저작권은 영어권문화연구소가 소유한다.
12. [규정의 개폐 및 수정] 본 규정의 개폐 및 수정은 편집위원회의 요청에 따라 이사회에서 개폐 및 수정을 의결한다.

『영어권문화연구』 원고 작성 및 기고 요령

『영어권문화연구』에 기고하는 논문은 아래의 원고 작성요령을 따라야 한다.

1. 논문은 제목을 포함하여 우리말로 쓰는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 한글로 된 논문은 본문에 한자와 영문 등을 쓰지 않기로 하되, 꼭 필요한 경우 괄호로 처리하는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 외국어로 쓰는 경우 보편적으로 많이 사용되는 언어를 사용한다.
2. 외국어 고유명사는 한글로 표기하되, 처음 나올 때 괄호 속에 원어 표기를 제시한다. 작품명은 한글로 번역하되, 처음 나올 때 괄호 속에 원어 표기를 제시한다. 인용문은 번역하되, 필요에 따라 원문을 괄호 속에 병기한다. 운문의 경우에는 원문을 번역문 바로 아래에 제시한다. (인명이나 지명의 경우 해당 언어권의 발음을 존중하되, 결정이 어려울 때는 교육부 제정 외국어 발음 규정을 따르기로 한다.)
3. 각주는 연구비 관련 내용 및 재인용 사실을 밝히거나 본문 내용의 필수적인 부연 정보를 위해서 간략히 사용하고, 인용문헌의 명시에는 사용하지 않는다.
4. 미주는 가능한 사용하지 않는다. 실용논문의 경우 조사 및 실험 내용을 미주의 부록으로 첨부할 수 있다.
5. 컴퓨터를 사용하여 논문을 작성하되, 우리말 논문은 45자×450행, 영문논문은 70자×500행 (출판지면 약 20쪽) 내외로 한다. 논문의 작성은 가능하면 <아래한글>프로그램(hwp)으로 하고, 문단 모양, 글자 모양 및 크기 등은 기본양식으로 한다.
6. 직접, 간접 인용 부분의 마지막 구두점이 마침표의 경우에는 출처 표기 원칙을 적용 받아 (따옴표 다음의) 괄호에 이어서 표기한다.

7. 국내 서적이거나 논문을 인용하는 경우 본문 중에 괄호를 이용하여 미국현대어문협회(MLA) 『지침서』(MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers)의 규정에 따라 저자와 쪽수를 명시하고, 논문 말미에 다음과 같은 방법에 따라 인용문헌(Works Cited)으로 밝힌다.
 - 필자(또는 저자). 「논문제목」. 『책 이름』. 편자. 출판지: 출판사, 출판연도.
 - 영문문헌의 경우에는 다음과 같이 하고 책 이름은 이탤릭체로 한다.
 - 필자(또는 저자). 「논문제목」. 책 이름. 편자. 출판지: 출판사, 출판연도.
8. 국내문헌과 외국문헌을 함께 인용문헌으로 처리하는 경우, 국내문헌을 '가나다' 순에 의해 먼저 열거한 다음, 외국문헌은 'ABC'순으로 열거한다. 인용문헌은 본문 중에 직접, 간접 인용된 문헌만을 명시하고 참고(references)로만 연구에 사용된 문헌은 (피)인용지수(impact factor)에 해당되지 않으므로 명기하지 않는다.
9. 기타 논문 작성법의 세부 사항은 미국현대어문협회(MLA)의 『지침서』(MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers) 최근판 규정을 따르며, 한글 논문의 경우에도 미국현대어문협회 『지침서』의 세부 사항을 응용하여 따른다.
10. 심사의 공정을 위하여 필자의 이름과 대학 이름을 논문에 표기하지 아니하고, 본문에 필자의 이름이 나타나지 않도록 한다. 원고 제출시 필자의 신원은 '논문게재 신청서'에 적어서 제출한다.
11. 원고는 편집위원장 혹은 편집간사에게 이메일로 전송하고, 3부의 인쇄본을 동시에 우송한다. 제출할 때, 다음의 기본사항을 명시한 표지를 붙이고, 원고(영문요약 포함)에는 일체 필자의 인적 사항을 밝히지 말아야 한다. 게재 확정 이후 출판 교정 시에 필요에 따라 인적 사항을 첨부한다.
 - 논문 제목 (한글 및 영문)

- 필자 이름 (한글 및 영문) 및 필자 정보
 - 공동 연구의 경우 제1저자 및 교신저자가 있을 때 명시
 - 필자 소속단체(학교)명(한글 및 영문)
 - 필자 연락처 (주소, 전화번호, 이동전화번호, 이메일 주소)
 - 게재 희망호
12. 모든 논문의 말미에 5개 내외의 어구로 주제어를 명시한다. 한글논문의 경우 논문 말미에 2줄 띄고 “주제어”를 제목으로 한글 주제어를 한글로 명기하고, 영문초록 말미에 2줄 띄고 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 내외의 주제어를 영문으로 제시한다. 영어논문의 경우 논문과 영문요약 말미에 2줄 띄고 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 내외의 주제어를 영어로 명기한다.
13. 모든 논문 뒤에는 20행 내외의 영문요약을 붙인다.
14. 원고는 접수 순서에 의해 편집위원회에서 각 논문의 심사위원회를 위촉하여 심사하고 게재여부는 원칙적으로 편집위원회 운영 규정 제 4조 (원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)에 의거하여 결정한다.
15. 편집위원회는 논문을 포함한 원고 필자에게 출판 최종 송고 이전에 논문 형식과 맞춤법에 대한 교정을 의뢰할 수 있고, 의뢰받은 논문의 경우 최종 교정 및 편집의 책임은 필자에게 있다.

원고작성 세부 지침

1. 용지규격: A4
2. 용지여백: 위 쪽: 56.00 mm 머리말: 10.00 mm
 원 쪽: 49.99 mm 오른쪽: 49.99 mm
 아래쪽: 60.00 mm 꼬리말: 0.00 mm

3. 아래의 사항은 편집 메뉴 중 “모양 → 스타일”을 이용하여 정하십시오.

구 분	정렬 방식	행간	왼쪽 여백	오른쪽 여백	들여 쓰기	글자 크기	글자 장평	글자 간격	글 자 모 양
논문제목	가운데	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	14 pt	90%	0%	한글: HY신명조 영문: Times New Roman 한자: HY신명조
부-소제목	가운데	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	12 pt			
필자명	오른쪽	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	10 pt			
본문/바탕글	혼합	160%	0글자	0글자	2글자	10 pt			
인용문	혼합	150%	2글자	0글자	2글자	9 pt			
각주	혼합	130%	0글자	0글자	2글자	9 pt			
머리말-홀수	오른쪽	150%	0글자	0글자	0글자	9 pt			
머리말-짝수	왼쪽	150%	0글자	0글자	0글자	9 pt			

*논문의 시작 쪽에서는 머리말 감추기를 하시오.

접수 제 호
(심사) 호

수정·보완 의뢰서

심사 위원 ()명의 심사와 편집위원회의 의결을 거쳐 회원님의 논문을 『영어권문화연구』 제 ()호에 게재하기로 결정되었음을 통보합니다.

아래의 심사위원들의 지적사항을 수정·보완하고 교정을 거쳐서 ()년 ()월 ()일까지 반드시 제출해 주시기 바랍니다.

-수정시 필수 기입 사항

1. 수정·보완 사항의 항목별로 심사위원의 지적사항을 어떻게 고쳤는지 기록해 주시기 바랍니다.
2. 심사위원의 지적사항에 동의하지 않으시면 그 이유를 상세히 밝혀주시기 바랍니다.

-제출방법

1. 수정·보완이 완료된 논문과 수정·보완 의뢰서를 영어권문화연구소 이메일 계정(esc8530@dongguk.edu)으로 보내주시기 바랍니다. 출력물의 우편송부는 편집시 그림이나 도표가 손상될 우려가 있을 때에만 한합니다.

년 월 일

영어권문화연구 편집위원장

수정·보완 확인서

논문 제목		
수정 및 보완 사항	논문 형식	
	논문 내용	

영어권문화연구소 연구윤리규정

제1장 총 칙

제1조(목적) 이 규정은 동국대학교 영어권문화연구소(이하 '연구소')의 학술 연구 활동 및 연구소가 간행하는 학술지에 게재되는 논문 등의 성과물을 대상으로 한 연구 윤리와 진실성의 확보를 목적으로 하며 연구원 및 투고자는 학술연구자의 위상을 높이고 연구자에 대한 사회적 신뢰가 증진되도록 본 규정을 성실히 준수하여야 한다. 본 학술지는 학술연구 저작들을 엄정하게 심사하여 선정하고 게재한다. 이에 따라 학술지에 게재를 희망하는 논문 저자 뿐 아니라 편집위원(장)과 심사위원들의 연구윤리규정을 명확하게 아래와 같이 정한다.

제2조(적용 대상) 이 규정은 본 연구소의 학술지, 학술행사 발표문, 단행본, 영상물을 포함한 모든 간행물과 출판물 및 심사행위를 적용대상으로 한다.

제3조(적용범위) 특정 연구 분야의 윤리 및 진실성 검증과 관련하여 다른 특별한 규정이 있는 경우를 제외하고는 이 규정에 의한다.

제4조(연구부정행위의 범위) 이 규정에서 정하는 연구부정행위는 연구개발과제의 제안, 연구개발의 수행, 연구개발결과의 보고 및 발표 등에서 행하여진 위조·변조·표절·자기표절·부당한 논문저자 표시 행위 및 위 행위를 제안하거나 강요하는 행위 등을 말하며 다음 각 호와 같다.

1. “위조”(forgery, fabrication)는 존재하지 않는 논문, 자료, 연구 결과 등을 허위로 만들어 내는 행위를 말한다.
2. “변조”(alteration, falsification)는 참고문헌 등의 연구자료, 연구과정 등을 인위적으로 조작하거나 임의로 변형, 삭제함으로써 연구 내용 또는 결과를 왜곡하는 행위를 말한다.
3. “표절(plagiarism)”이라 함은 타인의 아이디어, 연구결과 및 내용 등을 정당한 승인 또는 인용 없이 도용하는 행위를 말한다.
4. “자기표절”은 자신이 이미 발표한 논문 및 연구결과물(비학술단체 발간물, 학술대회 발표문, 연구용역보고서 등 국제표준도서번호(ISBN)가 붙지 않는 발표물은 제외)을 다른 학술지에 다시 게재하거나 그 논문 및 연구결과물의 일부나 전부를 출처를 밝히지 않고 자신의 다른 논문 및 연구결과물에 포함시키는 행위를 말한다.
5. “부당한 논문저자 표시”는 연구내용 또는 결과에 대하여 학술적 공헌 또는 기여를 한 사람에게 정당한 이유 없이 논문저자 자격을 부여하지 않거나, 학술적 공헌 또는 기여를 하지 않은 사람에게 감사의 표시 또는 예우 등을 이유로 논문저자 자격을 부여하는 행위를 말한다.
6. 기타 본인 또는 타인의 부정행위의 의혹에 대한 조사를 고의로 방해하거나 제보자 또는 제보대상자에게 위해를 가하는 행위 등도 포함된다.

제2장 연구윤리위원회

제5조(설치) 연구소를 통해 연구를 수행하거나 발표하려는 자의 연구부정행위를 예방하고, 연구윤리규정 준수 여부에 관한 문제제기, 조

사, 심의, 판정 및 집행에 관한 업무를 총괄하기 위하여 연구윤리위원회(이하 “위원회” 라 한다)를 둔다.

제6조(구성)

1. 위원회는 위원장 1인을 포함하여 10인 이내의 위원을 둔다.
2. 위원회 위원은 연구소장, 편집위원장, 운영위원장, 연구소 전임 연구원을 당연직으로 하고, 임명직 위원은 편집위원회의 추천에 의해 소장이 위촉한다.
3. 위원장은 임명직 위원 중에서 선출한다.
4. 위원회의 위원장 및 임명직 위원의 임기는 2년으로 하되, 연임할 수 있다.
5. 위원장은 위원 중에서 1인의 간사를 선임할 수 있다.

제7조(회의)

1. 위원회는 위원장의 소집으로 개최하며 과반수 출석에 출석위원 과반수 찬성으로 의결한다.
2. 연구부정행위로 제보, 또는 기타 경로를 통하여 연구기관에 의해 인지된 사안이 있을 경우 위원장은 지체 없이 위원회를 소집하여야 한다.
3. 위원회는 연구부정행위로 인지된 사안에 대한 조사의 적부 판단, 조사위원회의 설치, 조사위원회의 조사결과, 사안에 대한 조치 등에 대하여 심의·의결한다.
4. 간사는 회의록을 작성하고 관리한다.

제8조(조사위원회의 설치)

1. 위원장은 위원회에서 연구부정행위라고 판단한 사안에 대하여 그 진실성을 검증하는 과정의 전문성을 고려하여 연구윤리위원과

- 외부전문가 약간 명으로 구성된 조사위원회를 설치할 수 있다.
2. 조사위원회는 위원회의 의결에 의해 활동을 시작하며 조사결과에 대한 조치가 완결된 후 해산한다.
 3. 조사위원회의 위원장은 연구윤리위원장으로 한다.
 4. 연구소는 조사위원회의 활동에 필요한 비용을 지출할 수 있다.

제9조(조사위원의 의무와 자격정지)

1. 조사위원은 심의에 있어 진실함과 공정함에 기초하여야 한다.
2. 조사위원은 심의 안건과 관련하여 인지한 내용을 사적으로 공표하지 않아야 하며, 검증과정에서 제보자 및 피조사자의 명예나 권리가 부당하게 침해당하지 않도록 유의하여야 한다.
3. 조사위원은 심의에 있어 외부의 부당한 압력이나 영향을 거부하여야 한다.
4. 조사위원은 자신과 사안사이에 심의의 공정함을 침해할 정도의 관련성이 있을 경우 지체 없이 이를 위원장에게 통보하여야 한다.
5. 조사위원의 연구 결과 혹은 행위가 심의 대상이 될 경우, 당사자는 즉시 해당 심의 안건의 조사위원 자격이 정지된다.

제3장 연구윤리의 검증

제10조(검증 시효)

1. 연구 윤리성 및 진실성 검증 필요성이 제기된 때로부터 5년 이상이 경과한 연구부정행위는 심의하지 않음을 원칙으로 한다.
2. 5년 이상이 경과한 연구부정행위라 하더라도 그 대상자가 기존의 결과를 재인용하여 후속 연구의 기획 및 수행, 연구 결과의 보고 및 발표 등에 사용하였을 경우 혹은 사회적으로 연구소의

학술 연구 활동의 신뢰성에 심각한 위해를 가한 경우에는 이를 심의하여야 한다.

제11조(검증절차)

1. 연구부정행위를 인지하였거나 또는 제보가 접수되면 위원장은 즉시 위원회를 소집하여 심의를 개시하여야 한다.
2. 위원회는 사안이 접수된 날로부터 60일 이내에 심의·의결·결과조치 등을 완료하여야 한다. 단, 위원회가 조사기간 내에 조사를 완료할 수 없다고 판단할 경우, 위원장의 승인을 거쳐 30일 한도 내에서 기간을 연장할 수 있다.
3. 위원장은 심의대상이 된 행위에 대하여 연구윤리와 진실성 검증을 위해 조사위원회를 설치할 수 있다.
4. 위원회 혹은 조사위원회는 필요에 따라 제보자·피조사자·증인 및 참고인에 대하여 진술을 위한 출석을 요구할 수 있으며, 피조사자에게 자료의 제출을 요구할 수 있다. 이 경우 피조사자는 반드시 응하여야 한다. 단, 사정에 따라 위원장의 판단으로 인터넷이나 전화, 서면 등을 활용한 비대면 출석도 허용할 수 있다.
5. 위원회는 심의를 완료하기 전에 피조사자에게 연구 윤리 저촉 관련 내용을 통보하고 충분한 소명의 기회를 제공한다. 당사자가 이에 응하지 않을 경우에는 심의 내용에 대해 이의가 없는 것으로 간주한다.
6. 위원회는 심의 결과를 지체 없이 피조사자와 제보자에게 통보하여야 한다. 피조사자 또는 제보자는 심의 결과에 대해 불복할 경우 결과를 통보받은 날로부터 14일 이내에 위원회에 이유를 기재하여 서면으로 재심의를 요청할 수 있다.
7. 피조사자 또는 제보자의 재심의 요청이 없는 경우 위원장은 심의·의결 결과에 근거하여 조치를 취하며 조사위원회는 해산한다.

제12조(제보자와 피조사자의 권리보호)

1. 제보자의 신원 및 제보 내용에 관한 사항은 비공개를 원칙으로 한다.
2. 제보자는 위원회에 서면 또는 전자우편 등의 방법으로 제보할 수 있으며 실명으로 제보함을 원칙으로 한다.
3. 연구부정행위에 대한 제보와 문제 제기가 허위이며 피조사자에 대한 의도적인 명예 훼손이라 판단될 경우 향후 연구소 활동을 제한하는 등 허위 제보자에게 일정한 제재를 가하여야 한다.
4. 위원회는 연구부정행위 여부에 대한 검증이 완료될 때까지 피조사자의 명예나 권리가 침해되지 않도록 주의하여야 한다.
5. 연구소와 위원회는 조사나 검증 결과 연구 관련 부정행위가 일어나지 않은 것으로 판명되었을 경우 피조사자의 명예 회복을 위한 노력을 성실하게 수행하여야 한다.
6. 연구부정행위에 대한 조사 내용 등은 위원회에서 조사 결과에 대한 최종 심의를 완료하기 전까지 외부에 공개하여서는 안 된다.

제13조(조치) 연구윤리 위반에 대한 조치는 그 경중에 따라 다음 항목 중에서 취하며 하나 또는 몇 개의 항목을 중복하여 처분할 수 있다.

1. 해당 논문 혹은 연구결과물 게재 취소 및 연구소 홈페이지 서비스에서 해당 자료 삭제
2. 해당 지면을 통한 공개 사과
3. 논문 투고 금지
4. 연구소의 제반 간행물과 출판물 투고 및 연구소의 학술활동 참여 금지
5. 해당자의 회원자격 정지

제14조(후속조치)

1. 연구 윤리 위반에 대한 판정 및 조치가 확정되면 조속히 이를 제보자와 피조사자에게 문서로 통보한다.
2. 조치 후 그 결과는 인사비밀 문서화하여 연구소에 보존한다.
3. 필요한 경우 연구지원기관에 결과조치를 통보한다.

제4장 기타

제15조(행정사항)

1. 연구윤리 위반 사실이 인정된 경우, 논문 투고 및 심사 등에 사용하기 위하여 받은 제반 경비는 반환하지 않는다.
2. 이 규정에 명시되지 않은 사항은 연구윤리위원회에서 정한다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 18일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2013년 10월 31일부터 시행한다.

영어권문화연구 *The Journal of English Cultural Studies*

2016년 8월 31일 / 31 September 2016

9권 2호 / Vol.9 No.2

발행인 한태식

편집인 김애주

발행처 영어권문화연구소/Official Publication by

Institute for English Cultural Studies

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