영어권문화연구

11권 2호. 2018년 8월

영어권문화연구소

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10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.5

Playing the Feminine:
Politics of Gendered Performances in Charlotte Dacre's *Zofloya*

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I. Introduction

A gothic tale that starts off by introducing an adulterous mother, Laurina de Loredani, who elopes with her lover, Count Ardolph, when her daughter is fifteen, Charlotte Dacre's *Zofloya: or, the Moor: A Romance of the Fifteenth Centur*y (1782) horrified and fascinated the reading public of the late eighteenth-century.[1] *Zofloya* has remained largely forgotten before Adriana Craciun exhumed it in 1997, but since then, it has garnered much attention from scholars. A major point of contention has been Zofloya, a satanic Moor who helps Victoria conspire to murder her husband (Berenza) and to win over Henriquez,

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1) Charlotte Dacre was Charlotte King's pseudonym. King used two pseudonyms, Rosa Matilda and Charlotte Dacre. According to Lisa Wilson, "'Rosa Matilda' summed up fears about the pseudonym's ability to blur the essential lines of social demarcation, lines delineating between masculine and feminine, genius and hack, author and reader" (412). See Diane Long Hoeveler's *Gothic Feminism* for a comparative study on Jane Austen, Rosa Matilda, and Mary Shelly's works.

Berenza's younger and virile brother engaged to a fair maiden called Lilla. The ethnic otherness and moral decrepitude of Dacre's eponymous character invited many critics to anchor their readings on either of his defining features. Stephanie Burley, along with Diane Hoeveler, takes a psychological approach to Zofloya, asserting that he is Victoria's darker self, and on a broader scale, "the fetish of Victoria's ideology of self-gratification" (203). Donna Heiland also links Zofloya to Victoria's psyche, reading Dacre's use of similar vocabulary in her descriptions of the two as indicator of Zofloya being devised as Victoria's unconscious (49).

Such readings have been met with opposition, with Kim Michasiw and Sara Schotland positing that Zofloya's Moorishness must not be overlooked. Putting *Zofloya* in context with Dacre's other works like "The Poor Negro Marli," Michasiw reads it as a commentary on the controversial issue of "Britain's participation in the West African slave trade" (35). In a similar vein, Schotland asserts that *Zofloya* conveys a warning that "[t]he evil of slavery is not so much that it enslaves poor unfortunates but rather that it can unleash the dogs of retaliation on the British people," that violence *will* be returned (130). Jeffrey Cass likewise takes up on the debate over the Dacre's representation and use of the Moor, but posits that Zofloya evokes ahistorical exoticism that encourage readers to indulge in "historical amnesia" rather than be reminded of contentious histories regarding slavery (69). Also focusing on Zofloya's otherness and his exotic existence, Gary Kelly and George Cohen-Vrignaud locate *Zofloya* in the tradition of gothic Orientalism. Noting the "Gothic's generic affinities with Romantic Orientalism," Kelly posits that writers of gothic oriental romances like

Dacre and Byron projected the "radical ambition for sexual emancipation onto Muslim bodies that doctrinally incarnate the rejection of Christian creed" (190). On a related note, Cohen-Vrignaud interprets Zofloya the Moor as an embodiment of "negative characteristics of the Oriental as defining other of the Enlightenment bourgeois ideal" with whom Dacre "pushes the sight of the other from Catholic Mediterranean to the Muslim Levant" (10-11).

Much ink has also been spent on attempts to place *Zofloya* in the genealogy of gothic fiction. Craciun aligns Dacre with Marquis de Sade and Matthew Lewis rather than with Anne Radcliff and puts *Zofloya* within the tradition of male gothic ("Introduction" 9). E. J. Clery and others have given weight to Craciun's position by noting that Dacre "set out to rival Lewis directly" ("Unnatural, Unsexed, Undead" 107). On the other hand, critics like Carol Davidson cautions against pinpointing Lewis as the key figure who influenced Dacre's writing and argued that Radcliff's legacy is clearly imprinted on *Zofloya* (35). The debate over Dacre's place in the gothic genre has come to a closure in the last decade with scholars noting that the binary opposition of male *or* female gothic does not apply to a multifaceted text that refuses to stay within boundaries of one or the other. As Moreno argues, *Zofloya* moves "from terror to horror" (421), defying the gothic "norm" that relates terror to female writing and horror to male writing. Cass also points out that *Zofloya*'s spectacular ending should be read as a campy rather than a tragic one, an ending with which Dacre satirizes the "melodramatic hyperbole of the Gothic" through the use of "stock Gothic devices" (68).

Nonetheless, Dacre's position on gender politics remains a

much- debated issue, perhaps due to the brutal endings she writes for her female characters who express their sexual desires overtly and violently. For instance, Hoeveler identifies *Zofloya* as a *misogynistic* text in which female desires are condemned and bourgeois ideals are reinforced (145). According to Hoeveler, the characterization of Laurina as a failed mother who neglects to nurture her daughter into becoming a woman "docile, passive, and dependent on the right claims of the patriarchy" (193), the implied consequences of bad mothering, i.e., Victoria's transformation into a *femme demonic*, and the condemnation reserved for both reveal the text's conservatism. Chaplin likewise criticizes Dacre, contending that she "present[s] the female subject as a titillating, sexualized, suffering spectacle" (138). On the other end of the spectrum, we have critics like Ann Mellor who suggests that we not take the edifying comments and moral framing of too seriously and instead recognize the complexity of the text that touches upon a "more aggressive libidinal subjectivity, than did the other writings of her day" (171). Similarly, James Dunn proposes that we read *Zofloya* as a singular text that dismantles the "gender stereotypes so rampant in traditional Gothic formulas" (308).

The above studies shed much light on the provocative novel as well as the ways in which Dacre navigated gothic conventions and social conventions regarding gender/sexuality. This paper builds on these previous works, but re-focuses its attention on the performativity of actions taken by Dacre's villainesses. Judith Butler has already noted that gender is a social construct that must be "performed," that "woman itself is a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end" (33). The "becoming"

of Dacre's female characters have been investigated by Craciun, Mellor, Jennifer Beauvais, and Christian Crockett, who explore the writer's radical approach to gender, female sexual desire, domesticity, and gender-bending techniques. However, what I want to emphasize by examining performativity in *Zofloya* is Dacre's *ironic* use of gendered ideals and stereotypes. Dacre's villainesses, Victoria and Megalena, are keen actresses adept in cloaking themselves in robes of femininity, and their efforts to perform the ideal feminine may mark them as submissive. As Butler points out, "norms act on us, work upon us, and this kind of being worked on makes its way into our own action" ("Performativity, Precarity, and Sexual Politics" xi). Dacre's villainesses are not exempt from such norms. The seemingly normative performances Victoria gives throughout the text indicates that she is oriented within the norms of her society, and Megalena's scathing remarks against Berenza are ground on her understanding of how women and men are "worked on" differently by societal norms. But it is important to note that Victoria and Megalena appropriate feminine tropes to satiate their own desires which transgress the norms by which they are expected to live.

Instead of having the norms work on them, Dacre's villainesses act upon and against them, donning cut-out female personas to unravel gendered hierarchies and to turn the dynamics of male-female gazing on its head. Speaking of desire and performativity, Butler posits that "if what 'I' want is only produced in relation to what is wanted from me, then the idea of 'my own' desire turns out to be something of a misnomer," that "I am, in my desire, negotiating what has been wanted of me" ("Performativity, Precarity" xi). Truth be told,

Victoria and Megalena do exist in relation to "what is wanted of [them]," but what motivates them to perform feminine ideals, what they hope to negotiate and achieve through their performative acts, is to go beyond the bounds of normalized femininity. What emerges out of their performativity is not the conventionally passive and/or pacified woman but a desiring subject intent on negotiating *not* what is wanted of them but what they want, and it is their emergence as such that makes them villainesses.

As the two women make conscious efforts to perform the feminine ideal in order to negotiate a breakaway from it, the complex workings and effects of performativity are revealed. Noting that performativity must be distinguished from performance(s), Butler argues that "theatricality need not be conflated with self-display or self creation" (*Bodies that Matter* 232). To do so is, according to Butler, to miss the "point that the historicity of discourse . . . and the historicity of norms . . . constitute the power of discourse to enact what it names" (*Bodies* 194). But this does not mean that an individual does not act (perform). Quite the contrary, social structures that constitute performativity force one to give "compulsory performances," and oppositional performances that "mimes and renders hyperbolic the discursive convention" are often given by resistant subjects and queered bodies (*Bodies* 257). Victoria and Megalena's performances as the ideal female demonstrate the restrictive norms by which gender is mediated and regulated. They take on such personas as the damsel in distress and the caring mother because these are roles, or to borrow Butler's words, names, that the social constructs bolstering their world are willing to enact upon them—their performances as the

femme ideal are compulsory ones they must endure before they can disrupt the (gendered) order of things. However, the compulsory performances Victoria and Megalena give are also subversive, as the affectedness of the ideal woman they play divulges the fictitiousness of that very ideal. This revelation is crucial. Like the "hyperbolic gesture" of queer bodies Butler mentions in her work expose the "homophobic 'law' that can no longer control the terms of its own abjecting strategies" (*Bodies* 257), that of villianized bodies performing in *Zofloya* punctures holes in the gendered fabric of their society.

Victoria and Megalena's performative and assertive personas, which Dacre condemns but does not soften, also reveals Dacre's defiant approach to gender politics of her time as well as to the gothic convention, both of which drew firm lines between the male and female. Like its villainesses who transgress the boundaries of gender, Dacre's text confuses the line that divides female and male gothic writing. And like her villainess-actresses, Dacre performs the female role of an apologetic writer, reassuring the readers of her disapproval of the villainesses' vices with "dear reader" comments and the violent deaths she pens for them.[2] Featuring villainesses who use their knowledge of the others' desire for maidenly/matronly women in disguising and achieving their vile wants, Dacre exposes ideal femininity as a fictive construct and mocks the one- dimensionality of

2) Despite her efforts, Dacre received backlash from contemporary critics—*Monthly Literary Recreations*, for example, stated that *Zofloya* is "void of merit, so destitute of delicacy," and that it displays "such depravity of morals" (qtd in Cracium "Unnatural, Unsexed" 261). However, *Zofloya*'s popularity in the market demonstrates that Dacre's performance was at least half successful.

her society's gender norms. Although the narrator constantly condemns the villainesses, the censuring asides they make about the typically gendered characters like Berenza and Lilla, Henriquez's angelic fiancé—which Dacre does not censor or soften—reveal Dacre's critical approach to the era's gender norms. The narrator often speaks of Berenza and Lilla's virtues, but the fact that Dacre puts similar or identical words in Victoria's mouth as she attacks both "virtuous" characters illustratively shows the arbitrariness of gendered virtues. And as the *Literary Journal*'s assertion that "our fair authoress must have been strongly attacked by the disease when she wrote these volumes and treated by the Devil, English, and common sense so scurvily" (qtd in Crucim "Unnatural, Unsexed" 267) demonstrates, the effect of seeing villainesses glide in and out of idealized female roles with ease, undermine, criticize, and subvert the gendered doxa of eighteenth-century England unnerved Dacre's audience.

In what follows, I trace in detail the disruptive manners in which Victoria and Megalena perform and utilize the femme ideal for the "perverse" purpose of exerting their sexual prowess and will to power. In the first section, I delineate the making of Victoria as a versed performer capable of self-fashioning herself a good maiden, positing that Victoria's ability to decipher gendered desires of others as well as her faculty in disguising her penetrating gaze from her target audience enable her to render gendered performativity subversive. In the third section, I examine the ways in which the "bad women" of *Zofloya* unveils the hypocrisy of the androcentric society that categorizes and tames women by the binary figures of mothers and whores. Through performative acts and outright condemnations

of gendered violence they are forced to endure, Megalena and Victoria offers critical counter-arguments against a society that refuses a place for assertive women who refuse to only be acted upon. Reading Victoria and Megalena as active agents striving to carve out a place where they can exist as desiring subjects allows us to interpret the deaths of these villainesses as poetic justice met by transgressive women but rather, devices through which Dacre emphasizes extreme oppression "fallen" women who voluntarily fall out of the acceptable female roles they *know* how to perform.

II. The Makings of a Good Performer

Referring to Freud's notion of the uncanny, Burley lists the series of uncanny spectacles in *Zofloya*, including "a happily married wife who abandons her husband, house guests who murder their hosts, and a daughter who sells her soul to the Devil in the guise of a servant" (199). The last in his list, Victoria, becomes uncanny because of her ability to penetrate the other's desire and to use accumulated knowledge of the other's want in devising deceptive performances for them. In the secluded mansion in Treviso where her aunt, Signora di Modena, serves as her tamer and captor, Victoria hones the art reading her target audience. In her brief examination of Victoria's time in Treviso, Chaplin points out that Victoria "calmly contemplates her predicament and plans her escape, nurturing a fantasy of revenge," refusing to "learn the lessons of sensibility, and thus to submit to masculine authority" (138). While it is true that Victoria

resists the masculine authority of the Signora, it is crucial to note that she *does* learn the lessons of sensibility. What makes Victoria a problematic figure is that Victoria utilizes the lessons of sensibility in planning and executing her fantasy of revenge. Her familiarity with feminine ideals do not tame her. On the contrary, her knowledge of feminized tropes become assets with which she can give convincingly gendered performances without her audience detecting her affectations.

It is at this juncture in Victoria's life that the word "artifice" comes to be associated with her. In previous chapters, the word had been reserved for Ardolph. In fact, it is Victoria who derides Ardolph after she learns of his scheme to oust her from his house; angered, she bursts out at having fallen victim to the "cold and deliberate artifice of Ardolph" in front of the Signora (72). However, she does not let this anger be expressed for long as she, from the lesson of sensibility, has learned that maidens like herself are not supposed to let their emotions erupt in such hostile manners. Her forced calmness is a calculated one based not only on Victoria's acquired knowledge ideal femininity but also her keen understanding of the aunt's role in their relationship. She knows that to disclose rage in front of the Signora endowed with the task of re-molding her into a proper lady would cause her to become subject to increased surveillance and oppression. And this knowledge leads her to consciously veil the "scorn and hate" she feels towards Ardolph and the Signora (75). Victoria's understanding of the Signora's duty and desire to tame her unruly boarder enables Victoria to devise a convincing role for her, that of a prodigal daughter slowly coming to her senses. This

performance quite effectively misleads the Signora into believing that she is making progress in "fixing" her niece. Taking Victoria's silence after her outburst as a sign of remorse, the Signora becomes less vigilant in watching over Victoria, giving her the time and space she needs to sketch out a detailed escape plan. Victoria's exile may have been meant to turn her into a docile woman, but rather than cultivate feminine virtues, Victoria acquires, as the narrator pointedly notes, "the most refined artifice" of affectation, which becomes "imbued into the mass of her other evil qualities" (75).

Victoria's escape plan succeeds because Victoria she disarms both the Signora and her attendant, Catau, who serves and keeps an eye on Victoria. While the Signora assumes that Victoria would despise the rustic country girl "too much to endeavor to corrupt or make a friend of her," Victorian sees through the Signora's "fancied penetration" of her mind (77). Displaying gestures of contempt in the Signora's presence but smiling at Catau when out of the Signora's sight thereby leading Catau to perceive her as a kindly soul held captive by a tyrant—who also treats Catau poorly—Victoria gains Catau's friendship behind the Signora's back. As Beatrice Moreno points out, Victoria employs "classic oratory and the capacity of language to move or elevate an audience," but spoken language is not the only tool with which Victoria seduces and turns Catau "into her slave" (425). Victoria achieves the feat of forming a clandestine alliance with Catau without the Signora knowing and enlisting Catau's help as she plots her flight from the unbarred prison due to her ability to regard her lower class attendant as a person with desires and to gratify them. Victoria's observation of the Signora and Catau's

interaction reveals that the latter, resentful of the former's tendency to exploit and demean her subordinates, is in want of a mistress who treats her as an equal. Based on this finding, Victoria puts on a show designed just for Catau, employing not only her words but also silences to earn Catau's sympathy and loyalty. As the Signora expected, Victoria *does* despise Catau, but she controls when and how her contempt is displayed. As aforementioned, she unveils her scorn for Catau only when the Signora is present. When Catau is her only audience, she remains mostly silent so as not to let on her distaste for the unpolished maid. When she does speak, she speaks more like a confidant than a mistress. At one point, she tells Catau that it would be "delightful" for "us to be quite out of the reach of the horrible Signora" (79). Using the collective noun, "us," Victoria influences Catau to see both herself and Victoria as the Signor's victims (79). A ring, which Victoria gives Catau with the intent of satiating Catau's financial wants—Victoria notes that the impoverished tend to be "almost always mercenary" (80)—also strengthens the tie between the two. Having been fully convinced of Victoria's performance as a kind mistress and a damsel in distress, Catau plays a part in Victoria's escape by switching clothes with her.

Victoria's ability to bore into the mind of the other coupled with her faculty of dissemblance ultimately wins her Berenza's hand in marriage. However, the success comes after a hard learned lesson that she must tread even more carefully when engaging with a man with an"investigating spirit" (58). After a long journey from Treviso to Venice, Victoria unintentionally lets Berenza hear her violently express the joy of having triumphed over her mother, who had

attempted to drive a wedge between Victoria and Berenza: "Now, then, cruel and ungenerous mother, thou canst no longer deprive me of a happiness similar to that which thou so selfishly enjoyest! . . . thou didst deceive and betray me; but I shall still live to thank thee for teaching me the path to love and joy" (89). Victoria's rather spiteful soliloquy in which she castigates Laurina's pursuit of (sexual) happiness and discloses her own want to satisfy her awakened sexual desires diminishes Berenza's affection for her. Not only that, he experiences a "sensation of regret at the avowed freedom of her principles," which makes him determined remain her friend rather than lover until he has "restrain[ed] and correct[ed] the improper bias of Victoria's character" (89). To justify the distance he puts between them and to convince Victoria of his need to domesticate her, Berenza explains that he wants to provide her with education that her corrupt parents had wrongly denied her, and that Victoria must comply if she wants him to be "rationally happy" (90). With Berenza ceaselessly "[scrutinizing] her, as though in her air and in her eyes he would read every movement of her soul" (91) and Victoria becoming intensely aware of his gaze, Berenza's palazzo becomes a stage where she must perfect her act of femininity. The situation worsens when Berenza realizes that Victoria may have "flown to him merely as a refuge from discomfort and oppression" (91). But the visible signs of his displeasure at such a prospect—which Victoria is quick to notice —serves her well, as they give her clues as to what her audience wants to see. Although Berenza does acquire some insight into Victoria's "actual feelings" (92), Victoria, not he, comes to hold the reign in their relationship as Victoria excels him in using the

"scrutinizing eye" to observe the other's "every movement, every look," and in probing meaning from "every word" the other speaks (96). Her careful study of Berenza yields her the conclusion that he desires but doubts her love for him, and such a finding allows her to craft scenes that quell Berenza's anxieties and restore his love.

Victoria wins the battle of the gazes because Berenza's scrutinizing gaze is too apparent and his emotions are too outwardly exhibited. The visibility of his gaze and frustration grants the observed opportunities to turn the tables without the observer knowing. Even under his watchful eyes, Victoria is able to manipulate him into being placated.[3] Staging an act of sleep talking, Victoria performs the role of an innocent, lovesick girl, the familiar mask of whom misleads Berenzato suspend his suspicions about Victoria's ingenuity. As the narrator describes the scene, Victoria shuts her eyes, "affect[ing] in reality to be asleep" as Berenza "gaz[es] upon her for a few moments" before taking a seat beside her (98). For the act is a continuation of previous acts in which Victoria assumed the character of a melancholy maiden, the enervated state of the sleeping girl invites no suspicion and instead triggers a sense of sympathy for Berenza, who mumbles, "why, my love, art thou unhappy?" (98). That the melancholic performances had slowly been restoring Berenza's affection for Victoria becomes quite clear as Berenza expressly wishes that "[he] were the envied cause" of her unhappiness (89). His whispered comment also functions as a cue for Victoria; upon hearing

3) As Ruth Anolik notes, "subordinates, who are assumed to be totally transparent to their beneficent keepers, are actually the location of disguised and threatening knowledge" (199).

him, she sighs and utters, "[w]hy wilt thou not love me Berenza?" (98). A play on feminine ideal, Victoria's assumed character of a devoted maiden secretly suffering from unrequited love dispels his suspicion that she may have been feigning interest in him to gain protection. The set-up of Victoria being asleep adds to the effect, as it conveys the message that the rambunctious girl is finally letting her guard down to reveal her "real" self and emotions. In answer to the somniloquist, Berenza draws a quick breath, and Victoria closes the act on its high note by exclaiming, "indeed, Berenza—I love *thee*" and reaching out to him for an embrace as she awakens from her pretend sleep (98). Not knowing he had unwittingly given Victoria directions how to deceive him, Berenza feels guilt at having doubted her.

Berenza fails to understand that Victoria's unconscious dream state is in fact a representation of such devised to tug his heart strings. This failure derives from his inability to perceive himself as an object of the female gaze, to regard Victoria as another "investigative spirit" who can probe into his deepest desires, find blind spots that such desires burn into his vision, and use them to her advantage. As Peggy Phelan notes, "to doubt the subject seized by the eye is to doubt the subjectivity of the seeing 'I'"(1). A self defined scholar of human behavior and its meaning, Berenza falls prey to Victoria's performative power because he neglects to check the credibility of his seeing eye/I. This neglect leads him to remain oblivious of Victoria's performative selves and the power she holds over him, until he dies.

III. "Bad" Women Strike Back

Dacre's secondary villainess, Megalena, is another observer-actress who penetrates the other's desire and utilizes her knowledge of such to become the other's mistress and master. Upon encountering Leonardo, who flees his home after his mother, Laurina, leaves her family, Megelena sees his need for protection, and offers to take him under her wing. Posing as a benevolent matron, she listens to and consoles Leonardo as he tells the story of his heartbreak over Amamia Zappi, the daughter of the man who took the runaway into his care. Megelena's performance as the tender protector-confidant secures her Leonardo's submission and faith, which enables her to coax him into becoming her lover. The change in their relationship is disconcerting as they had at first engaged in what resembles a mother-son relationship. The shift, which is made possible because Megalena is able to take advantage of Leonardo's vulnerability and perhaps his Oedipal desires, quite effectively reveals Megalena's manipulative powers. But not only that, it butts heads with the misogyny of Dacre's society which, as the social shaming Laurina receives after her "fall" clearly indicates, imposed the binary of mother vs. whore onto women. Although their altered relationship allows Megalena to play additional roles like that of a distraught mistress looking to her lover to avenge her ex-lover, Berenza, she also remains his matronly host and protector. A mother *and* mistress, Megalena's ambivalent, doubled position in her relationship with Leonardo dismantles the binary.

Megalena, as her name attests, is a character with whom Dacre

explores female sexual desires. Despite the disguise Megalena puts on in front of Leonardo at first, her desire for the young man is clearly shown from the beginning. In the scene where Megalena scans Leonardo's body as he sleeps, Dacre subverts the gendered dynamics of the gaze with more gusto than she had with Victoria and Berenza. Instead of being subject to the male gaze, Megalena arrests the unconscious object of her desire under her eyes. Her gaze feminizes Leonardo; his features are described with words conventionally applied to fair maidens, such as rose, pearl, and snow. This gaze is not a gaze returned. Megalena holds the *only* gaze that observes, desires, discerns, and commands in their relationship. Dacre does not write scenes where Megelena's appearances or behaviors are depicted from Leonardo's perspective, nor does she include scenes of power struggles between the two. Unlike Berenza who observes and discerns Victoria's every move—that is, until Victoria's more surreptitious gaze and performances blind him—Leonardo remains the object of Megalena's desirous gaze throughout. And unlike Victoria, who must constantly keep her penetrating gaze and manipulative schemes under a veil of affected obedience or at least feminine languor even after she regains Berenza's trust lest she be found out and thrust out of his house, Megalena need not hide her gaze as intently as Leonardo, not she, is the dependent party. As Leonardo's provider, protector, and mistress who knows of Leonardo's emotional and material wants, Megalena can be more open in her gazes and her demands.

Megalena can acquire a complete and lasting influence over Leonardo—instead of winning temporary, precarious control as does

Victoria in her relationship with Berenza—because, as Heiland points out, she is a "property-owning," unmarried woman (43). Her affluence allows her to exceed the boundaries of ideal womanhood, to transgress and to behave like a man. She takes on a young lover, boards him in her mansion, and displays him in front of her guests to show off her recent conquest, just as Berenza does with Victoria. Although she is not free from condemning words of men like Berenza, Megalena is portrayed as a woman undaunted by conduct rules that bind women to submissive roles. She does perform femininity, but the cloaks of idealized female personas she appropriates are donned and doffed for the purpose of reinforcing her power. Instead of letting her identity be formed through performativity, she actively performs the female, thus exposing the constructedness of the ideals by which women are encouraged to live. Moreover, it is imperative to note that Megalena partakes in the discourse of gender norms with a penetrating voice that cuts through misogyny. Berating Berenza, the "refined" gentleman and her once lover, Megalena exposes his hypocrisy, noting that he is nothing but a "proud and accomplished seducer" who, despite the seduced woman "sacrific[ing] to [him] her innocence and her fame. . . wilt never sacrifice to her [his] liberty" (134). A commentary on the unequal transaction of the two parties that had been intimately involved, Megalena's remarks target not only Berenza but also the double standards with which her society perceives sexual desires of men and women. As she explicitly argues, these standards force the seduced to surrender her everything but enable the seducer to live freely as, to use the word Dacre uses to describe Berenza, a libertine.

Berenza introduces Megalena to Victoria and readers as the bewitching ex-mistress of his friend who tried to lure him into betraying the friend and seducing her, but Dacre gives Megalena a rhetorical space from which she can make counter punches against the man who stigmatizes her. By so doing, Dacre undercuts the credibility of Berenza's story that exonerates the perpetrator of gendered violence and of the androcentrism of sexual politics of their era. In explaining to Victoria the cause for Megalena's grudges against him, Berenza admits to his having frequented her—even after Victoria's return to him from Treviso—and he tries to absolve himself by emphasizing that he stood his ground against the seductress who he knew would "readily abandon [him] for any other who might attract her wandering eye" (94). Megalena's account, however, suggests that Berenza had not been the innocent and conscientious victim of her improper advances as he himself posits. Moreover, her specific assertion that Berenza's exploitation of women lead to their sacrifice of innocence and *fame* points to the correlation between female virginity and reputation, none of which Berenza seems to have respect or protect.[4] Megalena's irate remark on the lack of impact allegedly improper conduct of a couple has on the man's reputation, freedom, and future behaviors hits the mark. It was indeed the social norm to put the blame on women, as indicated by Samuel Johnson's

4) Women's virginity and chastity, as Megalena implies, was indeed regarded as immensely important virtues without which the stability of a household cannot be safeguarded. The value of these virtues were not merely metaphoric. As Corrinne Harol points out, the eighteenth-century was one obsessed with female chastity, the insurance of which they believed to be the most efficient way to regulate"the inheritances of property" (7).

assertion that the “man imposes no bastards on his wife” (qtd in Harol1). Such a notion deliberately overlooks the fact that legitimacy problems arise much due to “illegitimate children of the father”(10), and permits men like Berenza to make light of his libertine days, as well as to pose *himself* as a victim of female lust.

Berenza's censuring of Megalena's manipulative coquetry and his over-emphasis on Victoria’s complete devotion to him expose not only the period's obsession with female chastity but also its anxiety over female affectation. As he puts it, his bride must “have nothing of the tittering coquet, the fastidious prude, or the affected idiot” (95). If a woman’s unaffectedness is important, so is her power of self regulation—if, he vows, “she forfeits for a moment her self-possession,” he will “cast her for ever from [his] bosom” (95). Berenza knows that love and propriety can be feigned, which is why he hesitates to take her as his wife. Berenza knows Victoria to be a virgin, and she is, for the most part, submissive to him, but the circumstances under which she came to reunite with him as well as the emotional outburst she has with him in earshot are troubling signs of her calculative, deceptive mind and amorality. She may be a virgin, but perfect virginity required not only chastity but the possession of “a number of intangible qualities that come to be associated with moral virtue” (Harol 10). Before she can become his bride, Victoria must prove that she is *not* an affected woman like Megalena by showing true signs of virgin virtues.

As has Megalena, Victoria has mastered the art of affectation, and it is for this mastery she is to be feared. Victoria becomes the more monstrous because “her mutability and her uncanny ability to

dissemble" which she uses to "cross social and gender boundaries" renders her into an excessively fluid subject impossible to contain (Beauvais 3). Despite her analysis of the subversive quality of Victoria's ability to shape-shift according to the other's desire, however, Beauvais reads Victoria's performance as the perfect wife that which "eventually leads to [her] loss of self" (5). Admittedly, Victoria never disrobes the wifely persona in front of Berenza, but to say that the role consumes her is to overlook the fact that she never becomes a fully domesticated subordinate of Berenza's. Furthermore, such a reading obscures the fact that Victoria rules over Berenza's house, body, and fate, as well as the fact that she attempts, to the end, to be in control of her life. Although Zofloya assists Victoria in murdering Berenza, it is Victoria who authors the scheme, and it is her earlier performances as the melancholy but caring wife that makes it possible for her to execute the preparatory plans before the kill—the removal of herself and Berenza to secluded mountains, banning of medical doctors, to name a few—without setting off Berenza's alarm. In other words, Victoria's assumed role of the pensive, domesticated wife, her pretense of having been subsumed into Berenza's identity, enables her to attack rather than become bound to or lost in domesticity whilst being protected by it.

Dacre does in the end write a horrid death to punish Victoria for reciprocating Berenza's kindness with violence. However, readers are also told throughout the text that Victoria plots against Berenza because the latter inflicts a deep wound in the former's pride as he deems her unworthy and base, as his inferior. As Craciun rightly notes, Dacre "reveals the marriage plot to be literally infernal" and

that "patriarchy and its central institution, marriage, are literally nightmares" ("Introduction" 11). Victoria and Berenza's marriage might become hellish after Henriquez, Lilla, and Zofloya enter their household, but it had already been a nightmare before that. In her description of the five years of their married life, Dacre clarifies that Victoria's unhappiness stems largely from her knowledge that "Berenza [is] her superior" and that he "must feel it likewise"(140). "Every word, every look, every action" of his, she feels to be "reproach[ing] her former degradation, and the abjectness from which it had *pleased* him to raise her" (140). Marriage in eighteenth-century England was conceived as a means with which people strived to create enclosed spaces of comfort, and "both husband and wife [were to serve as] key participants of an ideal domestic sphere" (Roulston 23). The "comfort" an idea home made by the husband and wife was to give both a sense of "personal support" (qtd in Roulston 22). But what Victoria feels in the home she makes with Berenza is condescension, inferiority, and the threat of being cast out. Making clear that Berenza's former contempt for Victoria and her awareness of this contempt forecloses their home from becoming a comforting space, Dacre urges her readers realize that Berenza is partly responsible for the nightmare that is his marriage.

What Victoria wants is to free herself from Berenza's "refined and disinterested attachment" (145) and be perceived as an equal partner in a relationship—sexual and otherwise. This want is hard to be met, however, for Henriquez, who Victoria takes to be a person who can grant her wishes, is not malleable enough to be influenced by her or to forgo patriarchal norms. Unlike Megalena who had only

to ensure Leonardo that she would keep him away from the eyes of society that shun him as the son of a fallen woman to keep him by her side, Victoria has nothing to offer Henriquez. While Leonardo quickly forgets about the young, innocent girl who professed her virgin love for him, Henriquez holds his fiancé, Amamia—a young beauty who he and others celebrate as the paragon of virtues—closely to his heart, and even brings her to Berenza's house. In fact, Lilla is the filter through which he perceives and assesses all women, as Dacre clearly notes. He responds to women unlike his "angel" with contempt. Victoria, he sees "with a tincture of dislike" precisely for that reason; she is "so opposite to his lovely mistress" (147). Victoria's confession of her desire for him only exacerbates the situation for her as it renders the formerly unlikeable but tolerable woman to a monster who intends to betray her husband. In other words, Victoria's plan to seduce Henriquez and escape from Berenza is thwarted because Henriquez, a man entrenched in a culture that devalues a woman for her subjectivity, is unable to be enamored by a woman threatening to destroy two conventional relationships to assert her sexual subjectivity. Victoria may be able to perform the role of the seductress, but as can be inferred from how the novel's seasoned seductress, Megalena, is demoted into a fiendish figure, the persona of the femme fatale Victoria adopts in trying to charm Henriquez is bound to reduce her to a condemnable wretch.

Aware that Lilla is Henriquez's idol, Victoria makes another attempt at seducing him by literally (and magically, with Zofloya's help) transforming herself into Lilla, only to fail, both in becoming the ideal woman and in winning Henriquez's love. These failures, on top

of the constant frustration at being pitted against Lilla, harbors in Victoria a great hatred for Lilla. It is, to be precise, not Lilla the individual but the ideals of femininity Lilla represents and Henriquez lauds that Victoria abhors. Finding it difficult to compete with the angelic maiden, Victoria censures the very femininity she can perform but not embody, going as far as to suggest that Lilla makes an "artful insignificant ascendancy" to her idolized status by playing upon the "undiscriminating fancy of [Henriquez's] boyish days" (159). Victoria's use of words like "artful", "undiscriminating", and "fancy" implicitly challenges the authenticity of Lilla's femininity. If there is a difference between Victoria and Lilla, it is that the latter is more capable of performing "the new bourgeois ideal of the 'civilized' domestic idol" (Hoeveler 188). Had Victoria been the only person to point to the potential fictitiousness of the ideal feminine, one might be able to read her censure against Lilla as words of a jealous lover. However, the *narrator* also draws attention to such possibility as well. Although she is careful to add on a series of pretty adjectives to adorn the description of Lilla, the narrator points out that "the mind and person of the orphan Lilla is. . .indeed *calculated* to excite an ardent love in youth" (144 my italics) and encourages readers to entertain the possibility that even Lilla's femininity might be the product of fabricated performances.

Victoria eventually stabs and kills Lilla, and such an act "resonates with a symbolic intent to destroy [the] false feminine ideal" (Dunn 314). The murder of Lilla occurs after Victoria fails to gain Henriquez's love after venturing to *become* Lilla herself. Victoria transforms into Lilla's angelic form but the spell soon breaks. When

her performance fails because she cannot fit into Lilla's mold or replace her, there is nothing Victoria the actress to do but to retreat to the back stage. This, Victoria certainly does. Returning to the cave where she has put the "real" Lilla in chains, Victoria kills the angel whose loveliness she could only mime for a short while. But if Victoria murders the angel with hopes of "mak[ing] space for women like [herself]" (Heiland 48), such a violent act gives her no satisfaction as the angel lives on even in her death, influencing the ways in which women are perceived. In fact, Victoria knows this to be true even before she stifles life out of Lilla, as she witnesses Henriquez choose death over letting Victoria replace Lilla. Devastated at learning that he has been tricked into being seduced by Victoria in Lilla's disguise and believing that Lilla has perished, Henriquez commits suicide. His self destructive action tells Victoria that Lilla has an undying power. This newly found knowledge awakens Victoria to the limitations and futility of performing, and such an awakening lead her to slip off her performative selves entirely, and to kill Lilla with her bare hands.

IV. Deaths of Villainesses: A Short Conclusion

In the last few chapters of *Zofloya*, we witness Victoria forgoing her mask of feminine submissiveness, succumbing to unbridled passions, committing multiple murders, and finding herself captive to Zofloya who reveals his satanic face before pushing her off a cliff. The other villainess, Megalena, takes her own life before the force of Inquisition reaches her. The tragic endings met by both Victoria and

Megalena suggestively reveal that women who fail to give themselves fully and unaffectedly to their roles and duties as chaste maidens, wives, and/or mothers are not permitted to escape damnation. Nevertheless, to read Victoria's plummet down the cliff and Megalena's suicide as punishments Dacre writes for her perhaps too masculine villainesses who simultaneously appropriate and conspire against gendered norms and institution is to pay too little heed to the fact that Dacre has let these women assert themselves and run rampant to the end.

Megalena dies not because of her libertine lifestyle or because she tarnishes sanctity of motherhood in becoming a phallic mother in her relationship with Leonardo, but because she becomes embroiled in the Inquisition after joining a band of bandits. Perhaps Dacre's conservative readers would have regarded Megalena's death a poetic justice well met, but Dacre allows her elder villainess to retain her autonomy and dignity by choosing death as a way out instead of being persecuted. Victoria's death is more complicated. In her final moments, Victoria clings onto Zofloya's arms, and the passivity she shows in the last scenes of the text has led critics to argue that Victoria finally submits herself to the sensibilities of traditional heroines. But if Victoria *does* show passivity in her final moments of terror, readings that feminize Victoria's last struggle discounts the fact that she who has disrupted the domestic "peace" of Berenza's house, destroyed the "masters" of this house, and eliminated—albeit only in her physical form—the ideal feminine, cannot be a conventional heroine of any kind. She is thrust into the abyss by the demon, but the demon's crowing remark that he has "deceived [her]

throughout . . . yet thou hast permitted thyself to be led along!" (267) reveals that Dacre identifies the cause of Victoria's downfall as not her affected femininity or lack thereof, but her failure to recognize the deceptive power of her co-conspirator, Zofloya, and her failure to keep a firm hand on how she interacts with him. At a first glance, Victoria's plunge to her death seem to deliver the message that the only fate reserved for a deviant woman refusing to become truly domesticated. However, the passive tense Zofloya uses in describing Victoria's failings—she let herself "be led along"—quite indicatively reveals that Victoria is defeated because she allows herself to be an object to be acted upon. There is little space for a female desiring subject to claim in society, but there is *no* space that a woman who, knowingly or unknowingly, permits herself to become an entity to be managed. Perhaps *that*, was the moral of Dacre's bloodcurdling story.

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Key Words

Charlotte Dacre, *Zofloya*, gendered performance, female ideals, villainesses

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Abstract

Playing the Feminine:
Politics of Gendered Performances in Charlotte Dacre's *Zofloya*

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This essay explores the performativity of villainesses in Charlotte Dacre's *Zofloya* to investigate Dacre's ironic use of gendered ideals. Featuring two villainesses, Victoria and Megalena, who use their knowledge of the others' desire for maidenly/matronly women in disguising and achieving their vile wants, Dacre exposes the fictitiousness of gendered ideals and mocks the one-dimensionality of gender norms. Victoria and Megalena are keen actresses adept in cloaking themselves in robes of femininity, and their efforts to perform the ideal feminine may mark them as submissive. But it is important to note that the performative selves over which the two villainesses have full command allow them to unravel gendered hierarchies, to turn the dynamics of male-female gazing on its head. Victoria and Megalena's assertive personas, which Dacre condemns but does not soften, also gives hints as how we can understand Dacre's defiant approach to gender politics of her time as well as to the gothic convention, both of which drew firm lines between the male and female. Like its villainesses who transgress the boundaries

of gender, Dacre's text also defies the gothic norm that relates terror to female and horror to male writing by appropriating them both. Like her female antagonists, Dacre performs the femimine role of an apologetic writer, reassuring the readers with "dear reader" comments and the violent deaths she pens for them. However, the fact that Dacre forces her readers to witness villainesses glide in and out of idealized female roles with ease and undermine, criticize, and subvert the gendered order of things reveals that Dacre's intent had been to unnerve and disrupt, rather than titillate then reassure.

Key words

Charlotte Dacre, *Zofloya*, gendered performance, female ideals, villainesses

논문게재일

❍투고일: 2018년 7월 8일 ❍심사일: 2018년 8월 3일 ❍게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.37

Spatial and Temporal Politics of Memories:
Focusing on Shepard's *Fool for Love*

Yoon, So Young*

I. Introduction

Sam Shepard(1943-2017) is an actor as well as a playwright. Cast in *Pelican Brief*, Shepard himself played a leading role with Kim Basinger in the movie *Fool for Love*, 1985. Shepard, well-known for his *Family Plays*, is a representative American playwright in contemporary times. Regarded as the quintessential writer who had revealed and scrutinized American spirit and varieties, Shepard was once involved with experimental theatricalism of the Sixties, but he changed his theatrical mode into realism after *Curse of the Starving Class*(1976). What is remarkable about him is that he is not only a prolific writer but a winner of various awards including the Pulitzer Prize for Drama for *Buried Child* in 1979. Among the writers who have dealt with the most American features, Shepard's plays well represent American-ness itself, which he had concentrated on. His plays converge on the

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recurring themes of family disintegration, longing for the West, absent father, and familial secret like incest between mother and son. As well-known, the collection of *Curse of the Starving Class*(1976), *Buried Child*(1978) and *True West*(1980) is called Shepard's *Family Trilogy*. In addition to these, two more plays including *Fool for Love* (1983) and *A Lie of the Mind*(1985) are classified as his *Family Plays* altogether.

To express his own visions on plays vividly, he depends on theatrical techniques such as imagery and transformation in particular. Shepard provides audience with realistic plays, traditionally a dominant American theatrical style. His exquisite elaboration for theatrical elements is focused on Shepardian Realism or so-called Shepard's superrealism, which shows the importance of using real props and weighs on immediacy to the audience. Themes and structural features of his plays investigate how American family is disintegrated and why they seek for the meaning of the West related to American identities. In sum, Shepard's plays converge on family disintegration, separated selves, American-ness, and so on. Shepard's theatrical techniques are well-equipped to present these themes.

For analysis, *Fool for Love*(abbreviated as *Fool*) is selected. Especially Fool provides plenty of schematic devices such as using car headlights toward the audience to rouse the importance of the fourth wall by breaking easiness of the audience. In this play, space onstage especially draws main and crucial interests. Characters on the stage occupy their specific spaces, which refer to cross the border of time line and memories. Also, it involves an inseparable area of the Old Man. Specifically, division of space functions as main characters'

emotional movement, consciousness and subconsciousness related to Foucault's concept of heterotopia. Heterotopia will be applied for revealing the meaning of space simultaneity between characters. Some researchers explore the importance of the border between reality and fantasy(Ryu 1986; Jung 2004; Yu 2013). In that case, the Old Man is regarded as a being situated in a fantastic area. In this vein, the Old Man's space is classified as a heterogeneous/ heterochroneous one. Moreover, memory is an important element to make the Old Man an (in)visible character. Therefore, as mentioned in the stage direction, Shepard's outlining, "the Old Man only exists in May and Eddie's minds," leads to strengthened his in/visibility.

In this play, sometimes dramatic irony plays a role in revealing layers of memory and discourse in a visually flat platform of the stage. Audience, however, can detect two dimensional memory territories from the perspective of visibility. In particular, consecutive operation of memories are destructed due to the existence of the Old Man. With this regard, Chapter 2 investigates the dimensions of space on the stage. In Chapter 3 rhetorical topography will be discussed.

II. Subdivision of Space

There are three main characters on the stage: May, Eddie, and the Old Man. Shepard's stage shows different dimensions of existence according to memories and relationships among them. Physically separated from the Old Man, May and Eddie occupy the other side of the stage. In comparison with them, the Old Man is alone in rocking

chair on the stage. What is noteworthy is the Old Man's gaze is facing the same direction as the audience as if he were part of them. All of them appear on the same dimension of the stage but May and Eddie cannot notice the existence of the Old Man, who is likely to be invisible. As shown in the stage direction, the Old Man only exists in May and Eddie's minds. That means that they cannot talk or speak to the Old Man as if there were no communication between them. However, this is not always true of that. In this respect, an evident visual gap between reality and memory is revealed. Also, memory involves time and the past love affairs. In so doing, time and memory cannot be separable, thus evoking various dimensions of time and space. For that reason, the area of the Old Man is called fantasy space or heterogeneous one.

The stage is a place that invisibility and visibility encounters altogether. In this vein, there is an unseen system operating dividing spaces. There are three different dimensions of space: visibility, invisibility and both. Firstly, space of visibility presents three characters —Eddie, May and Martin—who are obviously visible to the audience. What is interesting is the existence of the Old Man. The audience can see the Old Man although his space belongs to a heterotopic division. We can call it a heterogeneous area since the dividing line seems to draw the boundary between reality and fantasy. According to Foucault, "Heterotopia as inconsistent topography has the principle of superimposing several incompatible spaces in one real place" (18–19). The reason for the visual heterotopia lies in the extension of the primary space. Moreover, it is a heterogeneous topography on the ground because it is a planar space directly on the stage and visible to

the audience.

In the second division of space, things invisible could be mentioned. It can be called a space of memory. Discourse between May and Eddie may speak to the Old Man's past. Considering their conversation, the Old Man came to know their relationship had been twisted because of his own free life. The Old Man[1] is their father, however, they call him just the Old Man, not Father. That is, by calling their father the Old Man, Eddie and May may accept the existence of the father, taking into account the relationship with their mothers. For the two, their father figure is another name of absence. In this scene, appropriateness of space allocation is remarkable. Division of the spatial occupation shows a sort of compartment in order to reveal their memories are floating on what enunciation level is. There can be found time intrusion in the space of memory. Inconsistency in their memories also includes the fact that their remembering times and things are staggered. For instance, we can find crossed storytelling of May and Eddie. Moreover, when May's story is narrated, the Old Man urges Eddie to try correcting the episodes. For example, in May's subdivision, a bed lies in, but it is not intended to do its intrinsic function. Instead, Eddie tries to throw ropes at the bed poles, which evokes the times of longing for the West. And the last but not least, the third division of space is coexistence of presence and absence. In this regard, there are some reasons for coexisting of presence and absence spaces. In particular, there can be found some importance of the place where they meet again and talk to each other: an indecent

1) Based on the meaning from the Cambridge Dictionary, the Old Man is defined as someone's father or someone's husband.

and crap motel in the Mojave Desert. In this vein, spatiality draws attention. They are located in a desert: a symbolic place where is expected to be barren, unproductive and hopeless. According to Wilcox, the desert is defined as a haunted place by the spirit of the 'dead father' and "a patriarchal superego"(44). Love between May and Eddie is farfetched. Its territorial phase is defined as secluded, detached, unfrequented and uninhabited. They are occupied in irregular time zones; that is, their time is unceasing lapse between past and present. The existence of the Old Man proves this. This is a kind of space that halted time. Juxtaposing time and space, they are intertwined sophisticatedly. At any rate, division of space leads to division of time.

There is an absolute time operation from the Old Man. There exist heterochronias on the stage. According to the fourth principle of heterotopia, "More often than not, heterotopias are connected with temporal discontinuities [*découpages du temps*]; that is, they open onto what might be called, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronias" (182). Heterochronias can be found from their storytelling about the starting point of their love. Without knowing each other correctly, they had a crush on each other as soon as they met for the first time. At that moment, a particular fossiled time is laid on a background. It is linked to the Old Man's past love with May's mother. Operation of heterochronias is developing incestuous love between them. The inevitable trap of love between siblings opens and leads to heterotopia of a crap motel in the desert. The space of love between them functions as a heterotopia, which involves heterochronia. Heterochronia is a kind of fissure between real time and static time.

That means the Old Man's intrusion into their squabble provides heterochronias. That is, temporal discontinuities make accumulation of memories erroneous. Due to this mechanism, spatial division collapses so that the Old Man's heterogeneous areas are mixed with the real space of the stage. That leads to reassurance of the siblings' self-destructive love.

Eddie and May are alter egos of the Old Man: Eddie is represented as nostalgia for the West, where American men long for. The West atmosphere operates as "signifiers of masculinity"(Pugliese 76). On the other hand, May is an irresistible object, who is evidence of the Old Man's dual life. "Like the eagle and the cat in *Curse*, these pairings are both interdependent and self-destructive, caught in an impossible bind of mutual incompatibility"(Bottoms 191). It is certain that Eddie and May are incompatible as lovers. They are detrimental to each other so that they cannot accept each other's demand. They are representation of the Old Man's dual life and duality. According to Bottoms, ". . . as ever in Shepard's work, duality leads not to a healthy balance, but to perpetual division"(191). Considering their relationships, the Old Man is definitely their father. Nevertheless, they call him just the Old Man. This refers to their attitudes to negate or hide their father figure. What draws our attention is that only Eddie communicates with the Old Man. Contrastingly, the Old Man cannot talk to May on the stage. May's space does not allow the Old Man's voice and gesticulation. Only the Old Man talks about May; however, his voice cannot reach May as if she seemed to be deaf about it. That they are seen standing on the stage is a sort of phenomenon which occurs in a flat space. However, they are not seen as planar. "They cut through

space and make perfect sense without having to hesitate for the 'meaning'"(Shepard 217). Why are they standing in a three-dimensional space on a stage that is clearly visually flat? It appears to be related to a kind of dividing rule. They are seen on the same level from the perspective of the audience. But the Old Man's discourse lies in a different time and space.

The division of space is to divide the time, and the time eventually operates the return to the past through memory. And the space is the present space, but they recall the past through memory and make their space into the space of the past. Especially this time, the father who remembers the past while not talking to May plays an important role in explaining the politics of space. The Old Man's area is said to have access to fantasy or memory which arouses Eddie's storytelling. Eddie tells Martin(May's date) about the day he found about his father's secret life with May's mother. At that time, the Old Man occasionally contributes his point of view. May is angry because Eddie told his side of the story to Martin. May tells the story from her stance and the way it affected her mother and her youth with her mother who was always desperately waiting for the Old Man to come back. May ends her story by saying that when her mother tried to stop Eddie and May from having a sexual relationship, Eddie's mother shot herself in the head. As Hall insists, May is changing into a "speaking subject"(151). When they are communicating with the third man Martin, there exists another attendee, the Old Man. Practically, Eddie is telling about his mother's situation to the irresponsible father.

Concomitantly, vacancy of the stage is women's. That is, female space seems to be empty although May certainly exists onstage. This

implies there is no room for their mothers in comparison with that of the father. Like Hart(217), Jung points out that female spaces in Shepard's plays are described as suppressed one(155). Actually female figures do not appear onstage except May. Other females exist only in discourse and inside of an empty picture frame. In other words, relevant parts of the space for women are an empty picture frame, a drug closet in the restroom, May's red dress, and her suitcase for trips. Through May's outfit, male characters' leaving their family was supposed to be conjectured. In Shepard's most plays, a father figure is deeply connected with alcohol and economic inability. In addition, fathers are likely to run away from home and family. As highlighted by Yoon(2011), they are victims, who are oppressed by burdensome masculinity by supporting their family. They cannot exist as their ideal individuals rather than they are called some names which show relationships or responsibilities like family providers.

May and Eddie are sitting in the different space as if they cannot talk to each other. Despite this, the Old Man, who exists in their minds, can bind them without revealing a real body. Sitting in rocking chair, he recollects his past stories with a bottle of whisky. This inconsistent space in which the Old Man is staying is related to different dimension of time. It is in reality but in fantasy, too. Sometimes, this specific space connects different two dimensional spaces without rupture. This particularity shows dis-connectivity between characters' relationships.

On the basis of memory, there can be found three dimensional phases: Old Man's past should be connected May's and Eddie's mothers, May's memory about Father and Eddie's memory about

Father. Under the situation, their respective memories are scattered and dispersed on respective areas of the stage. With this regard, in this play, their memories are composed of pieces of past scenes. Memories do not follow the rules of Bergson's duration since they are episodic and fragmented. That is, time lines are discontinuous in that each memory does not match each other. Memories reorganize and redivide space and time to reveal their relationship to Martin. Memory reveals their relationship by sharing space and time again. The appearance of Martin, a third person, is realistic and visible, but it has the characteristic of being a listener to reveal Eddie's feelings toward May. Their feelings are complex and intricately intertwined as their relationship is a clutter.

The situation they are placed in a motel is compared with Heidegger's *Geworfenheit* (thrown in the world). As Bigsby points out, they are in the "middle of nowhere"(20) as a thrown status. Since they are thrown in the world, they should find their existential meaning. The two traces of their father's past are just the father's existence. But like his father and mother in their youth, Eddie fell in love with passion, but he was supposed to leave May like his father did to his mother. For May, who estimated this, Eddie's leaving is not that easy for her. Like this, the two characters function as traces of his father's double(alter ego).

His presence adds to the heightened dream-like quality of the play. He talks to Eddie mostly when only one of them is in the motel room and the other is outside or in the bathroom. Because of this, the Old Man acts as an audience and responses to the subconscious thoughts of Eddie and May. His conversations with Eddie seem to

take place on the landscape of their inner thoughts made real on the stage. Being absent, the father figure can be visible in recollecting memories like the Old Man in a rocking chair. In other words, their father is an iconic figure of absence. Nevertheless, the Old Man shows himself as if he responded and acted like from the audience's stance. Listening to Eddie and May's recollection, the Old Man shouts at Eddie urging to defend him.

His presence is a reminder of their complicated past and the shame of their incestuous relationship. The Old Man offers different points of view on May and Eddie's past and for the most part denies any fault in their present troubled state. He calls Eddie "a fantasist," perhaps a reference to Sam Shepard's father's attitude towards his son's role as a playwright who imagines things for a living and also Eddie's characteristic of being an idealist who imagines a better future for himself and is possible of believing in his own illusions. When he was younger, the Old Man convinced himself he could balance two lives without consequences. Nevertheless, theatrical device such as front headlights[2] of the car is effectively applied. His task as a playwright was to foreground the importance of the "actor-performer." These theatrical features are means for rebuilding the relationship with audience by providing a novel insight, which is the author's intention to make the audience impressed by the play itself. According to Shepard, easiness of audience should be broken for longer retention of the play itself. Strong and powerful images like

2) headlights from the stage shoots all the audience to evoke "You're in a theatre now. Don't be easily assimilated into the stage." This device is to produce a kind of Verfremdungseffekt(alienation effect) coined by Bertolt Brecht.

headlights of the car is beamed from the stage.

Eddie and May's story is discoursed in an invisible phase where this play attracts the audience. Also, sound of explosion shows visually another booming in his mind. Eddie says he is going out to see the damage that the Countess has done and promises to be right back. May packs her suitcase and tells Martin that Eddie was gone. May leaves with her packed suitcase and Martin stares out the window as the fire continues to blaze outside. In the end, male characters evade their responsibilities for family and females do know this well.

III. Rhetorical topography

Even a person who exists on the stage has a lot of boundaries that deny reality. Father's role is very slimy. However, his rocking chair shows importance of father's role. That is, a chair that shows a father's authority to keep his power. Moreover, the Old Man stares at the empty picture frame and says that it is Barbara Mandrell. It is stemmed from the unconsciousness of the father who has the right to manage and control his memory. As "men's traditional objectification and domination of women's lives and spaces"(Bottoms 211), this is an example of objectification of women by gaze. As Wilson illustrates, in this play 'gaze' belongs to men to show male dominance over women (52). Likewise, another example can be found from his relationship with May. Communication between father and son goes on to each other, but the Old Man does not talk to May. The Old Man just

watched May, who was maintained only by the recollection of childhood. However, paradoxically this suggests a deeply serious indictment of the assumption underlying Shepard's plays. Back to the space division, there can be found no spatial distinction from his son. The spatial border is blurred between father and son whereas there can be found an evident division of space between father and daughter. They never see each other.

Interestingly, there can be found some common things between father and son. That no male characters want to be responsible is related to their suppressed masculinity as family providers. Concomitantly, the Old Man does not want to take care of his family. His son, Eddie resembles him. Eddie and May are siblings. They had a crush on each other as soon as they met for the first time. They have an ardent wish for love; however, it cannot be earned for good. Their love cannot overcome their identities. The story of Eddie and May is told in a heterogeneous space although they exist in reality. Their relations lie in different memory dimensions. The moment the two of them are released, the father, who is listening to the story, has no memory of them. This story discloses his past dual life. He appears on a story he did not know. Like he said, no one has ever told him that. In other words, a story that is not heard does not come into reality because there is no resonance, and it exists in a space beyond reality. Like occupying space on their stage.

The Old Man's dual life reflects two siblings of Eddie and May, who exist on the same level of space on the stage with the Old Man. But they cannot notice him since the Old Man may not be seen from them. So the untold story about the two—son and daughter—presents

the Old Man's irresponsibility. Through the rhetorical device, it is necessary to grasp the meaning that there is another space depending on the existence of these two lovers, Martin, Countess, and so on.

Deviation of memory of the two people in heterogeneous space and distortion of memory of the Old Man share their story. Does the Old Man who is aware of the relationship feels that their past time and memory were not appropriate? In the relationship between them, especially May, is trying to avoid Eddie, Eddie finds his father's bad habits and does the same thing. In this vein, they are replaced by the father's consciousness and subconsciousness since they are the Old Man's double. Also, there are incestuous elements between them. Reflection of reality through the combination of memory can not be achieved when the Old Man speaks the difference between actuality and realism. The empty frame of the photo is a sort of infinite field to produce numerous signifiers. First of all, the Old Man said it was Barbara Mandrell. This is like a father's absolute authority to his son in order to define things. Also, he speaks as if he summoned his exact past memory.

THE OLD MAN: Well, would you believe me if I told ya' I was married to her?

EDDIE: NO.

THE OLD MAN: Well, see, now that's the difference right there. That's realism. I am actually married to Barbara Mandrell in my mind. Can you understand that?

EDDIE: Sure.

THE OLD MAN: Good. I'm glad we have an understanding. (27)

The stage with the Old Man is a space of consciousness for him, but the place where the Old Man exists for Eddie and May is a subconscious space. Also, the space where Eddie and May are located is like a space that is mirrored to the Old Man.

The existence of the Old Man intends to show the other horizon of memories; however, it is distorted. Topological differences show the theatrical fantasy and reality. These theatrical features are means for rebuilding the relationship with audience by providing a novel insight, which is the author's intention to make the audience impressed by the play itself. According to Shepard, easiness of audience should be broken for longer retention of the play itself.

Interestingly, Martin and Countess are the third persons, who are heterogeneous figures existing on heterogenous memory as well as reality. Peculiarity of heterotopias includes distortion of memory and different angles and points of respective memories. The reason is that this kind of love exists on the space of fantasy, not reality. There is some difference between theatrical reality and fantasy. This much is made crystal clear. Feeling of love between them lies in the different dimension as if they cannot evade the distortion of memories between them where scuffle for love happens.

They spend altogether on the stage but they couldn't remember car brands, certain affairs or peculiar areas. Obviously, they remember their house is not a place to share their feeling as family. There are things that families can share but can not remember between them. For them, their house is not a place of empathy. Besides, there is no place to share so that they meet at a crap motel in a desert. They are left in the abandoned space, and for them, love seems to be the

meaning of existence.

Relationship between Eddie and May reflects facing their father onstage. That is, May cannot encounter the Old Man unlike Eddie. Eddie lead a conversation with him as if they existed on the same level, not on his mind. Duality in this play focuses on the Old Man's past life and his two children, who are in fragmented relationships and pieces of memory. He remains onstage even after May and Eddie exit (rather than disappearing in a puff of memory), and supplies the final lines to round the play off.

> Intentionally or not, the play's structure implicitly exposes and queries men's traditional objectification and domination of women's lives and spaces, by presenting a scheme of masculine control much like that outlined by various feminist critiques of the domination of the male gaze in theatre and film.
>
> According to this scheme, the Old Man would represent the typical masculine observer in the audience, watching May from the outside as a feminine object whose own perspective he has no concept of(it is notable that the only time in the play when he addresses her, he speaks at her as if she were a child: he never communicates with her). (Bottoms 211)

On the other hand, there is no hierarchy or power in the female space. As he said at an interview, Fool "is really more about a woman than any play I've ever written, and it's from her point of view pretty much"(Shepard interviewed by Bernard Weiner). May is shown to be the victim of male assumptions and delusions. Yet, crucially, she is presented not only as a victim but as a character who is also very much a desiring subject in her own right (even if those desires are . . .

confused and contradictory) (Bottoms 211).

In Shepard's plays, father figures are inclined to leave their family rather easily. By doing so, they are seen as somewhat irresponsible beings, who run away from their duties. In this vein, we can develop suppressed masculinity discussion. There cannot be drawn any meanings from Eddie's repetitive vocabulary such as "I'm not leavin'. I don't care what you think anymore. I don't care what you feel"(40). Saying "I'm stayin' right here," Eddie never keeps his word as May knows it. Eddie's lies not to leave May lacks authenticity. May does not trust Eddie who says like mentioned above.

EDDIE: You know we're connected, May. We'll always be connected.
That was decided a long time ago.
MAY: Nothing was decided! You made all that up.
EDDIE: You know what happened. (70)

The love struggle between Eddie and May is to recreate the past of the Old Man. He is a typical figure who leaves his family. He is wondering why Eddie did not contact him when she committed suicide. "You were gone," said Eddie. Eddie's mother loved the Old Man very deeply. With this reason, she couldn't accept the Old Man's dual life and love affairs with another woman. Even if Eddie's mother attempted to separate the two, the mother's suicide happened after the misfire. Like this she did not appear on the stage, discursive approach helps to present a more sustained and consistent exploration of character.

The Old Man is not only Eddie's unconsciousness but the Old

Man's consciousness itself. They talk to each other unlike the Old Man cannot speak to May. Eddie is the Old Man's prolonged being. That means the Old Man's time is connected to the figure and thought of Eddie until now. The Old Man shows the presence of the past Old Man; otherwise, the specific terrain for the Old Man on the stage is inevitable time. Time and an unconsciousness terrain are involved in the specificity of the space in which the Old Man is present. If Eddie is the present of the Old Man, the Old Man is defined as the past. On the stage two different times coexist by embodying invisible female characters.

Why does love matters between them? Absence of Father is one of the elements of longing for love between them; even incestuous one. Their love goes beyond their identities, thus passing over being and time. In this regard, Jung says that the Old Man exercises control over his son by taking the initiative as a father figure(157). Différance of memories shows delayed memories and revealed difference of time and pieces of memories. The rhetorical differences and peculiarities are indicated in their conversation. Whereas Eddie said, "You'll never replace me and you know it,(74)" Eddie knows he is an alter ego of the Old Man. And May's expression "I don't understand how I could hate you so much after so much time. . . I hate you even more. It grows.(60)" reveals how deep and inseparable love they made. In particular, May's intention to evoke some jealousy from Eddie is frustrated when she introduces Eddie to Martin as a cousin. Martin is situated in the same level of audience when Eddie's storytelling continues. Eddie insists on May is lying to Martin. On top of that, Eddie said, "It was about whether or not you're actually a man or not . . .

Whether you're a "man" or just a "guy"(118)." This device activates to accumulate rhetorical topography firmly when Eddie and Martin are talking about going out to the movies with May.

> MAY: It was supposed to have been true every time before. . . You've been jerking me off like this for fifteen years. Fifteen years I've been a yo-yo for you. I've never been split. . . . I've either loved you or not loved you. And now I just plain don't love you. I don't need you. I don't want you. Do you get that? Now if you can still stay then you're either crazy or pathetic. (108)

This represents that May's shackle on love is persistent. Underlying truth or reality is, however, Eddie should leave her like her father. Between May and Eddie, love as endless relocation of space onstage investigates their irresistible relationship to the Old Man and his dual life. During communication with Martin, the Old Man adds his situation. At any rate, Eddie's storytelling about the Old Man is deeply rooted in May's presence. May retorts this story is all Eddie's makeup as if their love story were a lie. Saying, "You want me to finish this story for you, Eddie?" May develops her mother's love story toward the Old Man. She felt deeply grieving that somebody's death was about to happen. And when she goes on Eddie's mother's suicide, the Old Man talks like this, "That's the dumbest version I ever heard in my whole life. . . Speak on my behalf.(160)" From this, conversation between Eddie and the Old Man continues as if there were no one on the stage. Continuously, the Old Man urges Eddie to defend or represent him. At this moment, the fire is on the Eddie's trailer. And then Eddie left as expected. Nevertheless, the Old Man said to the

audience pointing into the void space on the wall, "That's the woman of my dreams. That's who that is. And she's mine. She's all mine. Forever(168)." Like this his enunciation is trapped in his own reality and fantasy operating rhetorical topography. Moreover, the Old Man is situated in heterochronias during the communication between Eddie and May, between Eddie and the Old Man, and when he told about May's childhood his heterochronic time management revealed his fatherhood. Through this, he exists on the stage by producing spatial and temporal dynamics.

IV. Conclusion

Shepard's theatrical techniques are particular and salient to investigate. The West is one of his recurring themes, which are focused on American identity, American-ness, American fathers' suppressed masculinity as well.

The background of the stage is a crap motel room away from the Mojave Desert. Actually May as a cook lives in the desert. The relationship between Eddie and May operates on the dimension where they cannot meet their father, the Old Man who takes control of the stage through his authority as a father.

Visually they are on the same platform at the same time but the invisible screen between them divides time as well as place. Division of space on the stage is categorized into two types. The first one shows each visible area of Eddie, May and the Old Man in terms of the audience. The second one provides an invisible horizon. This

sector is related to their memories about the past.

The compartmentalization of space is a manifestation of Eddie's father's desire to dominate the time through the device as well as memory that shows their father's power is working. There is no woman in the picture that the Old Man says as his eternal love, but the emotions that he put in the framework of love work like a still picture. Likewise, their relationship cannot be mentioned without love between siblings.

Eddie's lies not to leave May lacks authenticity. For them, emotions such as love occupy the different dimensions likewise memory distortion. Physically they are in the same space for them on the stage, but memory operates differently; it is transformed into a heterogeneous/heterochroneous one. They share rhetorical differences and peculiarities. Their memory functions about the division of the space on the stage. In particular, their communication lies in the rhetorical terrain in that fantasy eludes reality. In conclusion, their love is about the Old Man's duality.

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Key words

Fool for Love, spatial division, heterotopia, heterochronia, memory, duality

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Abstract

Spatial and Temporal Politics of Memories:
Focusing on Shepard's *Fool for Love*

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Well-known for a prolific writer, Shepard won a variety of awards. Shepard's theatrical techniques are particular and salient to investigate. The West is one of his recurring themes, which are focused on American identity, American-ness, American fathers' masculinity as well. Sam Shepard as a successor to tradition of American plays embodies his peculiar realism on the stage, his theatrical techniques sums up representation of using real props, immediacy and transformation techniques. His *Family Trilogy* and *Family Plays* are representative ones to show his theatricalism. This study investigates Sam Shepard's *Fool for Love*, which belongs to his *Family Plays*. Its main focus is on spatial division and temporal reversal with a view of incestuous relationships between siblings. This stage has conscious and subconscious spaces which are revealed by dividing characters' areas onstage. Among them, women's space seems relatively empty like the picture the Old Man pointed out. There certainly exists May, but there is no room for their mothers despite providing their father's space. Moreover, the father figure

shows authorities to cross the border between reality and fantasy. In particular, the Old Man's utterance has control over Eddie. Memories of the characters onstage are connected to passage of time; especially to show the Old Man's past duality. For that reason, Eddie and May are inseparably stuck in rhetorical topography of love. Therefore, their foolishness for love is about the Old Man's dual life with his two families. Like a quote by Archbishop Anthony Bloom, "The proper response to love is to accept it. There is nothing to *do*."

Key words

Fool for Love, spatial division, heterotopia, heterochronia, memory, duality

논문게재일

○투고일: 2018년 7월 20일 ○심사일: 2018년 8월 1일 ○게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.63

A Posthuman Vision:

Transhuman Characters Between Humans and Posthumans from Samuel Beckett's *Endgame*

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I. Introduction

We humans have achieved civilization by manipulating the world in accordance with its purpose through the tools; however, today's life science technology is making not only nature but also a human being a subject of the technology and challenging new human being species. Human birth, diseases, and aging belonged to inviolable areas, but in the 21st century, life science intervenes in this area and attempts to surpass the impossible by challenging human cognitive, physical, mental, and ethical limits with the help of drugs, prostheses, and surgery. In addition, we are now living in an era when we can change the human nature itself beyond the level of understanding what human beings are. In other words, we have reached the "designer evolution"(Deneen 63), in which we can artificially select and manipulate the material composition or mental characteristics of humans, becoming the first species to determine our own evolutionary

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direction; of course, this is attributed to the development of the most advanced scientific technology such as "NBIC"(Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno)(Luce 35).

Like this, today's technologies are our 'inner' skills to change and enhance human nature by directly targeting the human mind or body. According to Nick Bostrom, the idea of using science and technology to enhance the mental and physical capacities of humans is called "transhumanism" in "The Transhumanist FAQ"(Bostrom 4). And Joel Garreau describes transhumans as "those who are in the process of becoming posthuman"(qtd. in Wolfe xiii). In Bostrom's "Transhumanist FAQ", posthumans are interpreted as "possible future beings whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards"(Bostrom 5).

Also, transhumanist researchers insist that the current human species is not the ultimate form of development of human species, and that it is desirable to fundamentally improve human conditions by using science technology to eliminate aging and to actively enhance the mental and physical capacities of humans.[1] On the other hand, Francis Fukuyama, in his book *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*, focuses on technical identity, warning "the emergence of bioterrorism as a live threat"(Fukuyama xiii). In particular, he interestingly raises what is threatening the existing natural human identity as the three issues: cloning of a human embryo, control and enhancement of the human emotions by drugs,

1) Bostrom defines transhumanism movement as this:

> It is not our human shape or the details of our current human biology that define what is valuable about us, but rather our aspirations and ideals, our experiences, and the kinds of lives we lead. (Bostrom 4)

and the prolongation of life by stem cells(Fukuyama 18-83).

Beckett describes *Endgame* "There are no accidents in *Fin de Partie*. Everything is based on analogy and repetition"(Bair, 467), and so critics have made various allegory interpretations. For examle, Thomas Eisele presents a apocalypse vision, treating *Endgame* as a "religious themes"(Eisele 11); James Knowlson "tries to parallel the incidents and the events of *Endgame* as the chess game"(qtd in al-Nabrawi 55); Theodor W. Adorno takes epistemological standpoint, saying that "Beckett, as educated as anyone, presents the bill: philosophy, or spirit itself, proclaims its bankruptcy"(Adorno 121); and Hoon-sung Hwang illustrates "the so called postmodern confrontation between man and nature in an allegorical form in the wake of the bankruptcy of Enlightenment reason"(Hwang 131). From a transhumanist perspective, I will also try to reinterpret *Endgame* as an allegory showing a posthuman vision.

A vision of posthumans and transhumans is the most powerful paradigm of the 21st century. From the viewpoint of transhumans, Samuel Beckett's play *Endgame* dramatized a new possibility of recreating the human body with technology. In other words, in the play, he realizes the shape of a transhuman that replaces parts of character's body with machines. And he blurs the clear distinction between a flea, one of the lowest parasite insect and a human being, the highest mammal, i.e., between humans and nonhumans. We can think about transhumans on "the fault line"(Shepherd-Barr 256) between humans and posthumans. Beckett lets us encounter transhumans in *Endgame* by reimagining the relationship of Hamm and Clov as a symbiosis between a human and a nonhuman, or a

human and a prosthesis and Hamm's parents Nagg and Nell as elderly people whose lifespan are extended by the development of genetic engineering.

Human beings who have repeated evolution in the history of nature is now making their bodies the objects of technologies. In the passing from birth to death, there have been attempts to overcome the limit of human body and mind. However, transhumans or posthumans are different in terms of attempting to alter the limit of human characteristic and capacity even in the areas where we thought it would be impossible. Also, a biologist Julian Huxley asserts that advances in science and technology will enhance humans through the discovery of new technologies that combine 'organic' with 'nonorganic'(qtd. in Stanley 198). And a futurist named Jose Luis Cordeiro predicts the coming of transhumans and posthumans:

> *Homo sapiens* is the first species on our planet to become conscious of its own evolution and limitations, and humans will eventually transcend these constraints to become enhanced humans, transhumans, and posthumans. It might be a rapid process like caterpillars becoming butterflies, as opposed to the slow evolutionary passage from apes to humans. (Cordeiro 237)

Francis Bacon thought that utopia could be created in the idea of regaining lost Garden of Eden through science and technology (Dresner 9). And now, humans have the hope that the development of mechanical technology combined with science can make a utopia because "the utopia itself shows what society would be like if significant elements of a society were fully developed"(qtd in Ko 113).

We are heading for the transhuman and will definitely face a posthuman era by striving to transcend biological limitations and conditions. We need to question whether this future will become a posthuman world in the sense of a post-human to exceed the finite human limits, or it will be the gloomy world of George Orwell's *1984* or Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*. In this paper, I try to analyze the characters in Samuel Beckett's *Endgame* from the viewpoint of transhumanism to present a posthuman vision and to provide a critical assessment and outlook on the effects of modern science and technology on humans in the future.

Ⅱ. ⅰ) A Cyborg and Prostheses: Hamm and Clov

Beckett's *Endgame* does not have many props on the stage, and its atmosphere is entirely dark. From an aesthetic point of view of the stage set, he uses the "expressionistic"(Buning 59) technique. The stage in *Endgame* expresses "a human skull"(Sidney 61), and its two windows are two-eye-shaped. "Bare interior"(1) shows a human brain that must have been full of knowledge, information, and memories experienced by an individual, all of which have been now downloaded to the external information system, a computer connected with human brain; thus, when a human brain is seen to be empty like this, the meaning of the work can get different. The opening line of *Endgame*, "Finished, it's finished, nearly finished"(1) is made the key point of this play. This line implies that a human era ended, and this is a transhuman era, so finally a new human species, a posthuman era is

coming because the boundary between humans and animals, humans and nonhumans has blurred.

With the beginning of the play, Hamm is sitting in "an armchair" (1). Here, his 'armchair' symbolizes that his two legs are replaced with artificial legs, and "glasses with black lenses"(1) on his blind eyes are artificial glasses like "Dobelle Eye"(Naumann 130) developed by William Dobelle, which converts image information input to a camera into electrical stimulation and directly transmits it to the visual center of the occipital lobe. "A stiff toque"(1) on his head is a device that connects his brain with a computer, and "a whistle"(1) is a kind of a button to operate a prosthesis, Clov. And as Clov comes and goes with the ladder and goes up and down, he speaks to Hamm all that he looks at through the two windows. This shows, through the Clov, that the prosthesis which acts as Hamm's legs and eyes moves at the commands of the actuator. In the end, the acting of Hamm and Clov is the allegorization of the movement of a transhuman like a cyborg that a human and machines are combined.

Also, because *Endgame* is not a well-organized play but a problem-centered one, we need to see it as an absurd play, especially a postmodern absurd play. In the present 21st century, one of the postmodern absurd phenomena occurs between 'humans on the fault line' between humans and animals, between humans and nonhumans, or between humans and transhumans, and 'the environment around human beings' due to development of science technology. In particular, we should think about how Beckett pictures the future that today's science technology development will bring.

According to Andy Clark, the symbiosis of human-technology

(tools) is the fundamental condition to make human humanity possible, and as a result, a human is like a cyborg that is originally combined with biological body(spirit) and technology(tool): a cyborg means a combination of biological body and mechanical devices (Clark 3-8). Since Marshall McLuhan said "We both modify and are modified by technology ... which results in an extension of our senses (McLuhan 48-57)", many scholars have understood the media as an extension of the human body; therefore, the computer is an extension of the brain, the camera is the eye, and the speaker is the ears. In the future, existing computers will gradually disappear and the most advanced computers that are implanted in our bodies or skins will become common. In other words, the computer will not be in a tool anymore and will be the main part of a cyborg that can not be separated from a human being.

From a point of human species' evolution, another area to which we pay our attention is a study of prostheses devices. They are called artificial devices that replace a part of damage or missing body. David Wills puts it "from leg of flesh to leg of steel"(qtd. in Youngquist 165). But thanks to the radical development of electronic information technology as well as biotechnology, the prostheses to be introduced in the future are likely to make the category of 'disability' entirely meaningless beyond merely reducing the degree of disability. Advanced prostheses demand that we should newly reset relationship between humans and tools. Among words that define human characteristic is an expression of "Homo faber"(Tester 19): the human that uses tools. If the outer of the expression of the tool is expanded a little more and understood, human characteristic which Homo faber is

trying to capture is the very capacity of the human being to use technologies. Traditionally, the category of tools or techniques was understood to indicate something outside the body, distinguished from the subject who uses them. Today, the prostheses which humans wear, though they are artificial, are connected with our bodies almost jointless, exceeding tools to overcome disability. They are, as it were, the second bodies to acquire.

During the play, Hamm only gives Clov his commands, and Clov move his body with sensory function as Hamm says. Clov is only a subordinate machine to Hamm. He goes to "his kitchen"(2) and looks at "the wall, and waits"(2) for Hamm "to whistle him"(2). Here, 'the wall' is the symbol of the outside of Hamm's brain and a monitor connected with the computer. Clov stands by, watching the monitor, until Hamm whistles him and orders something to him. Thus, Hamm and Clov embody one cyborg consisting of a human body and machines. The setting of these characters is because Beckett observes human condition as "Cartesian centaur in which the body and mind are separated"(Hwang 27) under the influence of Dr. Arthur Aston Lece, his adviser and Descartes authority, at Trinity College. As is well known, Descartes considers animals as "living machines" (Regan 8) or "irrational machines"(Maude 83) because animals are distinctly different from "nonliving machines"(Regan 8).

Hamm, before speaking his first line, "yawns under the handkerchief"(2) covering his face and yawns the second time with opening word "Me"(2); in earnest, speaking his long lines, he whistles Clov and yawns four times more before Clov coming, that is, before the prosthesis operating. This is an expression of his weariness,

boredom, or banality that he spends all his time only playing because Clov does physical works, and the stiff toque, a machine attached to his brain, handles all that he thinks of and organize using the head. Especially to start playing with Clov, the behaviors that Hamm "takes off his glasses, wipes his eyes, face, the glasses, puts them on again"(2) are the same as waiting for a computer to boot up. In short, the following dialogue clearly shows us their relationship between Hamm and Clov.

CLOV: "All life long the same questions, the same answers."

. . .

HAMM: Why do you stay with me?

CLOV: Why do you keep me?

HAMM: There's no one else.

CLOV: There's nowhere else. (5-6)

And a mere "smithereen"(12) Clov, who barely survive attached to human body, looks at the wall in his kitchen and says "I see my light dying"(12) because he is foreseeing that if a new prosthesis is developed, he will become increasingly useless and it will be replaced with him. On the other hand, Hamm with artificial eyes and artificial legs can not sleep well because even his brain is connected with an artificial intelligence computer; he wants to return to nature, to run on his own legs, and to see the sky and the earth with his own eyes, dreaming that his blood flows from his heart to his brain.

HAMM: If I could sleep I might make love. I'd go into the woods. My eyes

would see… the sky, the earth. I'd run, run, they wouldn't catch me.

. . .

There's something dripping in my head.

(Pause.)

A heart, a heart in my head.

(Pause.)

. . .

Perhaps it's a little vein. (18)

However, Hamm requires a more advanced prosthesis because he wants to put "a proper wheel-chair"(25), further "big wheel, bicycle wheels"(25) on his armchair. This shows that Hamm wants the more advanced prostheses to enhance his legs. Prostheses to emerge in the near future will be limited to devices which primarily are enabled to overcome physical disabilities. However, once these prostheses become routine in earnest, even 'normal' people who have no physical disability will want to buy and wear them to enhance their capacities.

With his hand against the wall, Hamm says "Old wall!"(25); an old wall is the existing human brain; however, "the... other hell"(26) beyond it means a world where only transhumans exist without humans in destroyed nature. And, the wall is "all that's hollow"(26), owing to "hollow bricks!"(26); Hamm's brain is empty because the computer has already uploaded his knowledge and experiences from his brain. Also, Hamm sticks to a center, ordering Clov to put him "right in the center"(26), and looks anxious when Clov is behind the chair, saying "You give me the shivers"(27): Clov's place is not behind

the chair but "beside the chair"(27). This shows transhuman's anxiety that he will be unable to freely do physical activities if prostheses is not right next to him or is invisible.

The science technologies in the 21st century are complex to the degree not to look over the whole, and therefore it seems almost impossible to adjust and control them properly. Especially because the Internet has a dispersed network technology, it can be intercepted and tracked by anyone in the world, and it is not easy to control it because of its intrinsic distributed nature. There are so many "individual constituent elements"(Minoli 4) which make up the network, and they move freely and change flexibly and quickly. A network created by them is a system which has no central point of the whole and center of surveillance and control. The reason why Hamm sticks to the center is that this center does not exist. And Hamm sees "a big sore"(32) inside his breast and says it is still "living"(32); now, he is also wearing an artificial heart in his body. Also, Hamm start to cognize that a technology scientist who see a human being as a subject of experiment appears, and what he or she is doing using mechanical engineering.

HAMM: I wonder.

(Pause.)

Imagine if a rational being came back to earth, wouldn't he be liable to get ideas into his head if he observed us long enough.

(Voice of rational being.)

Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I understand what they're at!

(Clov starts, drops the telescope and begins to scratch his belly with

both hands. Normal voice.)

And without going so far as that, we ourselves…

(with emotion)

…we ourselves… at certain moments…

(Vehemently.)

To think perhaps it won't all have been for nothing! (33)

If mechanical engineers evolve human bodies further and completely upload their information in the brains to a computer, Clov's eyes will become the outdated and useless prostheses, and he will "close"(36) his own eyes; when he opens them again, "there'll be no wall any more"(36). This suggests when Hamm is evolved, Clov will also develop; the algorithm will be entered into Clov himself without a wall connected with a human brain. In conclusion, Clov will be an artificial intelligent robot – an "artificial 'replican' with a human face and human behavior"(Birnbacher 155).

On the other hand, as Clov tells Hamm to leave him, Hamm responds, "You can't leave us"(37). Clov can not leave Hamm but the humans because if Hamm is dead, Clov will become another human prosthesis. Moreover, though Clov can not but obey Hamm's commands, he answers back, "Do this, do that, and I do it. I never refuse. Why?"(43); however, Hamm is impatient to enter commands into the prostheses one by one, complaining, "Ah the creatures, the creatures, everything has to be explained to them"(43). Clov moves only with the input commands, and if Hamm enters incorrect commands, Clov can not understand them and does not operate; thus, Clov says, "I use the words you taught me. If they don't mean

anything any more, teach me others. Or let me be silent"(44).

In the future, when the biotechnology develops, which recognizes the chemical action of the nerves in the human brain and even human emotions, a very small type of computer chip will be also embedded in the human brain, where commands are transmitted to the body and the nerves in the brain; then, emotional changes will occur, and sensory organs and the limbs will move. Here, this computer chip corresponds to the pineal gland of Descartes, which is important in Descartes' philosophy. It is a small gland in the center of the human brain, and called "the fontanelles"(50) by Hamm in *Endgame*. Descartes' view is that this gland is the "principal seat of the soul, and the place in which all our thoughts are formed" (Descartes 143). For Descartes, many small arteries which surround it are full of animal spirits because the body and mind communicate through it(Olsen 280). Also, animals are "automata or moving machine" (Ross 65) that performs all physiological functions by causing blood circulation and the motion of animal spirits with "the mechanical effects of the heating of the blood by only a fire without light in the heart"(Schmaltz 231).[2] According to him, a drop of blood flows from his heart through the small arteries of the brain to the pineal gland, where human emotions and ideas are formed, human senses are perceived, and human limbs and sensory organs move. On the other hand, the transhuman brain commands the chip embedded in the brain to engage in his emotions and move the body, not the blood or fine

2) Animal spirits of Descartes' understanding is as follows:
The animal spirits, which Descartes compares with the wind or a flame because of the rapidly of their motion ... very fine wind, or rather a very lively and very pure flame, which is called the 'animal spirits'. (Lærke 116)

wind. In *Endgame*, Hamm's brain is connected with the computer, but the chip is not yet planted in his brain, so the drop of blood reaches his pineal gland from his heart through the artery.

HAMM: There's something dripping in my head.

(Pause.)

A heart, a heart in my head.

. . .

Perhaps it's a little vein. (18)

. . .

Something dripping in my head, ever since the fontanelles.

(Stifled hilarity of Nagg.)

Splash, splash, always on the same spot.

(Pause.)

Perhaps it's a little vein.

(Pause.)

A little artery. (50)

The human bodies can be manipulated any amount of time through a mechanical approach; all surgical operations can be called mechanical manipulations, including orthopedic operations, neurosurgery, and plastic surgery. But if we can now move away from it and explain the mental world with the action of chemicals, and if the a change of emotions in the mental world is caused by the action of chemicals in the human brain, we will be able to manipulate the changes in our emotions by manipulating the action of chemicals in human brain. So eventually, it might be thought that humans can manipulate the whole

body including body and brain freely. If we reach this stage, it is possible to transform the gene and replace the neuron with another machine, so that we can create something like a cyborg or "designer baby"(Paul x). Hamm, a transhuman in the play, asks his father Nagg, "Why did you engender me?"(49), complaining why Nagg gave incomplete birth to him, instead of creating a perfect design baby for him. And now, Hamm tells him, "We're finished"(50) and "There'll be no more speech"(50). Now that we humans adjusts even chemical reactions in our brains and talk with computer chips and sensors, Hamm's lines above suggest that the conversation in the existing human language with human voice will disappear and speak in the language of a new human species using a machine.

Ⅱ. ii) Genetic modification and extended life : Nagg, Nell and a madman

In *Endgame*, Clov's second line, "Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there's a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap"(1), shows that the modified crops through genetic manipulation grow enormously. In addition, Hamm says that even nature as the only human "shelter"(2) is used as a tool, "too"(2), so "it's time it ended"(2) because it has been ruined by genetic modification and nuclear development. Now, humans can decompose and fuse materials at will, and it is possible to make even artificial life with the development of genetic engineering. However, there are several possible problems in the process. If super-crops and super-livestock are made by genetic

manipulation, they will be so widespread due to their good performance that other crops and livestock may all disappear as they will destroy other ones.

Moreover, if only these super-crops and super-livestock are grown and raised, the diversity of plants and animals will be lost. But without diversity of species, when an epidemic arrives, it will not be able to win the epidemic; however, if species vary, some species survive when they are attacked by bacteria. In other words, if it were attacked by a deadly bacterium in the case where only one species exists, all of that species could be extinct; for example, in Hamm and Clov's lines, we see nature face a situation where the seeds of the grain do not sprout and grow anymore.

> HAMM: Did your seeds come up?
>
> CLOV: No.
>
> HAMM: Did you scratch round them to see if they had sprouted?
>
> CLOV: They haven't sprouted.
>
> HAMM: Perhaps it's still too early.
>
> . . .
>
> They'll never sprout! (13)

Currently, genetic engineers are mixing the species that have so far firmly settled in the frame of the spices with obscure things, genetically manipulating and designing the early embryos with the 'new' biotechnology. From a posthumanist standpoint, an American molecular biologist, Lee Silver presents a very eerie prediction as a new species vision that in 300 years, "other successor species"

(Birnbacher 154) that could not be genetically mixed will appear; in other words, they are unable to reproduce with each other. The technique he expects is to artificially create a chromosome pair and insert all of the desired genes into the nucleus; then, the number of chromosome pairs in a person who is designed will be 24 instead of 23; however, this person will not be able to reproduce with each other because they are not compatible with the normal human species with 23 chromosome pairs. Eventually, the accumulation of genetic 'designs' over generations will create different human species on Earth. Furthermore, an American artificial life researcher Hans Moravec offers a positive discourse on a human as the ruler of evolution and on the physical extinction of the human species and the emergence of a new species fused with a human and machines as a result of human control of evolution(qtd. in Dinello 4–13).

Muttering to himself, "My father?"(2), "My mother"(2), after hesitating for a moment, and even "My... dog?"(2), Hamm puts them on the same creature and says their pain is the same; in fact, these words are breaking the boundary between humans and animals. And he says, "the bigger a man is the fuller he is. And the emptier"(3). This means that the designed super-humans are superior to the normal humans but can not combine with ordinary human species and reproduce their own species so at last can not help disappearing like super-crops or super-animals mentioned above. And the moment Clov says he has "a flea"(33), Hamm cried out, very perturbed, "humanity might start from there all over again! Catch him, for the love of God!"(33). Through the presence of a 'flea' in Clov linked to human body, Beckett implies the emergence of a new species that is

now fused with a human, a nonhuman, and an animal, and that if a new species appeared, a transhuman Hamm and a prosthesis Clov would die out. Therefore, Hamm tells Clov to make "a raft"(34) and go "far away, to other... mammals"(34). This is to say that a posthuman era is coming soon and they should leave far from here, and to some extent, it is as good as Foucault's famous prophecy that "man is a recent invention... would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (Foucault 422).

Hamm also tells Clov to look at the ground with a magnifying glass; it is to expand the function of the eyes. Clov sees and looks at the land outside with the magnifying glass again, but it is still only "Zero ... zero... and zero"(29): "Nothing stirs. All is— ... Corpsed"(29). As a result of the genetic modification and the development of atomic energy, even the material world, which is the most hidden part of nature, is used as tools by humans, and things on the ground are dead. And Hamm tells Clov to look at the see; however, "it's the same"(30), "zero"(31), the waves are "lead"(31), the sun is "sinking"(31), and it's "GRAAY"(31), "light black... from pole to pole"(32). Here, outer light can not be clear because it is a transition from the human age to the posthuman age, and the nature on the earth has been all developed and used as a tool, and so it is 'Gray' from 'the pole to the pole'. Even Hamm says to Colv, "the whole space stinks of corpses" (46), Clov adds "the whole universe"(46) to that end. It seems to say that all existing species on Earth have been modified and now everything in the universe is rotting.

Especially in the *Endgame*, there is "a madman who thought the end of the world had come"(44). According to Hamm's remarks about

him, as soon as he watched "all that rising corn"(44) and "the sails of the herring fleet"(44) through the windows, he returned to the corner, being "appalled"(44), and "all he had seen was ashes"(44). The madman thought they were all ashes because all that he had only seen outside the windows were not real crops or real fish but modified ones; thus, this is to announce the appearance of genetically designed super-crops and super-fish. And the madman, "a painter—and engraver"(44) in *Endgame* is a character like "das Besondere" (Thompson 93) in Adorno's expression: it is defined as "the specificity of art"(Thompson 93). As an artist, he is a character maintaining the human characteristics in transhuman era and refusing to transform himself into a transhuman. As Hamm says he liked the madman, Clov talks back to him, "there are so many terrible... All life long the same inanities"(45) just as a machine tells humans that what you humans do is terrible and stupid.

On the other hand, at this point where human life can be extended, the cultural soil, in which life extension is generally regarded as a good thing, makes the means of genetic manipulation reasonable for use. Genetic engineers try to identify the genes involved in lifespan and control human lifespan by manipulating these genes. In *Endgame*, Hamm, a younger old man who can move with prostheses, has a "red face"(1), but Nagg and Nell, his parents who are older humans only with life, have "white face"(9). And they show the old humans in the age of "homo hundred era"(Clements 231), who live by extension of life but do not have any work and have no financial power, depending on their son.

NAGG: Me pap!

HAMM: Accursed progenitor!

NAGG: Me pap!

HAMM: The old folks at home! No decency left! Guzzle, guzzle, that's all they think of. ...

CLOV: There's no more pap.

HAMM (to Nagg): Do you hear that? There's no more pap. You'll never get any more pap.

NAGG: I want me pap!

. . .

CLOV: If age but knew! (9-10)

In a world where there is no death, there are only old men without a youth, or there is no old age and are only young-old men; therefore, there are only old experiences without a new beginning. In this world, Nagg and Nell do not laugh anymore because they have very often heard the interesting stories, so they are "unhappy"(18). In *Gulliver's Travels* of Jonathan Swift, there are cursed people who "never die"(Blackford 129). To use modern scientific terms, they are people who were born without genes that cause death in the cells. They live among those who are destined to die, only spending their days without stimulus or the thrill of tomorrow, and never feeling the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure that comes with their lives, while those who are supposed to die enjoy all the pleasures of their lives.

In the future, human life extension will cause various socio-cultural problems. Of these, the most serious problem is that children

will almost disappear. If human beings live forever, human birth can not have any meaning. The more fundamental cause of this problem should be found in the increase in indifference to a new life that can be caused by living longer. In *Endgame* where there is no birth but only old humans, Clov climbs up the ladder at the end of the play and finds "a small boy"(78) with a telescope, which means the arrival of a new human species, a posthuman, rather than the birth of a child. Eventually, Hamm says to Clov, "I don't need you anymore"(79).

Ⅱ. iii) A psychotropic drug: Hamm's painkiller

Among the areas of human emotions, there are parts that can be controled by adjusting the emotions with the intervention of science and technology, and especially drug. Bostrom asserts that being able to control the self in the area of emotions is also one of the transhuman conditions(Bostrom Web). If Normal human's purpose of drug use is not treatment but enhancement, Fucuyama asks, is it justified to use psychotropic drugs like Prozac or Ritalin for the purpose of enhancement? In fact, Prozac and Ritalin are prescription drugs; Prozac is used as a treatment for depression and Ritalin is a remedy prescribed for ADHD(attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) (Fukuyama 40-48). But it is a problem to be prescribed not for treatment but for enhancement, that is, not for those who need treatment but for the normal people.

Apart from the side effects, to discuss what effect it has on the surface, Prozac prescribed to people with depression will make them

feel a little better; however, when prescribed to a normal person, it will make them much more better. On the other hand, because the people with ADHD should be calmed down, Ritalin is prescribed, but it make them still more calmed down when prescribed it to people in the normal range. In *Endgame*, Hamm constantly asks Clov whether it is time for him to eat the "painkiller"(7) and distinguishes the painkiller in the morning and evening to control his mood; according to the principles above, the painkiller is a kind of a psychotropic drug.

HAMM: In the morning they brace you up and in the evening they calm you down. Unless it's the other way round. (24)

Assuming a more advanced drug society, Hamm's personality changes on Friday, and his personality also changes on Saturday with the use of drugs; then, Hamm will ask whether it would be okay to call his personality a character cosmetic as if he got facial plastic surgery. But when it is time for Hamm to eat painkillers, there are no more psychotropic drugs. A painkiller for a new human species has not yet been created, or the painkillers used by transhuman have no effect on posthumans. So the painkiller box "was full"(71) but "is empty"(71).

Ⅱ. iv) A transhuman between a human and a posthuman: Hamm

Hamm dreams of being a posthuman, but says "all kinds of fantasies!"(70). He wants the human species to evolve themselves, to modify genes like atoms and to create new designer babies that are

close to perfection, but because of knowing that it will be 'zero' again, he tries to end up. So he asks Clov to hit him with "the axe"(77) or "the gaff"(77) and put him in his "coffin"(77), but Clov says "there are no more coffins"(77). Because Hamm is a cyborg, he can not help being killed by 'the axes' or 'the gaffs' which are iron; now that he can not die as a human being, he does not be put in his coffin. Also, Hamm angrily says to Clov "ape!"(77); a human calls a machine an ape that is considered as the origin of the human species. This implies that the boundary between machines and humans is soon to be broken down, and that Hamm with clove is now evolving from a human being via a transhuman to a new human species, a posthuman. But Hamm wants several words from Clov's heart before Clov leaves, and Clov speaks towards the auditorium, or us: "love"(80). Compassion and love can only be done by humans, but ironically, Clov is saying them to humans.

> CLOV: That's love, yes, yes, not a doubt, now you see how-.
>
> How easy it is. They said to me, That's friendship, yes, yes, no question, you've found it. They said to me, Here's the place, stop, raise your head and look at all that beauty. That order! They said to me, Come now, you're not a brute beast, think upon these things and you'll see how all becomes clear. And simple! They said to me, What skilled attention they get, all these dying of their wounds. (80)

And Clov goes to the door to leave, saying, "When I fall I'll weep for happiness"(81). This presents that he will evolve into a prosthesis which can not only communicates with humans but also moves his

joints. Now, Hamm thinks that he and Clov have become true one and talks to him sincerely.

> HAMM: I'm obliged to you, Clov. For your services.
> CLOV (turning sharply): Ah pardon, it's I am obliged to you.
> HAMM: It's we are obliged to each other. (81)

Finally, Hamm, saying "Moments for nothing, now as always, time was never and time is over, reckoning closed and story ended"(83), throws the dog, tears his whistle and throws it towards the auditorium with his compliment. And he calls Clov because Clov is still Hamm's own prosthesis, saying to himself, "you... remain"(84).

Ⅲ. Conclusion

Giuseppina Restivo says that"Beckett's ironic allusions to science" (Restivo 103) is in *Endgame*, and that "Beckett was a literary man, who, in his gnoseological anxiety, developed an interest in science" (Restivo 107). But Beckett does not argue "directly about science or technology but shows 'how it is', ... that is, he 'objectifies' his diagnosis of the human condition by aiming his irony in *Endgame* at technology" (Restivo 109).

So far, this paper has interpreted Beckett's *Endgame* as an allegory showing the possibility of enhancing human body through science and technology. Also, I have predicted the posthuman vision by analyzing characters in Beckett's *Endgame* from the transhumanist

perspective. By transhumans, will human beings enjoy more freedom and happiness? We can not yet know whether transhuman dreams are for the treatment of disease and the evolution of human species or Pandora's box that may even make us lose the meaning of life.

Through transhumans like characters in *Endgame*, we all should think about possibilities that the evolution from humans through transhumans into posthumans can cause the end of the meanings or values we have been trying to respect and preserve, and, by extension, the end of mankind as a biological species.

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Key words

transhuman, posthuman, human, nonhuman, evolution, technology

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Abstract

A Posthuman Vision:
Transhuman Characters Between Humans and Posthumans from Beckett's *Endgame*

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The vision of transhumans and posthumans in the 21st century is a powerful paradigm. The main purpose of this paper is, at the time when our human species are trying to evolve ourselves, 1) to define a transhuman prior to a coming posthuman, based on Nick Bostrom, Francis Fukuama and several futurists' writings, 2) to analyze the characters in Samuel Beckett's absurd play *Endgame* from transhumanist perspective, 3) and to think together about how to find appropriate alternatives by presenting the transhuman problems from the point of view of literature and sociology in humanistic and practical level.

The main contents of the paper consists of four parts. First, it shows that transhumanization of the present human being is proceeding through Hamm corresponding to the body of transhuman as a cyborg and the Clov playing a role as the prosthesis connected with Hamm's body. Next, from Nagg and Nell, Hamm's parents and old people with extended lives, it suggests that the development of genetic engineering can lead to the social and cultural problems that elderly people with extended lifespan can arise when they rely on

transhumans without productivity and any work. Third, it questions whether it is justified that normal people use psychotropic drugs not for treatments but for control and enhancement of their emotions like Hamm that continues to seek a drug. Last, it presents a postmhuman vision of evolving from a human via a transhuman to a posthuman through Hamm standing on the fault line between a human and a nonhuman, and between a human and a posthuman.

Key words

transhuman, posthuman, human, nonhuman, evolution, technology

논문게재일

❍투고일: 2018년 7월 16일 ❍심사일: 2018년 8월 1일 ❍게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.95

The Search for Decolonizing Subjects in Nora Okja Keller's *Comfort Woman*

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Ⅰ. Introduction: Toward an Oppositional Cultural Politics out of the Postcolonial Condition of Asian Americans

Keller's *Comfort Woman* centers on a mother (Akiko, a former "comfort woman") and daughter (Beccah) relationship, which is a common theme dealt with in many Asian American novels. Structurally, her novel is divided into small chapters under the titles of either Akiko or Beccah, except one chapter entitled Soon Hyo, which is Akiko's Korean name. These alternate chapters make the narrative structure of the novel complicated, and this complication begins to be disentangled from the Soon Hyo chapter near to the end of the novel. The story narrated under the title of Akiko—or the Akiko story—describes the life story of Akiko, who tries to establish her relationship with her baby daughter Beccah; the story narrated under the title of Beccah—or the Beccah story—describes the life story of grown-up

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Beccah who tries to establish her relationship with her mother. My analysis of *Comfort Woman* puts this narrative structure in chronological order to help to make clear sense of the life stories of two Asian American women, Akiko and Beccah, characterized as the stories of their life struggles on the edge of society to which they are pushed. Furthermore, giving particular focus on their efforts to establish a meaningful relationship with each other, this study analyzes how their search to become decolonizing subjects out of the oppressive postcolonial social condition is embodied. By 'postcolonial' I mean the strong effects of Akiko's colonial experience as a sex slave upon her own and her daughter's lives.[1] And by 'decolonizing subjects' I mean the subjectivities that are being shaped while Akiko and Beccah struggle to overcome the colonizing situations into which they are pushed; hence, decolonizing subjects become subjectivities in process rather than fixed ones.[2]

I describe the postcolonial condition of a former comfort woman Akiko and her daughter Beccah in *Comfort Woman* as *displaced* and *haunted*, although there is a significant difference between them in terms of the extent to which each of them has to undergo displaced and haunted lives. Akiko's tragic life embodies the vulnerability of

1) Furthermore, the term 'postcolonial' in this paper is used to signify the dynamics that work around the relation between the continuation of colonial oppression or the tenacity of colonial legacies and the resistance against such colonial oppression or colonial legacies.

2) This is why I use the term 'decolonizing' instead of 'decolonized' here, for their pursuit toward a state of decolonization remains still ongoing throughout the novel. In addition, this also characterizes a fundamental nature of postcolonial struggle toward decolonization not only on an individual level but also on a collective level.

colonized (Korean) women and the systematic exploitation they were often subjected to under the Japanese colonial rule and even afterwards. Akiko is displaced by deception to a comfort station and goes through sex slavery as a comfort woman for the Japanese military forces during wartime; she is later displaced to the United States as a Korean refugee of World War Two with the "help" of American missionaries. Her postcolonial situation in the United States is characterized as haunted endlessly by her past colonial experience as a comfort woman. *Comfort Woman* focuses on how Akiko desperately confronts her traumatic colonial experience as a comfort woman while going through a different kind of colonial experience in a new land. She does not, however, remain utterly powerless in the process of such a displaced and haunted life. Rather, her life story of struggle becomes a life story of survival that shows how she makes endeavors toward a decolonizing subject in/through continuous oppressive moments of the postcolonial present.

The displacement Beccah lives through is quite different from that of her mother in that hers is not physical but mental displacement generated largely from an identity crisis: a sense of displacement as a Korean American caused by her feeling that she does not (or cannot) belong to society where she is supposed to feel at home. This sense of displacement grows intensified due to her sense of guilt that she is utterly foreign to her mother and her traumatic experience. In short, her sense of displacement is caused largely by her "broken" relationship vertically with her mother and horizontally with those around her. In addition, she is also haunted not directly by a ghostlike being just like her mother but indirectly by witnessing her mother's possession by a

ghost, yet making no sense of it. Her mother's world is thoroughly concealed from her. Her mother's death and her utter inability to write an obituary for her mother in particular lead her to seriously question and undertake the search for her mother's true identity. This search, significantly, results in her own coming-of-age and turns out to become her own struggle toward a decolonizing subject.

Samina Najmi characterizes *Comfort Woman* as a story of "the dual bildung of mother and daughter" evolving through "the relationship between mother and daughter" (Najmi 219). Furthermore, Najmi argues that *Comfort Woman* as an Asian American woman's Bildungsroman is different from one written by white male and female writers, giving particular attention to Keller's way of fusing two traditionally male genres (the Bildungsroman and the war narrative) "simultaneously gendering and 'Asianizing' them, to interrupt dominant feminist and nationalist discourses" (210). Put simply, Keller, according to Najmi, appropriates and reinvents the generic conventions of Bildungsroman because the possibility of subverting or decolonizing the Bildungsroman (and thus building up the agency of Asian Americans) resides "in this mutually constitutive process and transformative engagement" (Xiaojing 25). This paper is particularly concerned with this mode of engagement toward an oppositional cultural politics that can be pursued by marginalized and disadvantaged Asian American women, such as Beccah and Akiko, in their search for subject formation as Asian American women: appropriation of a given condition to explore a new possibility beyond that condition toward a state of decolonization.

Lisa Lowe provides a detailed and helpful argument on decolonization and the agency of Asian Americans in "Decolonization,

Displacement, Disidentification: Asian American 'Novels' and the Question of History." Lowe explores how Asian American (female) writers—e.g. Theresa Hak Kyung Cha in *Dictee*, Jessica Hagedorn in *Dogeaters*, and Fae Myenne Ng in *Bone*—engage oppositional cultural politics "out of the conditions of decolonization, displacement, and disidentification" (103) that characterize the postcolonial condition of Asian Americans. Here 'decolonization' is an existential human condition of struggle into which Asian Americans are often situated in the United States. This condition of struggle is, according to Lowe, caused by 'displacement' (forced or willing) and 'disidentification' (which is what Asian Americans go through mainly due to racism). Lowe adds: "if we understand 'decolonization' as an ongoing disruption of the colonial mode of production, then Asian American writing participates in that disruption from a location already marked by the uneven and unsynthetic encounters of colonial, neo-colonial, and mass and elite indigenous cultures that characterize decolonization" (107). Here Lowe suggests decolonization not only as the condition of oppression but also as the condition from which resistance can be explored and pursued: these two aspects in this condition are overlapped in a complicated and contrasting manner. The study of *Comfort Woman* in this paper is primarily concerned with the ways in which Keller, through both Akiko and Beccah, explores the possibility of an oppositional cultural politics out of the postcolonial condition of Asian Americans characterized in such terms as decolonization, displacement, and disidentification. To this end, this paper examines how the structure of oppression shaped by decolonization, displacement, and disidentification can (or cannot) be transformed into the

structure of a possibility in which the search for decolonizing Asian American subjects can be undertaken.

Ⅱ. How the Search for Decolonizing Subjects Unfold in *Comfort Woman*

i. The Akiko Story: A Story of Survival

Narrated from Akiko's first person perspective, the Akiko story, is to some extent similar to testimonies of former comfort women, particularly in the sense that it describes how Akiko becomes a comfort woman, how she goes through unbearable sufferings at the comfort stations, and how her traumatic experience as a sex slave for the Japanese military forces ruins her whole life. This story, however, is quite different from testimonies of former comfort women because it details Akiko's life after the Pacific War and in particular her life in the United States where she has to continue to endure the trauma caused by her past experience as a sex slave.[3] This section will be

3) Testimonies of former comfort women (e.g., Keith Howard's collection of testimonies by former comfort women) are often focused on certain colonial moments of their exploited and ruined lives, thoroughly disregarding their postcolonial struggle. Director Byun Young-joo's Nazun Moksori trilogy—*The Murmuring* (1995), *Habitual Sadness* (1997), and *My Own Breathing* (1999)—is a good example that shows how former comfort women gradually develop their agency as decolonizing subjects against colonizing forces that continually attempt to silence their voices. Refer, also, to "Japanese 'Comfort' Women as Subaltern Subjects" by Yoo-Hyeok Lee (2018). In this paper, Keller's *Comfort Woman* is directly or indirectly compared with testimonies by former comfort women because Keller's work as the first fictional

focused on the way in which Akiko desperately goes through the (post)colonial experiences into which she has been forced. By (post)colonial experiences I mean all that Akiko undergoes before, during, and after her experience of sex slavery at the comfort camps. My question is: (How) Does Akiko's struggle for survival demonstrate her agency as a decolonizing subject?

Akiko is sold and later displaced to a Japanese "recreation" camp mainly due to poverty. She narrates: "Perhaps if my parents had not died so early, I might have been able to live a full life. Perhaps not; we were a poor family. I might have been sold anyway" (*Comfort Woman* 17).[4] She is sold for her sister's dowry, just "like one of the cows before and after" her, and later is displaced to a comfort station, which is completely opposite from what she is told that she "can learn factory work or serve in restaurants" to make lots of money (*CW* 18). The process of Akiko's selling and displacement in *Comfort Woman* accurately reflects testimonies of former comfort women: in brief, comfort women did not volunteer for but were tricked or forced into sex slavery (*CW* 18–9). Akiko narrates: "I knew I would not see the city. We had heard the rumors: girls bought or stolen from villages outside the city, sent to Japanese recreation centers. But still, we did not know what the centers were like. At worst, I thought, I would do what I've done all my life: clean, cook, wash clothes, work hard. How could I imagine anything else?" (*CW* 19). This brief narration

representation of comfort women's experiences is influenced by such testimonies. Unless otherwise marked, by testimonies I mean testimonies by former comfort women.

4) Hereafter all the quotations from *Comfort Woman* will be cited as *CW* followed by page numbers.

describes the gloomy destiny women in the lower class like Akiko had to endure not only under the influence of Confucian patriarchy but also under the Japanese colonial rule; it also suggests that the majority of the Korean comfort women were drawn from the lower class. Although Akiko is pushed into an inescapable situation due to poverty, her attitude toward the harsh reality is somewhat positive, and this reveals a hint of her agency. She chooses to confront an unknown and fearful future, and is even ready to go through a hard life—whatever it might be—if she cannot escape from it.

In the comfort station where she is displaced, she works as a servant and secret messenger for other comfort women for a while because she is too young to serve as a comfort woman. However, when Akiko 40 is killed in a horrible way by Japanese soldiers because "she denounced the soldiers, yelling at them to stop their invasion of her country and her body" (*CW* 20), she becomes Akiko 41. This numbering of comfort women demonstrates that they were merely considered commodities to be consumed. She describes how Japanese soldiers treat the dead body of Akiko 40: "They brought her back skewered from her vagina to her mouth, like a pig ready for roasting. A lesson, they told the rest of us, warning us into silence" (*CW* 20–1). And she also comments on her death: "That is how I know Induk [Akiko 40's Korean name] didn't go crazy. She was going sane. She was planning her escape. The corpse the soldiers brought back from the woods wasn't Induk. It was Akiko 41. It was me" (*CW* 21). This is how Akiko's life as a comfort woman begins—as a moment of death. This also implies that her life afterwards is like a life in death. So the rest of her life shows her struggle to go through a life like death.

Keller does not provide a detailed description of Akiko's own experience as a comfort woman—particularly, how she is sexually abused as a comfort woman. Instead, she focuses on things that traumatize Akiko the most in the comfort stations: the sexual abuse committed on other comfort women by Japanese soldiers and her own horrible experience of abortion (*CW* 22). In the novel, these experiences are narrated in relation to their effects on Akiko's present life, particularly in connection with her relationship with her missionary husband and her baby daughter Beccah. Her relationship with her missionary husband turns out to be another form of colonial experience. She puts her missionary husband's hidden sexual desire for her in parallel with that of Japanese soldiers in the comfort stations (*CW* 94–5); while having a sexual relationship with her missionary husband, she even thought that her "body was, and always would be, locked in a cubicle at the camps, trapped under the bodies of innumerable men" (*CW* 106).[5] This demonstrates how strongly Akiko is traumatized by her experience at the comfort stations.

Furthermore, her traumatic experiences of unutterable sexual abuses at the camps (both her own experiences and her witness to others' experiences) ruin her life not only during her life at the camps but also afterwards, up until the end of her life. Although Akiko flees from the camps and is led to the mission house that is supposed to be a safe haven, her life in that place rather becomes restless because she has to suffer from trauma endlessly. In order not to be haunted by memories at the comfort stations, she makes every effort to preoccupy

5) In *Comfort Woman*, Keller describes the missionary work by American missionaries very negatively, relating it to American imperialism.

herself with other work (*CW* 65). Even during the speech by a missionary, she was haunted by these memories at the camps, particularly the inhumane treatment of comfort women such as sexual abuse and murder at the hands of Japanese soldiers (*CW* 70). Keller's detailed description of Akiko's traumatized and haunted life shows the physical sufferings and mental wounds that comfort women like her have to continue to endure and cope with.

Akiko is later displaced to the United States through marriage to an American missionary. Akiko says:

> We are being called home, back to America, they explained to the girls in their care. We will find homes and sponsors for you, if you wish to come with us. Most of the girls declined, saying they would try to find their families, saying they had somewhere they could return to, now that the war was over. They could pick up the threads of their lives, weaving them into a future as if the war had been a minor disruption in the fabric, but I knew I had to leave with the missionaries. I knew, had known that moment I crossed the Yalu and entered the recreation camps, that my home village of Sulsulham was as far away as heaven for me. So when the minister told me I should marry him if I wanted to leave Pyongyang and come to America with them, I did. I made it easy for him to take me. (*CW* 100-1)

Akiko's choice not to remain in Korea but to immigrate to America is made because she thinks that there is no place for her to return. She does not think like other girls who think that since the war is over, they have somewhere to which they can return back. They even think that they can pick up the threads of their lives and weave

them into a future. To Akiko, however, the disruption in the fabric of her life caused by her traumatic experiences as a sex slave is so serious that it is considered to be impossible for her to pick up the thread of her ruined life and weave it into a future. This shows the extent to which her life (and that of many other former comfort women) is ruined. In reality, after the Pacific War, not only was it not easy for them to return to their homes, but it was also impossible for them to remember and talk about their shameful experiences as sex slaves to anyone. Their desire for the stories of their ruined lives to be heard in fact was thoroughly frustrated. Many of the former comfort women had to suffer from trauma—both mental and physical wounds —carefully guarding the horrible past in their hearts for almost half a century. Their life even after the war was a continuation of colonization. From this perspective, one can understand Akiko's choice to go to America to escape from the unbearable reality she might go through in her original home.[6] Her choice to go to America, however, turns out to be an escape to another tragedy rather than to a new home.[7]

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6) Regarding how former comfort women were ill-treated and their voices were complexly silenced after the war, see, for example, Chungmoo Choi's "Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea."

7) Here Keller relates the history of Asian comfort women to the history of Asian immigration to the United States that takes place after the Pacific War. In Chang-rae Lee's *A Gesture Life*, for which comfort women's traumatic experiences serve as a main source of literary imagination, the former Japanese soldier Hata's immigration to the United States takes place in the sixties just after the new immigration law passed in 1965. Although there is a clear difference between these two phases in US immigration history, Akiko's and Hata's immigration to the United States can be summarized as leaving the (colonial) past behind towards a new and better world, a typical immigration

Akiko experiences many new things in America, and the abundance of American society in particular attracts her for a while, yet she concludes as follows: "That's what all of America was like to me. When you see it for the first time, it glitters, beautiful, like a dream. But then, the longer you walk through it, the more you realize that the dream is empty, false, sterile. You realize that you have no face and no place in this country" (*CW* 110). This quotation describes the deep sense of displacement she experiences in America. Indeed, the last sentence—"You realize that you have no face and no place in this country"—succinctly characterizes that which Akiko and her daughter undergo: Here "no face" is similar to what Lowe calls 'disidentification' and "no place," what Lowe calls 'displacement.' In this regard, one can argue that "no face" and "no place" also succinctly characterize not only Akiko's but also many Asian (and other, non-white) immigrants' lives in the United States.

In the midst of her displaced and haunted life in the United States that keeps her from having a normal relationship with others, Akiko finds a possibility of redemption in her attempt to establish a relationship with her baby daughter Beccah. Akiko never expected that she could have a baby because the sexual abuse—in particular, the abortion—she had experienced at the comfort camps made her "insides too bruised and battered, impossible to properly heal" (*CW* 15). Akiko also says: "The baby I could keep came when I was already dead" (*CW* 15). The birth of little Beccah, hence, revives her "dead" life and also gives her the meaning of her own existence in the midst of an unbearable life in a new country where she feels completely

story.

isolated. Hence, Akiko says: "I will call her Bek-hap, the lily, purest white. Blooming in the boundary between Korea and America, between life and death, this child, with the tendril of her body, keeps me from crossing over and roots me to this earth" (*CW* 116-7).

Furthermore, Akiko bestows a quite significant meaning, even beyond a symbolic level, on Beccah's umbilical cord that literally connected each other. One day when she finds out that the birth cord is gone out of Beccah's belly, she is "panicked, suddenly frantic to find this one piece of flesh that was both me and my daughter" (*CW* 97) disappeared. When she finally finds it after a frantic search, she says: "I would keep the cord so that as she grows into the person she will become, a person I do not know yet, we will both be reminded that we share one body, one flesh" (*CW* 97). Another relevant example is Akiko's act of drinking dirt during her pregnancy and later leading also her daughter to eat the same dirt. Akiko says,

> When I was pregnant with my daughter, I made tea with the black dirt from the garden outside our room at the Mission House for Boys. I drank the earth, nourishing her within the womb, so that she would never feel homeless, lost. After her birth, I rubbed that same earth across my nipples and touched it to my daughter's lips, so that, with her first suck, with her first taste of the dirt and the salt and the milk that is me, she would know that I am, and will always be, her home. (*CW* 113)

To make sense of Akiko's unique and somewhat desperate attempt to establish a meaningful relationship with her daughter, I consider it in comparison with her other relationships, particularly her

relationships with men such as Japanese soldiers and her husband. Japanese soldiers treat Akiko merely as an object through which they just want to gratify their sexual desire. She is considered a disposable commodity. She is expected to comply with whatever she is told to do and to keep silent instead of voicing what is in her mind and heart. Akiko's relationship with her husband is similar to her relationship with Japanese soldiers. Although her husband (a white man and missionary) pretends to be her saviour, his real intention is his longing for young girl Akiko (*CW* 93–5). During his lecture trips in America, she stands by her husband's side in her Korean dress as a kind of a display of his achievement during his lectures about his works in the "obscure orient"; at home, however, he treats her as a mere object of his sexual desire (*CW* 106–7). In these relationships with Japanese soldiers and her husband, she is considered nothing but an object of their sexual desire. Unlike her relationships with these men who dominate and destroy her body and soul, her relationship with little Beccah enables her to find the life and meaning with which she can continue to live. More significantly, in this relationship, she does not remain as a passive recipient (i.e., an object of others' desire) but somehow finds her subjectivity as a mother who must nurture her baby.

Patricia Chu argues that "Keller's choice to rely on mother–daughter bonds as the sole examples of intersubjective recognition renders the novel unsatisfying even as a fictional psychological portrait, because the mother–daughter plot denies that subjects must exist in a wider social world" (64). As she further argues, however, "this isolation is readable … as a symptom of her oppression" (78).

Ideally, one's search for an intersubjective self needs to be pursued not only person-to-person but also in a wider social world. Keeping in mind her life situation as an Asian American immigrant, single mother, and former comfort woman, the choices she can make are very limited. With no skill and language ability, she has to struggle to survive at the bottom of society, "drifting in and out of under-the-table jobs" (*CW* 4) and is barely able to make ends meet until she works as a fortuneteller. In addition to this serious material disadvantage, she has to overcome a social disadvantage—such as racial discrimination—as an Asian American woman. Furthermore, Akiko has to deal with the internal oppression and torment caused by her traumatic experience as a comfort woman. Indeed, isolation is the existential and difficult life situation she has to overcome. From this perspective, it is very natural and significant that she tries to find a possibility of survival through the establishment of a relationship with her daughter. Hence, the mother-daughter plot in *Comfort Woman* serves effectively to demonstrate the way in which Akiko, a former comfort woman and Korean refuge of World War Two, in search of survival, copes with the oppressive situations in which she is positioned, because that is perhaps the only meaningful relationship she can make in her given situation.[8)]

8) However, grownup Beccah belatedly realizes and acknowledges the bitter fact that although her mother really needed her, she could not overcome the gap between her mother and herself. In this respect, we can make sense of Akiko's suicide. In her completely isolated life, she has no choice but to kill herself. Her death, however, signifies more than her self-denial because it leads Beccah to struggle to make a relationship with her dead mother. This issue will be further elaborated in the next section. How then can we make sense of Akiko's relationship with ghosts and her possession? Indeed, ghosts

The Akiko story I have analyzed in this section shows how Akiko survives both the sex slavery in the Japanese comfort camps and the oppressive and marginalized life in the United States. What makes Akiko's way of survival unique and interesting is that she does not claim but rather hides her true identity. As she says, "hiding my true self … enabled me to survive in the recreation camp and in a new country" (*CW* 153). In the comfort camps, her true self as a Korean girl Soon Hyo is hidden; instead, she becomes Akiko 41. In the new country, her true self as Soon Hyo who had traumatic experience as a comfort woman is completely hidden from others including her own daughter. She was somehow forced to be in this situation and to accept such misfortune. In such colonizing situations, however, she manages to survive by hiding her true self. According to Chen, by hiding her true self "in every situation she encounters, Akiko is able to negotiate the strictures imposed upon her" (137).[9] Here the room to negotiate her life condition in her given situation becomes the space from which she can insist on her own agency as a survivor in stead of a victim. She appropriates her given disadvantageous condition so as to explore a new possibility beyond that condition toward a state of decolonization. Akiko's subjectivity as a decolonizing subject is being

play a significant role throughout the novel. In a positive sense, the ghost of Induk serves as a sort of a guardian angel for Akiko in the Akiko story, and later her possession even contributes significantly to the financial needs of her family as she begins to work as a fortuneteller. On the latter case, Tina Chen discusses in detail focusing on the role of shamanism in *Comfort Woman*. In a negative sense, however, her possession further isolates her from her daughter and the outside world.

9) I find that this point is quite similar to what Chungmoo Choi argues in terms of ambivalent female subjectivity under gendered nationalism.

shaped in the process. Hence, the significance of Kellller's *Comfort Woman* is that it "explore[s] how a young girl might survive and establish a vital sense of her own worth and subjectivity in the face of brutal, systemic objectification" (Chu 77).

ii. The Beccah Story: A Story of Relationship

Narrated from Beccah's first-person perspective and focused particularly on her view of her mother's life, the Beccah story is in the main a story of relationship. The central motif of the story is her inability to write her mother's obituary, even though she has worked as the one who records the lives of the dead in the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* for the previous six years. She says:

> I have recorded so many deaths that the formula is templated in my brain: Name, age, date of birth, survivors, services. And yet, when it came time for me to write my own mother's obituary, as I held a copy of her death certificate in my hand, I found that I did not have the facts for even the most basic, skeletal obituary. And I found I did not know how to start imagining her life. (*CW* 26)

This sense of guilt prompts her to undertake a journey to discover her mother's true identity; this journey also turns out to be a journey through which she discovers herself and her inner strength. Furthermore, that journey prompted by her bitter realization of her ignorance of her mother—or the unbridgeable distance between the two—interestingly leads her to a new relationship with her mother.

In this section, I will first discuss how Beccah's coming-of-age as a daughter of an Asian American woman, which is characterized as her journey to discover her mother's true identity, also leads to the build-up of her subjectivity as a decolonizing subject, by which I mean that she confidently accepts her identity as an Asian (Korean) American, just as her mother calls her "Bek-hap, the lily, purest white. Blooming in the boundary between Korea and America" (*CW* 116). Another point that I am going to discuss is that structurally the Beccah story also shows the way in which the comfort women's buried story is dug out and comes to light. This point will be analyzed in relation to the way in which former comfort women's stories since the early 1990s have been widely spread to the public both locally and globally and as a result have inspired literary imagination: comfort women's stories as "postmemory."[10)]

The aforementioned seemingly unrelated two topics converge on the topic of relationship. The first point, which is about Beccah's journey toward her mother's true identity, is closely related to her pursuit toward bridging her detached relationship with her dead

10) The term postmemory is originally from Marianne Hirsch (1997; 2012). Hirsch's postmemory is a useful concept by which to make sense of second-generation memories of cultural or collective traumatic events and experiences, such as those connected to the experiences of former comfort women. In this paper, I use it to consider how the inherited knowledge of comfort women's traumatic experiences has quickly become not only a local issue but also a transnational and global issue, and, more interestingly, has served as a stimulus to trigger the work of postmemory in second-generation writers such as Nora Okja Keller and Chang-rae Lee, so as to continue to generate a series of cultural productions on comfort women's traumatic experiences. For further information about the work of postmemory, refer, for example, to 김미영, 이유혁 (2012), Jeyathurai, and Rice.

mother. At the center of such a process lies something hidden from Beccah the daughter and her discovery of the thing—a kind of treasure box—that leads to another level of her relationship with her mother and also her relationship with the hidden (hi)story from her mother: traumatic (hi)story of comfort women. This is how the two seemingly unrelated topics are intricately overlapped. My discussion will show how the complication of such two stories of relationship gets resolved.

After her husband dies, Akiko tries to return to Korea, but she just gets to as far as Hawaii. Unlike the Akiko story that is mainly about the life of Akiko, her husband, and little Beccah as it is situated in the mainland U.S., the Beccah story is about the life of Beccah and Akiko in Hawaii that is located on the boundary of the United States. This locality of their dwelling implies not only their physical but also their mental states of being located on the edge. Physically, as a single mother and immigrant, Akiko has to go through difficulties financially, "drifting in and out of under-the-table jobs—washing dishes in Vietnamese restaurants, slinging drinks in Korean bars on Keeaumoku—stringing together enough change to pay the weekly rent on a dirty second-floor apartment off Kapiolani Boulevard" (*CW* 4). Although their financial situation gets better when Auntie Reno discovers Akiko's potential and helps her to work as a fortuneteller, Akiko's possession continues to keep her on the edge of sanity.

The following visual image of darkness well depicts not only Beccah's but also her mother's life on the edge: "I remember the darkness of that apartment: the brown imitation-wood wall paneling blackened from exhaust from the street, the boarded-up windows, the

nights without electricity when we could not pay the bill" (*CW* 4–5). Here the darkness refers to the material disadvantage Beccah and her mother experience. Figuratively, the darkness also symbolizes the mental state she and her mother have to cope with. Beccah adds: "And I remember nights that seemed to last for days, when my mother dropped into a darkness of her own, so deep that I did not think she would ever come back to me" (*CW* 5). The darkness here also signifies the fear that the already detached relationship between Beccah and her mother might remain unbridgeable. This darkness also indicates her ignorance about her mother's world or her inability to approach her mother's world; hence, it just remains utterly dark to her. Beccah narrates:

> When the spirits called to her, my mother would leave me and slip inside herself, to somewhere I could not and did not want to follow. It was as if the mother I knew turned off, checked out, and someone else came to rent the space. During these times, the body of my mother would float through our one-bedroom apartment, slamming into walls and bookshelves and bumping into the corners of the coffee table and the television. If I could catch her, I would try to clean her cuts with *Cambison* ointment, dab the bruises with vinegar to stop the swelling. But most times I just left her food and water and hid in the bedroom, where I listened to long stretches of thumping accentuated by occasional shouts to a spirit named Induk. (*CW* 4)

Beccah and her mother fall into each one's world of darkness. Their lives go parallel in this way until towards the end of the novel, where Beccah finally discovers her mother's hidden life through her desperate search prompted by her mother's death. Furthermore, her

journey to discover her mother's true identity enables her to reconsider her way of seeing her mother—in the end, Beccah recognizes her mother as a survivor of such unutterably traumatic sex slavery—as she has to ponder not only on who her mother is but also on who she herself is throughout that journey. Significantly, this journey enables her to build up her subjectivity confidently as an Asian American woman and as a daughter of a former comfort woman.

Such journey, furthermore, leads her to a new awareness of her unique and even mysteriously inter(or re)connected relationship with her mother, unlike her other relationships that end up unsuccessfully. One day after her mother was saved from her suicide attempt, through her conversation with her mother, Beccah realizes that "I was her finder, and she needed me. I wanted to remind that she was bound to me" (*CW* 48). And then, her mother told the story of Princess Pari, instead of directly telling Beccah what she was looking for. That story is about how a princess saved her parents who were sent to hell after their death. At the hell, the princess found their parents whose souls were trapped in fish bodies and she brought them out of the hell into the Lotus Paradise where they were reborn as angels (*CW* 48–50). This part of the novel ends like this:

> That Saturday after my mother dies, I watched the water of the canal lap at the trash under me and waited for something, some sign from my mother. I don't know what I was thinking, but I never caught a glimpse of a fish that might have carried her spirit. When the time came, when she needed me, I had failed to rescue her. No Princess Pari, I could not swim to the far shores of death to pull my mother back to life; I could not even put my feet in the water. (*CW* 51)

Beccah regrets that she could not save her mother just like Princess Pari in the story. However, Beccah happens to find her role as a different kind of Princess Pari by becoming the one who retrieves something that her mother lost; this role helps Beccah to realize how much her mother indeed needed her and how much she is bound to her mother.[11)]

Beccah's unexpected discovery of her mother's jewelry box helps her to begin to understand the unknown territory of her mother's world, and as a result, to realize her role as a different kind of Princess Pari for her dead mother. At first, Beccah expects that the jewelry box may contain such things as "frog pins and pendants and earrings given to her by her regular customers, assorted buttons, the gold and jade hoops that she sewed on my clothes for protection, her wedding band, a baby tooth, my umbilical cord, school pictures and report cards, her jade frog" (*CW* 169). But she "unearth[s] something unexpected under the tangle of jewelry: a cassette tape marked 'Beccah'" (*CW* 171). Going through newspaper articles collected along with the cassette tape, Beccah comes across many unfamiliar words and names, and her mother's real name for the first time. She says:

> I sat, surrounded by the papers, by the secrets she had guarded and cultivated like a garden. I sat and I waited for some way to understand, to know this person called Soon Hyo, thinking that I had always been waiting for my mother, wasting time in the hallway of her life, waiting for an invitation to step over the threshold and into her home. (*CW* 173)

11) For a detailed discussion on the myth of Princes Pari in *Comfort Woman*, see Kun Jong Lee's "Princess Pari in Nora Okja Keller's *Comfort Woman*."

This is how Beccah begins to get into her mother's hidden life and pick up the threads of her mother's ruined life bit by bit, seeking to weave them into a future. The two alternate stories—the Akiko and Beccah stories—that seem to go parallel converge at this point as Beccah begins to make sense of her mother's hidden and traumatic life story of the past.

In the Beccah tape, her mother invites Beccah to the concealed history of the atrocities of comfort women. Keller describes what and how comfort women suffered in general instead of recounting Akiko's personal story at the comfort camps. 'Chongshindae' is the key word into that secret world. Beccah narrates: "Wishing I could turn up the volume even more, I added my own voice, an echo until I stumbled over a term I did not recognize: *Chongshindae*. I fit the words into my mouth, syllable by syllable, and flipped through my Korean-English dictionary, sounding out a rough, possible translation: Battalion slave" (*CW* 193).[12] Keller adds a detailed explanation of the term:

> *Chongshindae: Our brothers and fathers conscripted. The women left to be picked over like fruit to be tasted, consumed, the pits spit out as Chongshindae, where we rotted under the body of orders from the Emperor of Japan. Under*

12) The term 'Chongshindae' is the Korean word former Korean comfort women and activists and scholars working on behalf of them used instead of the problematic term 'comfort women.' However, using this term in place of comfort women is also problematic in that its literal English translation is "voluntarily offered body corps" (Howard v). The comfort women did not offer their bodies voluntarily but were forced to do so. Chang-rae Lee deals with this issue in his novel *A Gesture Life*. So these days many use the term 'sex slave' instead. Concerning issues on the terminology, see Chung 220-22.

> *the Emperor's orders, we were beaten and starved. Under Emperor's orders, the holes of our bodies were used to bury their excrement. Under Emperor's orders, we were bled again and again until we were thrown into a pit and burned, the ash from our thrashing arms dusting the surface of the river in which we had sometimes been allowed to bathe. Under Emperor's orders, we could not prepare those in the river for the journey out of hell.* (*CW* 193, original emphasis)[13]

Beccah rewinds the tape to hear this unbelievable accounts on comfort women again: "I rewound the tape where my mother spoke of the *Chongshindae*, listening to her accounts of crimes made against each woman she could remember, so many crimes and so many names that my stomach cramped" (*CW* 194). In Akiko/Soon Hyo's accounts of sex slaves, she repeats and emphasizes the fact that such horrible war crimes were committed by the orders of the Emperor of Japan. Keller adds: "Without reference, unable to recognize any of the names, I did not know how to place my mother, who sounded like an avenging angel recounting the crimes of men" (*CW* 194). In this respect, the contents of the tape are a former comfort woman's cry for justice, not just on a personal level but more importantly on a collective level because Keller's description of the atrocities of comfort women is focused on the traumatic sufferings of comfort women as a whole.

Beccah's efforts to approach her mother were not successful

13) The title of Therese Park's fiction on comfort women *A Gift of the Emperor* succinctly captures what is described in the quotation: in brief, comfort women were just treated as "gift" sent to the Japanese imperial forces by the emperor.

while she was alive. She finally enters into a new relationship with her mother while trying to know who her mother really is after her mother's death. Her discovery of her mother's jewelry box and the cassette tape in particular among her remains serve as a turning point. Her mother's death—not only spiritual death largely due to her trauma but also physical death—keeps her away from her mother continuously. However, interestingly, her mother's physical death not only disconnects Becccah from her mother but also at the same time leads her to a new relationship with her mother. More interestingly, their relationship does not remain confined to a personal level but further extends to a collective and social level due to the contents of the cassette tape inherited from her mother. It is because Beccah hears not an individualized tragic history by her mother but collective stories of numerous comfort women from the cassette tape. Comfort women's traumatic history is inherited to her as postmemory. The novel challenges us with such a difficult task of how to deal with comfort women's traumatic history as postmemory that needs social engagement on a collective level. The ending of the novel, hence, is significant.

As the ending of the novel implies, former comfort women's testimonies are like "a small seed planted" and "waiting to be born" (*CW* 213): this ending appears to be somewhat positive yet still quite open-ended. Keller's *Comfort Woman* itself is a good example that shows a particular way such a seed can be brought to fruit, and also demonstrates the way in which testimonies of former comfort women can serve as postmemory that results in literary imagination. The literary representation of comfort women's traumatic experiences

such as Keller's *Comfort Woman*, however, is just one way for the small seed planted by former comfort women to be born to fruit. In regard to social activism for justice on behalf of comfort women, the seed panted and waiting to be born seems to imply that it depends on how we react to the issue to bear the fruit of justice for the sake of comfort women. Hence, as Tina Chen also points out, "the issues at the heart of *Comfort Woman* are indeed about the ethical responsibility we bear as readers and critics of—and also as witnesses to—this story" (116).

The ethical responsibility Chen mentions above also suggests the need and importance of one's ethical engagement with others. Keller's *Comfort Woman* shows how Beccah relates herself to her mother the former comfort woman and the trauma inherited from her, although in doing so she has to confront pain and difficulties emotionally and mentally. This type of Beccah's engagement with her mother and the inherited trauma helps her to gradually build up her subjectivity as a decolonizing subject. Here by a decolonizing subject, I mean Beccah's subjectivity that is being shaped, as she continues to engage with her disadvantageous situations financially and mentally as a daughter of an Asian American woman who is struggling with her own traumatic past.

How Beccah engages with her mother and her mother's trauma in particular unfolds as follows. First, Beccah's discovery of how her mother survived the horrible life as a sex slave brings her to a new perspective on her mother: she comes to see her as a survivor rather than a "weak and vulnerable" victim (*CW* 194). And then, albeit belatedly, as she begins to establish a relationship with her mother,

she also realizes that she can take up the role of Princess Pari on behalf of her mother. As the open-ended ending of the novel shows, whether she can play such a role successfully is yet to be determined. It is perhaps because justice for comfort women is still an ongoing project. Furthermore, justice for comfort women is the project that requires the next generation's participation so that it will not be buried and forgotten. Finally, Beccah accepts her Asian American identity positively at the end of the novel by taking up the role of Princess Pari on behalf of her mother and thus becoming "Bek-hap, the lily, purest white. Blooming in the boundary between Korea and America" (*CW* 116).

The novel ends with the hint of a positive future that can possibly be made by second generations like Beccah who accept the role of a different kind of Princess Pari. What can (or cannot) be made possible still remains to be seen. Yet, Beccah's position in between suggests something positive in terms of her Asian American identity, because she arrives at that point through her desperate journey that in the end helps her to know her mother and herself better. Although she along with her mother is continually pushed to the edge physically and psychologically, this adverse position also becomes the point where she begins to move forward by picking up the threads of her own and her mother's lives and weaving them into a future. Through Akiko and Beccha's stories, Keller shows how two marginalized and disadvantaged women of minorities in the United States somehow learn to engage with their colonizing situations, and in the process, manage to build up their decolonizing subjectivities, albeit in limited manners.

Ⅲ. Conclusion: Beyond Hyphenated Identities

This paper has examined how the search for decolonizing Asian American subjectivities is embodied in Keller's *Comfort Woman*, giving particular focus on two main characters Beccah and Akiko/ Soon Hyo. What makes their search for subjectivities quite distinct is that comfort women's traumatic history lies at the core of their search. This unknown trauma makes their relationship remain disconnected until the unexpected discovery of such traumatic history by Beccah reconnects their relationship in a very unusual manner. Keller shows how Akiko/Soon Hyo and Beccah somehow manage to build up their subjectivities while each desperately makes efforts to restore their relationship. In the end, they both learn how to go through unutterable pain and sufferings and prove themselves survivors in each one's unique manner. This is the way their decolonizing subjectivities get shaped.

Keller's two Asian American women's survival stories help us to consider some important characteristics of Asian American identity politics, particularly with regard to envisioning beyond (or decolonizing) the hyphenation of Asian American subjectivities. Keller's narratives of the two women suggest a critical point through which to (re)consider how "[t]he shift ... from seeking to 'claim America' to forging a connection between Asia and Asian America" in Asian American studies has been made possible in recent years (qtd. in Goellnicht 1). Keller shows Akiko's displacement first from Korea to America and later from America to Hawaii, which is on the edge of America and also a place in between America and Asia (or Korea).

This is the place where the detached relationship between Akiko and Beccah finally gets reconnected through the comfort women's traumatic history inherited to Beccah from her mother. In this way, Keller shows how a connection between Asia and Asian America is made possible, and furthermore, suggests how redefining Asian American subjectivities beyond the hyphen of Asian America can be made possible. Specifically, Keller's bringing comfort women's traumatic history, which has often be considered an East Asian issue, to the debate of Asian American studies indeed enables us to rethink what makes Asian American subjectivities. In this way, Keller attempts to redefine Asian American subjectivities, which are not something fixed and given but rather "always in process ... [by] continu[ing] to try [given] borders and revise [given] interiors" (qtd. in Goellnicht 9). This way of Keller's appropriating comfort women's traumatic history in Asian American studies serves to decolonize Asian American subjectivities by helping us to envision possibilities beyond the hyphen. This is the characteristic of an oppositional cultural politics Keller embodies in *Comfort Woman*.

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Key words

Postcolonial Condition of Asian Americans, Decolonizing Subjects, Nora Okja Keller, *Comfort Woman*, Beyond Hyphenated Identities

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Abstract

The Search for Decolonizing Subjects in Nora Okja Keller's *Comfort Woman*

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This paper examines Keller's *Comfort Woman*, focusing on how Keller characterizes two main characters Akiko and Beccah's search for their decolonizing subjects out of their postcolonial condition. The postcolonial condition of their present life is characterized by the effects of Akiko's past colonial experience as a sex slave on Akiko and Beccah. This makes them endlessly 'displaced' and 'haunted,' even to the extent that their relationship as a mother and a daughter is so ruined that it remains detached and unbridgeable. Keller shows two individual stories that go parallel in the novel, and these alternate stories—Akiko and Beccah stories—finally converge at the point when Beccah begins to make sense of her mother's hidden traumatic life story of the past. On the one hand, this characterization reveals how hard it is to restore the broken relationship between Beccah and Akiko. On the other hand, however, in those individual stories, Keller shows how they desperately manage to overcome adverse situations to which they are often forced; in the end, Keller represents their stories as stories of survival. It is significant that they develop their

agency as decolonizing subjects against colonizing forces in such process. More importantly, what makes Keller's oppositional cultural politics notable is that the way of Keller's appropriating comfort women's traumatic history in Asian American studies serves to decolonize Asian American subjectivities by enabling us to envision possibilities beyond the hyphen: a way of forging a connection between Asia and Asian America.

Key words

Postcolonial Condition of Asian Americans, Decolonizing Subjects, Nora Okja Keller, *Comfort Woma*n, Beyond Hyphenated Identities

논문게재일

❍투고일: 2018년 7월 8일 ❍심사일: 2018년 8월 3일 ❍게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.129

Feminine identity and The ethics in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of darkness*

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Ⅰ. Introduction

The critique of *Heart of Darkness* tends to be interpreted as two sides: the criticism and advocacy of imperialism. The reason for these two separate criticisms lies in the ambiguity expressed by Joseph Conrad. He is criticized as "a terrible racist"(124) by Chinua Achebe who is the most critical critic of this novel, which is asserted in two respects. One is aestheticism and the other is rhetoric. Of course the latter is included in the former. According to Edward Said, Conrad's aestheticism has become "an attempt to separate cultural and aesthetic experiences from the realities of real politics" since Kant, and then his aestheticism has become an ideology that supports imperialist maneuvers and conspiracies" (58). Also, in his strange rhetoric, allegories are said to reproduce existing ideas rather than overthrow in the process of depicting the other discriminately. Abdul

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Jan-Mohamed, explaining how the mental state of imperialism in an allegory's monochrome logic process is implemented and extended, says that "its allegorical extensions come to dominate every facet of imperialist mentality" (80). Furthermore, The rhetoric of irony has no intention to dismantle the ideology due to the distances and differences of the rhetoric, and just emphasizes the blind faith that the enlightenment will be automatically dismantled. I.e., "duplicitous tropes" (80) are generated and of the "function of colonialist fiction" (80) within this ambience.

Focusing on the singular functions of the New Criticism that takes a conservative stance on the rhetorical characteristics of aesthetics, this critique might miss the importance of aesthetic strategies. In particular, Conrad's narrative strategy, although it breaks up the dichotomy, implies an ambiguous attitude which avoids complete dismantling, and ultimately supports a value-neutral position. Such a position coincides with the characteristics of postmodernism, in which there is no absolute truth, and the subject goes as far as to be the subject to doubt. Therefore, Conrad's conception of a social climate extends beyond recognition of the world to the uncertainty of the subject. Conrad's main character in *Heart of darkness* follows the post-modern subjectivity which opposes a stable and unified subject and an absolute truth. Also, this post-modern self coincides with the feminine identity, which is different from traditional self. This new concept of subject constructs the identity that is characterized by feminine qualities such as division, discontinuity, and liquidity.

The European identity in the Colonial era has been explored from the political, sociological, and psychological perspectives. According to

the findings, problematic human being relates to the identity which structures and privileges white male-centered thinking. So, this human being completes his uniqueness in such a way that he removes objects painted with black in a negative sense, such as those that can not be included in universal human beings. Likewise, Conrad noted that the mechanism of exclusion operates within the identity and that European-centric thinking at the time was an extreme expression of male-centered self or existence. That is why Conrad depicted the main character as the subject that privileges female qualities.

The term 'identity' can be used in various meanings such as individual uniqueness, role identity or unity, but most of the time, it is adhered to the identity derived from the traditional self. In the meantime, the women's liberation movement has presented various theories in various debates in order to establish the normative identity of women, but they made an error that they become obsessed only with their identity. At the heart of the misconception of feminine identity lies the fact that women fail to perceive the male-centered logic that necessarily entails the logic of male or masculine systems and the exclusion of the other.

The feminine identity is come up in "Third World Feminism (Kristeva 1995: 222)," which is the concept of "subject in-the process"[1] (*RIPL* 37) of Julia Kristeva. However, it is necessary to recall that this feminine identity is not just for a specific group of women or biologically female. In contrast to the traditional self, the feminine

1) In Julia Kristeva's *The Revolution in Poetic Language*, the term 'subject in-process' is first mentioned, and the term is variously translated into 'speaking subject' or 'subject in trial.' Kristeva's subject is a divided subject rather than an integrated one, a floating subject rather than a teleological one.

identity seeks a solution in the feminist paradigm to avoid the exclusion of the other; it is to acknowledge the many conflicting relationships that are constructed within our community or our subjectivity.

The ethics of care is feminist philosophical perspective that uses a relational and context-bound approach toward morality and decision making. Carol Gilligan asserts that the morality of justice is still practicing the violent exclusion of the other. This morality of justice is based on the subject's independence from the specific relationship with the other and making independent moral judgment. The chronic problem is that this morality is too associated with independence or segregation. This paper raises a new alternative feminine identity to the contradiction of masculine identity. And this could be an attempt to analyse why Marlow lied to Kurtz's fiancée. It's justified on the basis of feminine ethics.

Ⅱ. Why is it feminine identity?

How can a feminist philosophical approach to *Heart of darkness* prescribe Marlow's identity? This question begins not with the concern of feminist liberation to realize the identity of women, but with the interest to deal with the maladies created by male-centered self. This feminist critique makes Conrad's novel much more favorable. Because it enables analysis of the ambiguous narrative and attitude Marlow expresses as long as feminine semiotics relates to the limits of existence. In addition, the study of why feminine identity, which is the

issue of this study, is required explains the position of Conrad at the center of imperialism criticism.

"Kristeva thought it would be better to take up again as basic presuppositions, start from small things, ... rather than take up the grand problems the history, she prefers to look of at minimal components that constitute the speaking being. Kristeva notes: I consider that my work as an analyst is political work, to take it in a microscopic and individual sense"(Noëlle 8). As Kristeva turned away from politics on the large scale, so-called this analysis of identity could be politics at the level of the individual.

Kristeva insisted that feminist has overlooked the difference and heterogeneity and the level of semiotic practice that moves forward the rupture and overthrow while nominating feminism to represent women such as its own individuality and unique identity. She pointed out as well that as feminism may be the opposite of masculinity, it may be behind humanism opposing to the '-ism' of existing feminism, which only produces propaganda. Nevertheless, she did not abandon her interest in 'minimal feminism.' Kristeva cited the mapping of three generations of feminist thought, in her famous essay 'Women's Time', She distinguish between different eras and generations of feminism first published in 1979. "There she depicts the first wave of feminism as a time when women, using a 'logic of identification', pursued liberal, egalitarian ends, followed by the emergence of a militant second phase, which rejected all 'patriarchal' thought and practice, attempting to create 'counter societies' constructed around mythical notions of womanhood. This is the now familiar account of 'equality' feminism followed by a strictly alternative, 'difference' feminism: with

women first seeking inclusion in, and later exclusion from, the masculine symbolic order" (Segal).

Kristeva proposes the third wave of feminism that is critical of the binary of sexual difference itself: She denounced the first and second wave of feminism as the principles being executed in the process of excluding each other and then pointed out that the coexistence of the two kinds of temporalities or the two principles, is being sought by the third wave of feminism. "The third wave of feminism began in the mid-90's and was informed by post-colonial and post-modern thinking. In this phase many constructs were destabilized, including the notions of "universal womanhood," body, gender, sexuality and heteronormativity" (Rampton). Feminism of the third generation takes 'feminine identity' as the norm of feminism today, which includes differences that do not exclude.

Accordingly, feminine identity should be embodied in the spirit of femininity, that is, no exclusion, neither female-centered nor male-centered. Kristeva does not specifically mention feminine identity, but the subject in-process presents the identity the third generation aims at. The third generation shows a turning point to overcome the logic of exclusion itself. According to Kristeva's subject theory, the subject can not be a unified perfection, and the signification that the subject generates are inevitably occurred by the dynamic interaction of the symbolic and the semiotic elements. Namely, subject creates a new heterogeneous meaning by the dialectical relation of these two functions of language. Subject in-process, as a place where the destructive forces of negativity intersect, dismiss rational attempts to define and stabilize thought and language. Here,

the semantic process of the subject expresses the difference of the other rather than excludes.

The interaction between the semiotic and the symbolic produces a sensible ability in which the subject acknowledges the other. Allison Weir says that subjects do not exclude others when they constantly involve in this constitutional processes, through which they open up their own others and make them meaningful (277). The subject who expresses the differences and transform themselves through the process, combines the commonality with the other through individual differences. It should be noted here that the relationship with the other is no longer a universal relationship with our independent self, but an individual combination with a sensitive one. The formation of specific relationships with the other must be preceded for the pursuit of coexistence. To explore this issue more obviously, it is necessary to examine identity focusing on Gilligan's theory. Because even if Kristeva's 'abject/tion'[2] in subjectivity shows well the logic of exclusion, the explanation about why feminine identity is necessary is conceptually insufficient.

Identity has many meanings in different domains, and much analysis of identity has been done in particular focusing on identity and difference (or sameness and otherness), which are contrasting but interrelated terms that have played an specific role in the development of Western philosophy. If we follow Hegel, we could find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility toward every other

2) If the abject means dirty, base and disgusting things, then abjection means the subject's reaction to the object. In other words, if the abject from the subject is showing the instability of his/her identity, abjection is to reject the dirty, impure, uncontrolled materiality of the subject.

consciousness. The subject can be posed only in being opposed; he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object, as it were. Why is it that masculine identity can not acknowledge his limitations in identifying the other? By turning their unconscious into consciousness, they do not acknowledge division but emphasize the unity of the subject. Whereas feminine identity shows the tendency of respecting others by accepting the difference and diversity unlike the self-centered masculine identity.

Although feminine identity is distinguished from biological differences between men and women and defined as identity that should be moreover pursued by both parties, this identity may more applicable to women for the reason it is derived from the feminine qualities of women. Gilligan proposes her own theory analyzing different moral attitudes in "Remapping the Moral Domain." Since men think their selves as individual and separate, they regard morality as a hierarchical order of competing rights among individuals, while women regard morality as a matter of responsibility to the other since they view the selves as an interdependent entity. Gilligan illustrates with a story of two four-year-old children playing together: In this particular version of a common dilemma, the girl said,

> "Let's play next-door neighbors. "I want to play pirates," the boy replied. "Okay," said the girl, "then you can be the pirate that lives next door. (Gilligan 242)

"The girl offers an inclusive solution, one that recognizes the way in which individual interests are created, or at least transformed by

social relationship" (Clement 8). But, there is no interaction that allows a boy to consider the other. To a boy, the other is "the generalized other" that has an equal right. Thus, he would like to play a game according to equal principle of opportunity. He merely compulsorily admits to the same right of a girl but he is not interested in girl's desire itself while a girl shows concern for his specific need. In this regard, the other is "the concrete other" (Benhabib 158). The acknowledgment that she accepts the other is that she recognizes the differences in the specific desire of the other; this acknowledgment does not give an equal right to the difference in the concrete other, rather accepts the difference as a difference. It is also an ethical act to embrace the other's pain. Furthermore, a girl experiences herself changing in a comprehensive process of recognition that she experiences, communicates and sympathizes with others' differences. In the act of a consideration, a girl comes to acknowledge and respond to the other and include it as part of herself.

Since the mid-20th century, moral philosophy has emphasized universal absolutism despite the influence of postmodernism. The masculine moral theory, like justice, makes independent moral judgment, unrelated to the concrete other. In this sense, it shows different attitudes from feminine morality, which emphasizes the emotional relationship with the concrete other. This discussion is centered on conceptual anti-patterns such as reason vs. sensitivity, justice vs. care, contextual transcendence vs. context dependency, and separation vs. combination. It should be noted that the former is related to masculine identity. and the following controversy shows that masculine identity eventually leads to violence against the other.

Seyla Behabib has criticized Rawls's original position on the basis that it only considers the position of the "generalized other" at the expense of the "concrete other" When we assume the standpoint of generalized other we "abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other," whereas when we assume the standpoint of the generalized other we view each individual as having "a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution" (158-9). Benhabib argues that Rawls's veil of ignorance condition in the original position means that the diverse viewpoints and experiences of others are not taken into account, and this makes for a myopic theory of justice.

Judith Butler criticizes the moral subject as a narcissistic villain in Kant's *theory of morality* (112). These narcissistic subjects see themselves as a perfect unity so that their thoughts and judgments become absolute and immutable. Butler also argues that Hegel's self-consciousness in *the Phenomenology of mind* fully recognizes the other in the end. At first, consciousness constructs the other outside of itself and recognizes it as its own again. But the acknowledgment of the other at this time is the same as what was inside him before. The other is identified as a part of me that is appropriated by me in this recognition process. Therefore, this recognition as an assimilation process of the other destroys its characteristic (38).

Critique of Postmodernism simply sees all concepts of identity reiterate the male economy aiming for identity that excludes differences. That is why women's ontology, epistemology and ethics are fundamentally a critical alternative to this. Gilligan argues in the

"Remapping the Moral Domain" that the ethics of care previously theorized could be an alternative to the masculine morality rather than merely as a tendency of the female self. The ethics of care does not avoid emotionally correct judgments, but recognizes and includes the differences between different people. Feminine identity based on certain feminine qualities is a process of feminization that has been rejected, collapsed, resumed and influenced by one another. In the sense in which the feminine identity is the ability of social participation, it provides the possible solutions of harmonious coexistence for society.

Ⅲ. *Heart of darkness*

3.1. Femininity and power

Conrad, like many of his contemporaries, wrote *Heart of darkness* as the adventure story genre. However, by the time of writing it he lost his fate both in the imperial project and heroism itself. Although it still seems to be ostensibly hero's adventure story, Conrad keeps confounding readers' expectations as the story proceeds. The story of Marlow's travel up the Congo river becomes something more complex. Because Conrad subverts the standard character of hero by surrounding him with alternate trajectories: It is the subversion of the European self-image bringing order to chaos with the femininity. Conrad depicts European as those that identify themselves with an ideal self: This human image is the result of

unilateral absoluteness as a fictitious subject that gives narcissistic identification with the other. In my discussion of the thematic dimensions of the text, I will try to show how Marlow, a protagonist in this novel presents himself differently from those traditional self. And I will show the very characteristic way Marlow's identity is recounted to contain femininity, the viewpoint of the feminine gender.

Marlow goes to Congo like a hero he dreamed of as a child. By the way, it is the woman who made a trip to Congo possible. He got a job from his aunt, who actually asked his male relatives for a job but it didn't help. He was guided by women as interviewed for the position. The two women there were knitting with a black wool. Marlow felt "an eerie feeling" (12) from the woman, and said that she seemed "uncanny and fateful" (12). Woman is linked to the function of preoedipal mother here, which is "the place where the subject is both generated and negated" (Clarke 12). The woman which symbolizes preoedipal mother, places him in a dilemmatic situation that subject suffers an identity crisis.

Marlow's journey to the river is towards the realm of the semiotic, the realm of multiple perspectives. Also, in other words Africa jungle symbolizes Chora[3] that is never integrated into the

3) Chora is the womb of a woman Plato refers to in *Timaeus* and is called a webnurse as a container of all things. It is the birthplace of all life, a creative space and a destructive vessel in which life flows. In other words, it refers to the female body and femininity at the same time. In Kristeva's *Revolution of Poetic Language*, the concept of chora discussed at the linguistic level is not empty vessel but a source of voice and rhythm that creates and transforms various meanings and social order. It is a space filled with the voice of the semiotic in which other languages cross each other outside the discourse. Kristeva's semiotic language is non-language, with forms such as rupture,

symbolic language. Conrad addresses some points about the semiotic and feminine qualities through the protagonist's struggling. Marlow's unified consciousness in this semiotic space is completely confounded. He feels an uneasy fascination toward the jungle in Africa, "as if I also were buried in a vast grave full of unspeakable secrets. I felt an intolerable weight oppressing my breast, the smell of the damp earth, the unseen presence of victorious corruption, the darkness of an impenetrable night..." (78). It really puts him at risk "as the sea closes over a diver" (41) as well. The jungle seems to constantly involve in the composition of his being even in such a static state as darkness.

> And this stillness of life did not in the least resemble a peace. It was the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention. It looked at you with a vengeful aspect. (41)

The jungle is a pre-civilized time-space, a place full of itself that does not need language. It is as if traveling back to "a prehistoric earth" (43), "the earliest beginnings of the world" (41). Therefore, Chora, which is likened to maternity, is opposed to paternal order. Adjectives such as "implacable," "inscrutable," "vengeful," (41) imply feminine power which shows the power of silence. He links his existence to this surroundings, a place where the silence is omnipotent, and cuts off the symbolic order, the opposite of the semiotic such as whiteness and stability and so on.

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meaninglessness, silence, and rhythm. It is a heterogeneous element in the language that has the power to violate the singular meaning of text. And this semiotic language is in agreement with Plato's chora, which is a pre-verbal characteristic such as contradictions, borders, and non-verbal.

3.2 Marlow's Feminine identity

Conrad represents the abhorrence to African aborigines without filtration, likely the reproduction of the other embodied by avant-garde writing. The term 'abject' refers to a person (or thing) who is low, alienated, or excluded regardless of sex. Initially, Marlow's perception of Africa assumes absolutely inevitable mechanism of abjection, for example, "the fascination of abomination" (7) is his expression of it – "the growing regrets, the longing to escape, the powerless disgust, the surrender, the hate" (7). However, while experiencing the colonial reality Marlow gradually became aware that the humanitarianism that white people apply to colonial natives is arbitrary and violent. Looking at the hard-working aboriginal people who are treated irrationally in the river estuary, he says, "these men could by no stretch of imagination be called enemies" (18). He confesses that neither the enemy, the prisoner, the workers, the rebels, nor any words can explain the natives. Marlow experiences external conflict when he witnesses how horribly the colonial natives are treated by a colonial ruler. As many critics have already pointed out, Marlow's encounter with the helmsman is critical moments at which he was aware of the hegemonic discourse in a colonial context.

This change that relates to identity exhibits his feminized self, so called feminine identity, which entails a difference in the way he thinks of the natives. What we can then see is that his feminity that threatens to pull apart the binary oppositions. As the journey progresses, allowing himself constantly to occupy the other within his

masculine identity he establishes the subject/other relationship that is different from the one he had previously. He feels the greatest crisis the white subject could have by forming a bond with an indigenous helmsman. The racial hierarchy so far is reversed. This reversal is made by his sensual awakening. The gaze of helmsman struck his unconscious with the power of the semiotic expressing more than language could represent. He listened to the most truthful sounds in his being and thought that "they are also human like us" . . . "your remote kinship with his wild and passionate uproar" is "ugly enough" (44). At this point, it implies that the black helmsman is the other defying and deconstructing white-male dominating discourses. Despite his uncomfortable feeling, he is the first to acknowledge a helmsman.

With this acknowledgment, by combining the helmsman with himself specifically, he realizes his limitation that the helmsman was a part of human being like him. Marlow, who realized his limitation, has an attitude of treating people with sensitivity. The following is the scene showing how he considers a helmsman.

> Perhaps you will think it passing strange this regret for a savage who was no more account than a grain of sand in a black Sahara. Well, don't you see, he had done something, he had steered; for months I had him at my back-a help-an instrument. (62)

The crucial factor here is that they have formed "a subtle bond" (62). Feminine identity refers to the possibility of coexistence with the other. Unlike 'feminine identity,' in the case of a masculine identity,

the other is brought into and then understood by its own identity. It is the difference in how to recognize the difference of the other. His first perception of African aborigines was an ambiguous 'unknown' that can not be known. The identity (sameness) and universality that masculine identity expresses erase the peculiarities of the other and violently put it into one paradigm. As a result, the aborigines are represented by a single 'savagery.' However, the dichotomous ideology of imperialism inherent in Marlow's identity was dismissed as he faced indigenous peoples in conflict with his thinking.

Furthermore, Conrad wants to show a woman as blank space in *Heart of darkness* at close of paly. Women are the abject reminding an abject, which means that women are both the culmination and origin of an abject. Marlow goes back to his origin to her. The African woman that he run into there seems to be the most uncertain. She is a physical being who disgusts as a sexual object of a colonial white man. Nevertheless, he is fascinated by her rich and mysterious body. On the contrary, Kurtz's fiancée, who endures pain with sincerity and faith, is in a superior position, but she symbolizes the absurd woman of Victorian age. She is subordinate to the patriarchal system with a fantasy of Kurts and as "pure, spiritual but not related to sexuality" (502) as Geary said.

When he meets the fiancée for Kurts' work, he hears the screams of an indigenous woman in her voice with "the accompaniment of all the other sounds, full of mystery, desolation, and sorrow" (94). His male-centered ideas were disintegrated into chaos when he recalled the African woman seeing Kurtz's fiancée. Two opposing women make him falls into utter chaos. He feels a healthy sexual attraction in

abominable aboriginal women, while he feels a foolish contradiction to Kurtz's fiancee, who was regarded as the symbol of sublime.

In short, a specific bond of friendship was forged between Marlow and a helmsman. By abandoning the logical reason within his identity logic has left the field open for post-modernist deconstruction. He says, "If my late helmsman was to be eaten, the fishes alone should have him" (63). This thought, derived from his emotional compassion, shows the human dignity over the helmsman's death. Just as the semiotic broke the unified narrative, helmsman's black "frown" (57) disrupted Marlow's racism. Marlow who recognizes the helmsman as a human category out of non-human species has undergone a very radical change because he found his true self in the process of recognition that realizes his own fixed mindset in a closed and male-oriented identity. His awakening ultimately reaches its climax with the female other. He understands the contradiction of the male-centered thinking system by differentiated image of women. As a result, he forms an identity that avoids the conceptual confrontation between civilization and barbarism, or men and women.

3.3. No Justice, but care

Humanitarian and violence is at the center of controversy in the colonies in the 18th and 19th centuries. The prototype of the controversy is the lack of morality. Humanitarianism was a fictitious ideology for the empire's Europeans to justify their rights. This chapter lastly attempts to see the back side of the righteous ideology underlying the western culture. It then ultimately would put forward

the claim that humanism is flawed as our contradictory human. Immorality that reflects a male-centered world view is extensively expressed in European identity during this period of time.

What Marlow mean by women at the end of the novel is out of touch with the truth. *Heart of darkness* examined through the feminist philosophy opens new horizons of perception on morality of justice. Nina Pelikan Straus argues that Marlow seems to have a masculine intention to conceal a woman. It means that commentaries on this work have been largely female-exclusive (130). When it comes to Marlow's lie on Kurtz's last word, most critics have made critical judgments ignoring the consciousness of his female identity. Michael Levenson explains this problem as follows:

> Marlow never shrinks from judgement, but he judges without abstract ideals, without general principles, indeed without consistency.... He derides moral absolutes and willingly suspends universals in favor of concrete discriminations. We know that he abominates lies and that he recognizes justice as Kurtz's due, but when he meets the intended he complies with neither the maxim of honesty nor the claim of justice. Instead he acts as the practical moralist who overturns general conceptions without overturning ethics. (55-56)

Marlow does not appeal to those tainted ideas: progress, compassion, and justice when explaining a particular reason for lying to Kurtz's fiancée. He says simply that "it (the truth) would have been too dark too dark altogether" (96). According to Gilligan's feminine ethics, Marlow proves to be a person of empathy with others who are not a sexist or an imperialist advocate. The ethics of care is a theory

that developed as a response to the ethics of justice and can be regarded as a normative ethical theory (Noeth 17). Gilligan explains that the moral consciousness of women is not based on the abstract notions of men's right and wrong but contextual and perceivable the suffering of others.

Women are wondering who will suffer from the act of judgment, rather than applying the abstract rules of justice before deciding on the right and wrong action. Why does Marlow lie to Kurtz's fiancée? – "The last word he pronounced was your name" (96) – he would have no purpose to shame her, but to protect her from unnecessary suffering according to Gilligan's theory. Through analysis of my work, what I have tried to emphasize is that the truth should not be closed or unilaterally interpreted, rather than only to suggest that Marlow's action was correct.

IV. Conclusion

Feminine identity mirrors multiple perspectives on matters in that it is the site of the subject through a process of subjection. Constructing feminine identity in a postmodern culture is an attempt to revise, reformulate, or rethink traditional ethics as well. But it seems difficult in this post-modern age to speak an honest voice because respect for differences complicates the search for moral truth. However, unless new perception of the other, we can not prevent the subordination or exclusion of the others from the society today. Released from the gender binary and hierarchy, feminine identity is not a women's issue

or a battle between women and men; it is the movement to coexistence with the new feminist paradigm. In view of Conrad's suggestion of feminine identity as an alternative to male-centered society, the feminist elements such as openness, ambiguity, and multiple perspectives inherent in feminine identity reflect moral ethics that are different from existing ethics.

Does Marlow defend Kurtz? Otherwise, why did he lie? This ambiguous position is a characteristic of feminine identity that takes no definite position. Feminine ethics can be illuminated by ambiguity avoiding accurate judgments, yet it enables coexistence with others because of the way it perceive others. Ultimately, I do not claim completely to replace the ethics of justice with the ethics of care that does not make an accurate judgment. Just as Conrad recognizes that the moral justice is irrelevant to reality, I would like to present feminine ethics as a balanced approach to morality. And feminine identity should be established not only for the woman but also for the man to realize their true selves: In other words, all human beings can realize their identity without falling into the exclusionary mechanism in this feminist paradigm. In this new paradigm, conceptual confrontation is avoided.

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Key words

Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad, Feminine identity, the ethics of care, coexistence

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Abstract

Feminine identity and The ethics in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of darkness*

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This paper analyzes the feminine identity and the ethics of care through Joseph Conrad's *Heart of darkness*. Feminine identity, a concept opposite to the traditional self, raises an alternative for harmonious coexistence within feminine paradigm. In *Heart of darkness*, Marlow, who recognizes a helmsman as a human being, forms feminine identity out of the male-centered self. After building a 'concrete' relationship with the helmsman, he comes to have a thoughtful sensibility by abandoning the logical reason. Malow's awakening, moreover, reaches its peak by women. He acknowledges the limitation of a male-centered thinking when facing two other women. At this moment his dichotomous thinking on each flowed women collapses, so that he could avoid the conceptual confrontation of civilization/savagery and men/women. In light of Gilligan's theory, Marlow proves that he is not a sexist or imperial advocate but a person of empathy with others. His intention of his lie to Kurtz's fiancée is to protect her from unnecessary pain, not to shame her as her theory. Feminine identity leads to 'coexistence' with others

through the sensitivity of care for others.

Key words

Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad, Feminine identity, the ethics of care, coexistence

논문게재일

❍투고일: 2018년 7월 19일 ❍심사일: 2018년 8월 1일 ❍게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.153

Cold War Anti-miscegenation Broadway Narratives of 1950s American Family Structure

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I. Introduction

Legal reform in the U.S., beginning with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 and including legislation resulting from the need for Cold War alliances in Asia, opened the door for greater immigration opportunities for Asians and a pathway to the status of citizen. The perceived duties of citizenship in the early post-war era included the responsibility of family, especially in relation to gender roles and parenthood. The inclusion of Asians as U.S. citizens brought the possibility of interracial romances and ignited the long-held fears in American mainstream society of miscegenation.

The early Cold War period coincided with the Golden Age of American musicals (1950s and 1960s). Coincidently or intentionally with the leading Broadway duo in musical theatre, Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein, presented two productions that were based

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on novels which contain interracial issues. Delving into a controversial issue was likely not entirely fortuitous because in the 1920s Hammerstein had written the musical *Show Boat*, which mainly dealt with the issue of miscegenation. James A. Michener's 1947 Pulitzer Prize-winning book *Tales of the South Pacific* was the inspiration for Rodgers and Hammerstein's *South Pacific* (1949), and Margaret Landon's bestselling novel *Anna and the King of Siam* (1944) was the source of *The King and I* (1951).

Focusing on the historical context and content of these musicals, this study presents an analysis of the newly configured and diverse American family structure during the Cold War era with an emphasis on interracial couples and how the influence of anti-miscegenation laws affected the portrayal of parental figures as short-term or permanent couples. The interracial romances portrayed in the two librettoes reveal the extremely complicated subject matter of race and gender as defined by legislation, such as G. I. brides and anti-miscegenation laws prominent in the U.S. at that time. This article closely examines the 1950s American family structure in terms of gender roles and the portrayal in anti-miscegenation narratives of Asians as responsible men and women with the ability and desire to become good American parents and citizens and thus adds to the literature by bringing into focus the cultural humanization of Asians.

II. Courtship: "You've got to be carefully taught"

Frank H. Wu portrays the society's negative attitude and hateful

impression against miscegenation in America in the 1950s as "Whites from ardent segregationist to moderate integrationists opposed intermarriage"; he explains that "President Harry S Truman replied frankly to a reporter who asked whether intermarriage would become common, 'I hope not; I don't believe in it'" (276). This was the general attitude that Rodgers and Hammerstein dared to face in their new musicals.

The various stories and romantic couples contained in the two Broadway productions portray two major categories of Asian-ness in America: "Unacceptable" and "Acceptable." Historically in the U.S., Asians had not been considered as acceptable, legally or culturally. According to anti-miscegenation laws such as the California Civil Code provisions, Asian people could not marry white people and had difficulty in becoming American citizens. Even those Asians lucky enough to become American citizens, both men and women, still faced huge obstacles in relation to the American interpretation of gender roles. In the post-World War II context of American history, despite these hardships Asian people *might* find some acceptance and become citizens. This is what two productions suggest to the audience.

Anti-miscegenation laws performed a fundamental role in defining racial identity and fortifying racial hierarchy; along with restrictive federal immigration laws, the state anti-miscegenation laws put constraints on intermarriage keeping Asians as "inassimilable" foreigners not suitable for citizenship (Moran 17-18). In contrast to these legal practices, the Rodgers and Hammerstein's musicals portray interracial couples. *South Pacific* introduces the couple of

Joseph Cable, a Caucasian U.S. Marine lieutenant, and Liat, a Tonkinese woman. *The King and I* presents an image of an interracial couple with the Asian King of Siam and Anglo-Saxon Anna Leonowens.

In the 1940s, thirty states had anti-miscegenation that banned interracial marriage.[1] Both of the musicals were first presented on the Broadway stage during the time period between two pivotal court cases of *Perez v. Sharp* (1948) and *Loving v. Virginia* (1967) that changed the legality of such marriages. Andrea Perez, who was white, wanted to marry an African man and was denied a marriage license. She challenged two California Civil Code provisions (60 and 69, 1939) that banned licenses for the interracial marriage of "a white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian, or member of the Malay race" and declared all interracial marriage illegal and void (Moran 84-85). The Supreme Court of California ruled the provisions unconstitutional, thus not lawful in California. It took until 1967 for the United States Supreme Court to rule that miscegenation state laws were unconstitutional in *Loving v. Virginia* (Sohoni 587).

In the historical context of one year after *Perez v. Sharp* the 1949 musical *South Pacific* makes an indirect allusion to the legal and cultural difficulties of accepting an Asian woman and Eurasian (strongly implying Amerasian) children as a part of an American family.[2] A major hurdle in the adaptation of Michener's novel was

1) The thirty states are as following: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

2) Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines Amerasian as "a person of mixed

how to compress the expansive three hundred page book with its eighteen short stories into a two-hour musical in *South Pacific*. Michener admitted that his book did not have a focused dramatic story-line (Sturma 26). "After studying the book for several months and making these and no doubt other notes, Hammerstein, almost certainly in cooperation with Rodgers, decided that the Nellie Forbush -Emile de Becque romance should be the principal plot and that the Cable-Liat-Bloody Mary story should be secondary" (Lovensheimer 56). Thus, the romance between nurse Nellie Forbush from Arkansas and French plantation owner Emile de Becque was used for the happy ending (acceptable) couple and Lt. Joe Cable and the native girl Liat for the unhappy ending (unacceptable) couple.

The American characters, Nellie and Joe, represent two examples of the American postwar attitude of racial prejudice. Nellie is a nurse who comes from Little Rock, Arkansas, and Cable is an Ivy League graduate from the northern city of Philadelphia. While, in Michener's book, Nellie is a twenty-two-year old nurse from Otolousa, Arkansas, Rodgers and Hammerstein changed her hometown to well-known Little Rock, Arkansas. Coincidentally, Little Rock would go on to become a more volatile and sensitive part of American history in 1957. In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, nine African American students enrolled at Little Rock Central High School. The Arkansas governor commanded the state's National Guard to block their entry (Sturma 29). In response, President Eisenhower more powerfully defined

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American and Asian descent; *especially*: one fathered by an American and especially an American serviceman in Asia."

racial actions as domestic enemies. On September 24, 1957, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*'s headline "Eisenhower Warns He'll Use Troops If Little Rock Terror Continues" was accompanied by three photos of a violent attack on a *colored* reporter (Morin 1). An inside article reported detailed information with the subtitle, "'Full' U.S. Might Pledged Against Integration Foes" (Morin 1). As the newspaper indicated an act of discrimination based on racial prejudice was an action of integration enemies. Earlier court cases, such as the 1947 case of *Mendez v. Westminster* which banned "the intermixture of white students and children of 'Japanese, Chinese, or Mongolian' decent" (Briones 221), were indicators that Asians were also subject to Jim Crow-like laws.

Nellie's feelings are significant as shown in the end of Act II Scene IV in which Nellie speaks her mind to Emile about how she and Cable feel about those Asian people. Nellie refuses to marry Emile because her perception of marriage cannot accept his previous relationship with his dead Polynesian wife. When Emile approaches Nellie to ask why she wants to move away from him, Nellie turns to Cable for support and says, "No, wait a minute, Joe. Stay. Please!" (134). This scene exposes the miscegenation issue:

> EMILE. No. Now. What does it mean, Nellie?
>
> NELLIE. It means that I can't marry you. Do you understand? I can't marry you.
>
> EMILE. Nellie—Because of my children?
>
> NELLIE. Not because of your children. They're sweet.
>
> EMILE. It is their Polynesian mother then -their mother and I.
>
> NELLIE. …Yes. I can't help it. It isn't as if I could give you a good reason. There

is no reason. This is emotional. This is something that is born in me.

EMILE. (Shouting the words in bitter protest) It is not. I do not believe this is born in you.

NELLIE. Then why do I feel the way I do? All I know is that I can't help it. I can't help it! (135)

Nellie claims that she has no control over why she has these feelings as if they were natural and born in her. Also, she says that her mother is very prejudiced (66) implying an inherited trait. Assuming her fellow American feels the same Nellie says, "Explain how we feel, Joe—" (135). This theatrical version is not as extreme as Michener's original story in which Nellie "suffered a revulsion" at the thought of Emile with a Polynesian woman because "her entire Arkansas upbringing made it impossible for her to deny the teachings of her youth" (112).

Table 1 Philadelphia Population, 1930-1950

Year	Total	White total	White percentage	Black total	Black percentage
1930	1,950,961	1,728,417	88.6	219,599	11.3
1940	1,931,334	1,678,577	86.9	250,880	13.0
1950	2,071,605	1,692,637	81.7	376,041	18.2

Source: U.S. Census referred from Countryman's table (13)

In contrast to Nellie, Cable is conscious of the nature of how racial prejudice develops. Both Michener in the book and Hammerstein in the musical established Cable's hometown as Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love. Michener had grown up in Pennsylvania and Hammerstein owned a farm in Pennsylvania so both

were likely aware of a growth in minority migration during the 1950s which included a huge increase in the African American population. Table 1 gives historical evidence of a possible influence which both men brought to the character of Joe Cable.

Evidencing the table, Matthew J. Countryman stresses that Philadelphia's 1951 improvements in civil rights were made possible because Philadelphia experienced a racial demographic change due to the industrial mobilization for the war and state political reform regarding civil rights for all citizens of Philadelphia (13). Since Cable comes from Philadelphia, he is more aware of racial intolerance and the problems of a racial-mixing relationship, especially pertaining to marriage.

The character's name, Joe Cable, represents a part of the U.S. history. "Joe" means everyone or anyone like G.I. Joe. "Cable" echoes a legal case called "Cable Act (1922) involving miscegenation. The character's name might be interpreted as every/any U.S. man could be involved with Cable Act. The Cable Act indicates:

> The law, as it now stands, puts a premium on feminine bachelorhood. A woman may be a patriotic American, an American born and bred, but if she marries a foreigner she must lose her American citizenship. [...] Another bad feature of the law is that a foreign-born woman, who does not understand our language or anything about our country, may come over here, marry an American and become automatically entitled to vote. (Kauffman "Cable Act (1922)")

This awareness and the message of racial tolerance become

more effective in musical elements. Songs in musicals are used as vehicles to "express what was otherwise unsayable within the typical serious drama" (Lerner 174). Ann Rugg identifies that the Broadway musical evokes a particular audience relationship and connection to a particular historical America (46). For example, Oscar Hammerstein's *Show Boat* (1927) dealt with controversial issues of racial mixing through its songs, including "Can't Help Lovin' Dat Man."

Similarly, Rodgers and Hammerstein stressed the issue of racial prejudice through song in *South Pacific*. The song "You've Got to Be Carefully Taught," which contains the musical's central theme, links clearly to Nellie's past and to Cable's understanding of the present. According to Fordin, some "experienced theatrical people" asked Michener to persuade Rodgers and Hammerstein to remove the song to insure a greater success, but they rejected the idea because the song exemplified the reason why they had wished to create the musical and they made the decision to retain it "even if it meant failure of the production" (Lovensheimer 86; Fordin 270–71). Emile, as a foreigner, cannot understand Nellie, and asks Cable why she believes that prejudice is born within them. Cable stresses, "It's not born in you! It happens *after* you're born" (Rodgers, Hammerstein, and Logan, 136). Examining some of the lyrics of Cable's song shows the strength of Rodgers and Hammerstein's message of how young Americans are educated into racial prejudice:

> You've got to be taught to hate and fear,
> You've got to be taught from year to year,
> It's got to be drummed in your dear little ear—

You've got to be carefully taught!
You've got to be taught to be afraid
Of people whose eyes are oddly made,
And people whose skin is a different shade—
You've got to be carefully taught.
You've got to be taught before it's too late,
Before you are six or seven or eight,
To hate all the people your relatives hate—
You've got to be carefully taught!
You've got to be carefully taught! (136)

With this song, Rodgers and Hammerstein articulate how deeply racial intolerance was rooted and institutionalized in America. As the song stresses, people are carefully taught to hate certain people before the age of "six or seven or eight" (136). According to Jean Jacque Rousseau, children between the ages of two and twelve sense "everything" and become "familiar with feeling" rather than understanding and reason (Gianoutsos 13; Rousseau 20). Through the song, Hammerstein expresses a wish for people to comprehend and to reason with each other rather than to instinctively hate other people.

Hammerstein's lyrics promote an understanding of others in the broadest sense; the song is not particularly focused on a love relationship. Fordin underscores Hammerstein's answer to a question about his supposed "love" for people: "I don't idealize people. I am conscious of their imperfections. In fact, I haven't got a high opinion of human beings. When they make mistakes, I am not surprised. It is

the perfectionist who gets indignant when people let him down. If a man is disillusioned about people, it is his fault. He had no business having illusions" (271). So Cable understands and declares that the deep, learned intolerance in American society makes it impossible for him to bring his Asian beloved into his upper middle class family back home. Geoffrey Block provides insightful analysis into the issue of Joe Cable and social class in his book *Richard Rodgers*:

> Realizing that he could never take her back to Philadelphia society, and both unwilling and unable to stay, Cable rejects Mary's offers and Liat's love, and, at the end of the story, leaves for battle. The central conflict of the story is within Cable. While he partially overcomes his racial intolerance through the depth of his feelings for Liat, he eventually succumbs to it because he is unable to reconcile his feelings with the societal pressures of his upbringing, pressures that also bring issues of class into the story. (161)

As Block argues, Ivy League Cable and native girl Liat would not be class compatible in American society. Cable is unable to overcome his discomfort with both race and class feelings and at this point in the story helplessly says "no" to the marriage proposal. He seems to be given two options: leaving his love or staying with her which would mean leaving his country. Contrary to Michener's original character, who two years earlier in the book runs away from a serious relationship of interracial marriage and suffers from being called "Fo' Dolla'," a racially derogatory term that refers to his interracial relationship (Michener, 382–383), Rodgers and Hammerstein's Cable makes the hard decision and decides to choose love if he survives the

life-endangering mission (Rodgers, Hammerstein, and Logan, 137).

Additionally, Lt. Joe Cable's name, coupled with the story of his difficult decision to marry Liat, might reference the *Cable Act of 1922* or "Married Women's Independent Nationality Act," named for Ohio Representative John L. Cable. While the Cable Act allowed women to regain their citizenship after marriage to aliens "eligible to citizenship," the law still deprived American women of their citizenship if they married those "ineligible to citizenship," particularly Asians (Kang 139 -41).

The immediate critics' responses to *South Pacific* did not mention its content and songs on racial prejudice, especially ignoring "You've Got to Be Carefully Taught" (Block 124). Although the musical diminishes prejudice, Cable could not be allowed to marry Liat as the result of racially biased culture. It would have been too controversial if Cable would have chosen Liat instead of his country. His death seems inevitable because his interracial romance might have been hard for mainstream American audiences to accept in 1949. Rodgers and Hammerstein discussed alternate endings in which Cable did not die but in the end they chose his death (Fordin 272).

These feelings of racial intolerance addressed in the musical did not only come from emotional or cultural sources but also legal sources. Anti-miscegenation laws in many states criminalized interracial cohabitation and sexual relations between whites and people of color. Despite Cable's tragic death, his narrative did foreground one American who had a more open mind to the possibility of interracial marriage which prefigured the advent of Asian war brides. In addition, his death affects Nellie who, in an

emotionally touching scene, shows a change of mind in relation to her own racial prejudice. In this moment, Nellie meets Liat and Bloody Mary who are desperately searching for Cable, unaware that he is dead. Nellie's reaction of sympathy and empathy shows a beginning of change in her attitude toward non-white people (Rodgers, Hammerstein, and Logan, 158-59).

III. Courtship: "Something Wonderful"

In comparison to the couples in *South Pacific, The King and I* steps further into the interracial issue with a couple involving an Asian man and a white woman. This musical production is based on Margaret Landon's novel, *Anna and the King of Siam*. Landon's book uses two works written by Anna Harriette Leonowens for her story source: *The English Governess at the Siamese Court* (1870) and *Romance of the Harem* (1872). Both works were based on Leonowens' experiences with the Siamese royal family. The musical is set in the 1860s when Siam (now Thailand) was surrounded by European imperial powers, an allegorical reference to Asian countries with the expansion of Communism in the early Cold War period. In this setting, the Asian king has a connection with Anna, a British governess, who comes to Siam to teach the royal children and King's wives. In the musical adaptation, Anna's character, while remaining British, behaves and acts more like an American of the mid-twentieth century with a stress on the writers' ideas about American democracy and individualism (Glassmeyer 107). Rodgers and Hammerstein use

the King as the vehicle to show the unsettling feelings of a transition from traditional to modern and of the need for and difficulties of assimilation into the Western world. Faced with expanding colonial power in Asia and neighboring countries, the Siamese King needs to deal with Western imperial power, especially British power. Consequently, the King wants to modernize (Westernize) his country through education and hires Anna who is a widowed teacher.

In *The King and I* Rodgers and Hammerstein hint at an interracial romance between the King and Anna. When the original company was working out the interaction of each character, Yul Brynner suggested that "We have to play it as potential lovers. Otherwise the play is just about two cultures, and who cares?" (Lawrence 180). Also, in the *New York Times*, Rodgers and Hammerstein admitted an intentional romance: "The strength of their story lies in the violent changes they wrought in each other. Yet their life together bears unmistakable implications of deep mutual attraction—a man and a woman relationship so strong and real and well-founded that it seems in some ways more than a love affair, more than a marriage" (Lawrence 180).

The interracial romance reoccurs in the story through the romantic song "Something Wonderful" and the dance scene featuring the song "Shall We Dance." The insinuative romantic song, "Something Wonderful," is heard four separate times. All of them insinuate the theme of romantic relationship between the King and Anna and the acceptance of American democracy in Siam. First, after Anna has a tumultuous quarrel in which the King calls her his servant, Lady Thiang, the King's head wife and mother of the crown prince,

visits Anna and advocates for him. Thiang explains the many things the King has to deal with and his need of Anna's help: "Our agents in Singapore have found letters to British Government from people whose greedy eyes are on Siam. They describe King as a barbarian, and suggest making Siam a protectorate" (58); and "He needs *you*" (59). Moreover, Thiang sings, "[The King] will not always say,/ What you would have him say,/ But now and then he'll say/ Something wonderful" (60). This song ends with the lyrics, "He'll always needs your love and so he'll get your love/ A man who needs your love can be wonderful" (59–60). Second, immediately after this scene, Thiang sings to herself another version of the song "She'll always go along,/ Defend him when he's wrong/ And tell him when he's strong/ He is wonderful./ He'll always need her love/ And so he'll get her love/ A man who needs your love/ Can be wonderful!" (62). It is during this second singing that a romantic theme clearly emerges with the blessing of the person who loves the King most deeply.

The third time is a rendition of "Something Wonderful" played by the orchestra to accentuate the King fulfilling his promise as he gives Anna her own house away from the King's polygamous palace at the end of Act One (78). As Thiang predicted, the King said something wonderful by fulfilling his promise and giving Anna her own house. I argue that allowing Anna to have a house represents his acceptance of American style democracy. Having a separate house implies freedom, so the King allows her to keep her (American) freedom in his country and as a consequence saves his country from Western imperialism. As "Something Wonderful" is used to praise American democracy, simultaneously it gives a positive tone to the interracial

relationship. Similar to the third time, the fourth is also a rendition of "Something Wonderful" played by the orchestra to put an accent on the next generation practicing American democracy in Siam at the scene of the King's death with the next king's proclamation (145). With the echoing music, the King leaves his life and Anna.

Moreover, the dancing scene featuring the song "Shall We Dance" fortifies the positive tone of the romance. After the diplomatic party ends and they are alone without the judgmental observation of society, the King gives a ring to Anna as a gift. Although she wishes him to put it on her finger, he rejects her request and she puts it on the index finger of her left hand. Here a difference in interpretation between cultures arises. The King could have meant the ring as an appreciation for Anna's service. In Anna's culture, and the audience's culture, the gift of the ring could be interpreted as a promissory ring that would signify a committed relationship. Anna puts the ring on the correct hand but not the correct finger, possibly implying her acceptance of an ambiguous romantic relationship.

Following this ring scene, Anna comments that equality between a man and a woman is "a beautiful idea" and she uses dancing as an example (119). The King expresses his displeasure of the idea of a woman dancing in the arms of someone who is not her husband. Thus, in order to explain the beautiful idea, Anna sings "Shall We Dance" and dances by herself in front of the King. In response to her song and the dance, the King requests that Anna teach him how to dance in the western style. Unlike the vernacular dances in Siam where a couple dances side by side without touching, Western social dances, like the polka, need physical touching between the man and

the woman. The polka also requires that the man lead the dance and the woman follow, and to do the dance successfully the couple must communicate with each other. At first, Anna leads the dance by holding the King's hands (123). At one point, they switch to the western style dance hold and the King leads Anna as explained in the stage direction "Looking very directly into her eyes he advances on her slowly and puts his hand on her waist" (124). The stage direction also portrays the manner of the dance: "They dance a full refrain and dance it very well indeed, rhythmically and with spirit, both obviously enjoying it. They stop for a moment, stand off and laugh at each other" (124). As they dance together, they sing:

ANNA. (*Singing*) Shall we dance?

KING. One two three and.

ANNA. On a bright cloud of music shall we fly?

[…]

ANNA. Shall we then say "good night" and mean "good-bye"?

KING. One two three and. (*He sings:*) Or perchance,

When the last little star has leave the sky

ANNA. Shall we still be together,

With our arms around each other,

And shall you be my new romance?

(KING sings the word "romance" with her)

On the clear understanding

That this kind of thing can happen,

Shall we dance? Shall we dance? Shall we dance? (123)

The lyrics clearly present a mutual understanding of a possible romance as they sing the word "romance" together. Clearly, with the three major elements of the ring, the dance, and the song, this scene crafts a lovely interracial couple.

In an interview, Mike Wallace asked Hammerstein about his personal views about interracial romance:

> WALLACE: Does that express your view as far as you're concerned with miscegenation. Inter-marriage between races is perfectly sensible?
>
> HAMMERSTEIN: Yes.
>
> WALLACE: In "The King And I"?
>
> HAMMERSTEIN: In "The King And I," I think "The King And I" is best symbolized by the number in it, "Getting to know you, getting to know all about you" as the nurse from the governess from Wales talking to the little Siamese kids whom she'd grown to love and who'd grown to love her. And there is no There again, all race and color had faded in their getting to know and love each other. (Hammerstein, *The Mike Wallace*)

Thus the interracial romance between the King and Anna is possible due to their mutual "getting to know" and love for each other. Despite Hammerstein's personal thought, their interracial romance could not result in a happy ending, similar to Joe Cable and Liat in *South Pacific*. Historically, the real Anna Leonowens did not marry the real King of Siam; the Anna of Margaret Landon's book did not marry her king either. However, using artistic license, Rodgers and

Hammerstein could have chosen to adapt the story into something with a happy (and provocative) ending without the King's death. Adaptation allows for changes and eliminations: certainly, the duo removed the Tuptim's execution, for her illicit love in violation of her arranged marriage with the King, from Landon's text. Nonetheless, despite the idea of other possibilities for the King, the duo held on to a narrative, like *South Pacific*, that concludes in an ill-fated interracial romance that concludes in the death of the man.

Although the possibility of interracial romance is lost, Anna maintains her relationship with her pupils. In the final scene, the musical stages two farewells. In the previous scene, having informed the King and the court of Siam that she plans to leave, Anna rushes to the dying King and finds him in his study surrounded by his books and his children. The scene presents two farewells: Anna's leaving the country and the King's leaving his life. Strangely, the children seem more concerned about Anna's leaving than the King's. They even break into shouts of joy when Anna decides not to leave. The King berates them, "Silence! ... Is no reason for doing of this demonstration for schoolteacher realizing her duty, for which I pay her exorbitant monthly salary of twenty···five pounds! Further, this is disorganized behavior for bedroom of dying King!" (143). The King then declares his first son, Chulalongkorn, as his successor. The first thing Chulalongkorn does as king is to announce his democracy-inspired proclamations to his people, while the King quietly expires. This scene highlights the success of democracy intertwined with the prospects of interracial romance. The fact that Anna decides to stay represents a positive relationship implying an Asian-U.S. alliance. But the death of

the King ends his personal relationship with Anna.

IV. Parenthood: Good Wife/Mother and Non-Threatening Fathers

The miscegenation laws also encompassed the issue of gender. The laws partly includes reject on American citizenship to colored immigrants through interracial marriage. Thus many stereotypes on Asian heritage people presented unacceptability as an American man or woman. This section concentrates on how the two musicals portray Asian men and women as acceptable future Americans in terms of American family structure and gender.

During the war, women came out of the domestic space and became a good source of necessary labor. After the war, patriarchal society wanted women to return to the "traditional" role of a good wife and mother while a man went out and performed as a breadwinner. This movement was fueled by the fact that the returning men needed jobs and female workers could be competitors in the job markets.

The suggested role for women was that of a good housewife and care-giver responsible for the running of the home and for the welfare of her husband and children. TV programs epitomized this stereotyped gender role: "this tenacious stereotype conjures mythic images of culture icons—June Cleaver, Donna Reed, Harriet Nelson—the quintessential white, middle-class housewives who stayed at home to rear children, clean house and bake cookies" (Meyerowitz 1).

In this narrative, women should return to the domestic sphere and conceptually transform the strong war-time image of Rosie the Riveter into weak and delicate Rosie *the Riveted*.[3] Since many women had experienced the economic freedom that came along with working outside the home in factories and stores, some women did not want to return to the job of caretaker of the home and serving the husband. However, the pressure from "mainstream media such as governmental propaganda, magazines, and films" to conform to the good wife stereotype led many women to give up their own interests and focus on the needs of their husband and children (Meyerowitz 2-5). Moreover, a great deal of American propaganda utilized such images of a good wife in a comfortable home in order to highlight Americans' superiority over the Communists and the horrors of the lives of Russian women and their suffering under communism ("The Pill").

The portrayal of a good wife figure in society was reflected with a twist in both the Asian and Caucasian roles in the musicals. There was an acceptable exception to the "good wife at home" scenario with the positive portrayal of a strong single mother working outside the home while taking care of her children as best as she can.

South Pacific depicts the story of a single mother who has become a local entrepreneur. A Tonkinese woman, Bloody Mary, boldly sells her products as souvenirs to American servicemen.[4] She wants a better future for her daughter, Liat, possibly in America. Thus

3) My italic for highlight.

4) Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* describes Tonkinese as Chinese in the Pacific (126) and Polynesian as Black in the Pacific (138).

as she hawks her wares, she searches for a good candidate to marry her daughter from among the American military personnel who are her customers. She arranges a meeting between Liat and the officer that seems to be the best candidate, Lt. Cable. As Mary sees their relationship deepening, she asks Cable to marry Liat, saying that she is willing to financially support him with her job if he becomes her son-in-law: "I am rich. I save six hundred dolla' before war. Since war I make two thousand dolla' ··· war go on I make maybe more. Sell grass skirts, boar's teeth, real human heads. Give all de money to you an' Liat. You no have to work. I work for you··· " (120). Arranging her daughter's future happiness justifies Mary's appearance in the professional space. This character shows that Asian women are caring mothers and not just after American men to get to America for selfish reasons.

Another mother figure in *South Pacific* is Nellie, who serves as a battlefield nurse. Although she has a public service job, still her domestic duty to her man and his children is her highest priority. While Emile is on a life-endangering mission, she diligently takes care of his mixed-race children. In a motherly fashion, she tells them "Now you have to learn to mind me when I talk to you and be nice to me too. Because I love you very much" (168). In addition to this motherly kindness to the children, she also does her "wifely" duty to their father: "The children drink their soup. NELLIE comes back to consciousness enough to realize that EMILE must be hungry. She leans over and hands him the large bowl of soup with an air of 'nothing's-too-good-for-the-boss!' Then she passes him the soup ladle!" (170).

In *The King and I* two strong mothers are evident. Anna is a single mother who, to take care of her son, must support him by becoming a professional teacher for the royal children in the palace after her husband's death. In her role as working mother, Anna's job extends into advising and teaching the king, and in this way Anna is the only one who is equal to the King in Siam. This equality though is diffused in the musical. Anna can be equal but she must follow the King's lead. If he sits, she sits, keeping her head never higher than his. In front of the diplomatic visitors Anna plays the role of the domestic woman thus playing the role of a strong woman who knows how to support the man. The other mother is the King's first wife, Lady Thiang, whose son is the Crown Prince. As first wife she is the most public of the King's many wives. She is an example of "behind every great man there stands a woman," similar to the real life role model of Eleanor Roosevelt, the wife of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt when he was in office between 1933 and 1945. Lady Thiang is always looking out for her husband's interests even if it means allowing another woman to be closer to him and to her son. She gives the first son to Anna because she trusts the white woman to bring up her son and believes he would learn better from Anna. These two characters, Caucasian and Asian women, reinforce the role of the working mother as good wives.

Like the women, the men in post-war America needed to adjust to civilian life. During the war they dreamed of a safe and happy family life. The dream resulted in a baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s and in the popping up of tract houses on the suburban landscape. During this time, a television set was visible in the living rooms of

many homes and screened images of the good life. This idyllic family dream of house and children was mirrored in the fantasy world visualized and concretized by Walt Disney and brought to life in California at Disneyland which opened in 1955. Many baby boomer families wished "upon a star" to visit Disneyland physically and mentally. In a Disneyfied America where "all the mothers were caring, all the fathers had a good job, and all the children were cute and clever," there was no room for the realities of life as a minority.[5] The currency of reestablishing a traditional family structure with a breadwinning father excluded images of breadwinning Asian men as the dominant white American society felt most comfortable with images that reflected itself. The appearance of minority men in entertainment productions signaled an awakening awareness or softening of acceptance of non-white ethnicities and the transition of Asians in America from the image of foreigner/war enemy to that of American minority.

The role of Asian men Rodgers and Hammerstein's musicals suggests a moderated version of the American family portrait. In contrast to the menacing stereotypes of Yellow Peril and cheap labor competitor, their productions present non-threatening Asian men that can easily be assimilated into mainstream culture and can be assets in the areas of education, business, and wealth. However, it must be noted that there was an absence of Asian male characters in *South Pacific*, possibly because Michener did not feature Asian men

5) This is a paraphrase of Garrison Keillor's Lake Woebegon where "all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and all the children are above average" in his radio program, *A Prairie Home Companion*.

in his book. On the other hand, an Asian man who exhibits the assimilation and asset features is majorly featured in *The King and I*. This Asian king dedicates much time and energy to learning American ways in order to protect his country from European imperialism. This shows that the King, as an Asian man, can be a valuable individual who understands and accepts American democracy. Rodgers and Hammerstein used the King as a vehicle to illustrate the dilemma of necessary transition from traditional to modern and of the need for and difficulties of assimilation into the Western world. In terms of being an asset in the areas of education, business, and wealth, the King is shown to be highly educated. He supports the American president by writing a letter offering assistance to President Lincoln, which includes sending elephants to help him maintain peace in his country.

V. Mr. and Mrs. American Citizen

Other legislation that satisfied the government's diplomatic needs opened the door for Asians to becoming American citizens and American parents. For example, with the Magnuson Act (1943), the U.S. government, "as a gesture of goodwill toward China" repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and nullified the racial discrimination of immigration law. After the war people from Asian countries were considered more positively because their "ancestral lands" were becoming valued allies (Chan 122). American society gradually began to accept Asians as Americans. The 1946 Chinese War Brides Act

further expanded this possibility by opening up a way for Asian brides of U. S. military men to come to America. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 helped to encourage American citizens to adopt Asian children. However, in spite of President Truman's veto, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (also known as the McCarran-Walter Act) became law and thus reinforced discriminatory rules based on the origins of immigrants for the purpose of national security.

In this historical context, *South Pacific* and *The King and I* reflect Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein's awareness of these pieces of legislation. Their portrayal of Asians as responsible men and women who had the ability and desire to become responsible American citizens within in the culture show a positive attitude shift. The wide acceptance of the two Broadway musicals by the general populace also shows that there was a wind of change in the inclusiveness of Asians into the American family.

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Key words

South Pacific, *The King and I*, anti-miscegenation, American family structure, acceptable American parents and citizens

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Abstract

Cold War Anti-miscegenation Broadway Narratives of 1950s American Family Structure

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Focusing on the historical context and content of Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein's musicals, *South Pacific* and *The King and I*, this study delves into the newly configured and diverse American family structure during the Cold War era with an emphasis on interracial couples and how the influence of anti-miscegenation laws affected the portrayal of Asian-heritage parental figures as short-term or permanent couples. The interracial romances portrayed in the two librettoes reveal the extremely complicated subject matter of race and gender as defined by legislation prominent in the U.S. at that time, such as G. I. brides and anti-miscegenation laws. This article closely examines the 1950s American family structure in terms of gender roles and the portrayal in anti-miscegenation narratives of Asians as responsible men and women with the ability and desire to become acceptable American parents and citizens.

Key words

South Pacific, *The King and I*, anti-miscegenation, American family structure, acceptable American parents and citizens

논문게재일

❍투고일: 2018년 7월 3일 ❍심사일: 2018년 8월 3일 ❍게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

10.15732/jecs.11.2.2018.8.183

Evolution of Feeling of Free Will

Hwang, Hyun Kyu*

Ⅰ. Introduction

Free will is as enigmatic as it is elusive. So many thinkers throughout history have chimed in on the subject without achieving much success, at least not in terms of seeing people come to a consensus on the issue. In this article, I will first make a distinction between belief of free will and feeling of free will and claim that even though it seems plausible to say that only humans have belief of free will, feeling of free will might be something different and therefore might exist in nonhuman animals as well. Then, I will delve further into the feeling of free will and make the case that humans have feeling of free will not because we actually have free will but because this type of feeling evolved. I will then present possible theories that try to explain how feeling of free will has evolved in humans. I will conclude the article by mentioning the implications and limitations of

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the study and end it with suggestions for further researches.

Ⅱ. Belief of free will vs. Feeling of free will

Before making the distinction between belief of free will and feeling of free will, it is essential to define clearly what we mean by free will. Even though philosophers disagree on what the concept of free will is supposed to mean (see Dennett, 2003; Wegner, 2002; Inwagen, 1999), I think Sam Harris captures the core notion of what we mean by free will when he says that "[t]he popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present." (Harris, 2012:6) If we dissect the words, it does not seem far-fetched to say that most of humans believe that we could have done otherwise (e.g. "I should have shot the basketball instead of passing it.") and that we are the source of, therefore, in control of our thoughts and actions (e.g. "I can control when to raise my arm."). This sentiment is echoed when Feldman states that "[t]he belief in free will is a generalized lay-belief regarding the capacity for human choice – "Do I (and others) have a choice, and if so, can I (and others) freely choose to do otherwise?" As a belief, it captures a mental representation by a believer of the link between an object, in this case humans, and an attribute, in this case "free will", or the capacity for choice. (Feldman, 2017:4)." Thus, the conception of free will in the words of Harris seems like an adequate definition of free will, and to

take a step further, it seems that most humans do believe that we have this type of free will.

How prevalent is this belief in free will, though? According to Baumeister, "[b]elief in free will is widespread. It persists across cultures··· [i]t is found from early in life until old age··· [and it] remains strong even when people have their own freedom of action restricted." (Baumeister, 2014:21) At first glance, this statement is plausible as most people we confront on a daily basis do seem to work with the belief that each of us has free will. But at the same time, it must be acknowledged that individuals differ in how much they believe that they have free will depending on such factors as culture, personality, circumstances and etc. (see Wuketits, 2007) To see this, we need not look too far as many scholars have written and spoken about not believing in free will (see Libet, 1985; Wegner, 2002; Wuketits, 2007). Thus even though it is probably true that many, if not most, humans have belief of free will (i.e. believing that each of us has free will), it is definitely possible not to have belief of free will.

At this point, we need to address two separate but related issues. First, we have to explain why so many people have belief of free will. Secondly, we need to explain why some people do not share this belief of free will. To answer these questions we need to delve into the feeling of free will. How is belief of free will different from feeling of free will? Let us distinguish belief from feeling. What is a belief? Baldwin claims that "[t]here is impulse in Belief: all things believed belong to certain categories, have certain coefficients, toward which we feel, for consciousness at least, original impulses, and after which we consciously strive. There is likewise presentation or representation,

usually both, in Belief; for we believe a content, an objective." (Baldwin, 1892:404) There are two ideas in this definition presented by Baldwin. First is that a belief has a content. If there is nothing to believe in, then one would not be able to believe in anything. Merriam-Webster dictionary shares this sentiment when it defines belief as "conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence." (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2017) Thus, I believe it would be fair to claim that when we say one has belief in free will, what we are referring to is one's conviction of the truth of the statement that "one has free will." The second idea in the definition presented by Baldwin is concerned with what drives one to have a certain belief. What Baldwin is saying here is that whenever we believe in something it is because we have impulse, a feeling towards that category. In the case of belief in free will, as I shall elaborate on the issue later on, Baldwin is claiming that one has belief in free will because one has impulse, or feeling, to believe the statement that "one has free will."

Then, what is a feeling? Baldwin states that "let us understand by Feeling simply sensibility, the amount, intensity, agitation, of consciousness. It is consciousness itself, a "first intension"- consciousness in its simplest expression, but consciousness as present, also, in the highest operations of knowing and willing. The mollusk and perhaps the sensitive plant does not know anything, nor will anything, but it feels." (Baldwin, 1892:403) In this definition of the word feeling, Baldwin points out correctly, in my opinion, that it is the simplest form of sensibility. If there is any amount of intensity and

agitation in consciousness, the subject which possesses the consciousness can be deemed to be in the state of experiencing feeling. In this sense, feeling of free will can be defined as simplest form of agitation in consciousness that brings forth a sense of free will. Notice that this does not require a content of free will (e.g. statement of "one has free will) as is the case in belief of free will. The illustration of how a sensitive plant can feel even if it does not know anything is very important. As we have seen above, belief requires that there be a content to believe in. If one does not understand what the particular content is, it is hard to see how one would claim to have a belief about that content. But the discussion about feeling now has revealed the possibility that one can have feeling about a certain content even if one does not understand what the content is. This has significant consequence as it is possible to conjecture that even though belief of free will might be impossible in nonhuman animals (because understanding a statement such as "one has free will" is reasonably thought to be impossible in most, if not all, nonhuman animals), feeling of free will might exist in nonhuman animals (because one can have feeling of having freely willed something even if one does not have any idea what free or having willed something means).

Now that we have made the distinction between belief of free will and feeling of free will, we are ready to return to the two questions posed above. First, as to why so many people have belief of free will, we have seen from Baldwin's claim that feeling of free will is what drives people to form belief of free will. Simply put, people have belief of free will because they feel like they have free will. I believe

other answers are possible as well. Some justify belief of free will using God as one who endowed humanity with free will (see Pruss, 2003) and others have used various philosophical arguments to justify their beliefs in free will (see Dennett, 2003; Himma, 2009). Moreover, Baumeister claims that "[b]eliefs about free will are affected by multiple things. One motivating factor appears to be the wish to hold other people responsible and punish them for their misdeeds. Random and unpredictable behavior appears to increase belief in free will, possibly because they are cues that suggest autonomy as opposed to being programmed by external factors. Thus, both responsibility and autonomy are implicated in the causes of free will beliefs." (Baumeister, 2014:27) Even though these arguments are plausible, and probably true to a certain degree especially in the case of Baumeister, to explain why the belief of free will is so prevalent, we have to find a more powerful common denominator that is shared by almost all of the believers, and in this case, it is very clear what the driving force is: feeling of free will. Harris also claims that the "endurance of this notion [of free will] is attributable to the fact that most of us feel that we freely author our own thoughts and actions… Thus the idea of free will emerges from a felt experience." (Harris, 2012:15) If we can show that feeling of free will is so powerful and prevalent among people, then it would help support my claim that prevalent belief of free will can be explained by prevalent feeling of free will in individuals. And this claim seems more justifiable as I have shown above that belief is formed out of strong feeling towards that belief. Simply put, it seems natural to claim that if I have a strong feeling that I have free will, I will, very likely, form a belief of free will.

The great Niels Bohr once said, referring to the inevitable feeling of free will, that "[o]f course, it is impossible to say whether a person wants to do something because he believes he can, or whether he can because he will, but it is hardly disputable that we have the feeling of, so-to-speak, being able to make the best out of the circumstance." (Bohr, 1958:78) Even Wegner, who is famous for calling free will as an illusion, agrees that the subjective experience of choosing and willing is so powerful that it is of no surprise to him that people would be induced to believe in free will. (Wegner, 2002) Other scientists show similar sentiment (see Baumeister, 2014; Miles, 2015). These claims show why so many people would have belief of free will: feeling of free will. Now that we have answered the first question, we will dig deeper into the second question.

III. Feeling of free will. Why?

The second question which asks why some people, then, do not have belief of free will can also be answered using feeling of free will. If feeling of free will is so prevalent, then it is natural to question why we all have this strong feeling of free will. Two answers seem possible: (1) because we actually have free will and (2) not because we actually have free will but because of some other reasons. Those who fall under the category of (1) have belief of free will. But there are also those who fall under the category of (2). These people claim that we do not have free will but agree that we have feeling of free will. They try to explain why we have feeling of free will even though we

do not have free will. We can now see that some people do not have belief of free will because they believe that they have good reason to deny that we actually have free will and (some among these people) also believe that they have good explanations for why we have feeling of free will in the absence of actual free will. The natural question that follows is obvious. Who is correct? (1) or (2)?

Those who support position (1) claim that we have feeling of free will because we actually have free will. To understand this position we have to understand what actually having free will means. If we take a look at the statement made by Harris, we can see that having free will involves "that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and··· that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present." (Harris, 2012:6) First of all, the focus of this article is not to put to rest the debate of whether we have free will or not. This is a debate that has been with humanity throughout its history, and I am not (at least not in this article) claiming to settle the debate once and for all. Secondly, the evidence I would present in this article would predominantly involve studies and arguments that favor position (2). This might seem harsh to those who hold position (1), but I would like to remind that my aim in this article is to delve into those who hold position (2) and therefore that I am not focused on presenting a balanced view of both positions. Having said that, I still believe it is essential to demonstrate what position (1) is and how it can be criticized and possibly refuted.

Going back to the issue of whether we actually have free will or not, there are two separate positions. First, if we could have done something differently in the past, it would mean that we have some

sort of free will. Secondly, if we are the conscious source of our thoughts and actions, then it would mean that we have some sort of free will. Let us take a look at the first portion. Harris claims that "[e]ither our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them." (Harris, 2012:5) What Harris is arguing for is clear. It is either the case that we could not have done anything different in the past or if it was possible that something different could have happened in the past, it is not up to 'us' to decide. Harris' logic is as follows. Everything is either caused by prior events or emerges spontaneously. This includes our wills. Thus it follows that either our wills are caused by prior events or emerge spontaneously. If our wills are caused by prior events, conclusion that prior events (not us) are responsible for our wills entails. If our wills emerge spontaneously, it means that we do not decide what emerges but it is up to random chance that determines what emerges. In this case, too, we are not responsible for our wills. In the past, we had wills. But as we have seen now, we cannot be responsible for our wills in either of the cases. Regardless of whether past events could have been different or not, we are not the ones that have control over what happens, and therefore, it amounts to the conclusion that we could not have done something differently in the past. Similarly, Wuketits argues that our "will" is a product of genetics and environment and that these have been shaped by long history of evolution. (see Wuketits, 2007) Wuketits is also supporting Harris' view that our wills are determined by factors that are outside our control (i.e. genes and environment and how they have been shaped by history of evolution),

and therefore that we cannot control our wills, including our wills in the past. This amounts to the conclusion, once again, that we could not have done something differently in the past. David Buss, who is regarded as one of the pioneers of evolutionary psychology states that "[a]ll cognitive programs—including superordinate programs of this kind—are sometimes mistaken for homunculi, that is, entities endowed with free will. A homunculus scans the environment and freely chooses successful actions in a way that is not systematic enough to be implemented by a program. It is the task of cognitive psychologists to replace theories that implicitly posit such an impossible entity with theories that can be implemented as fixed programs with open parameters··· Far from being internal free agents, these programs have an unchanging structure regardless of the needs of the individual or his or her circumstances because they were designed to create states that worked well in ancestral situations, regardless of their consequences in the present." (Buss, 2005:54) Buss is also echoing the statements provided by ones mentioned above as he is claiming that we are not internal free agents but are rather cognitive programs that are devoid of free will. Our wills are not free in the sense that we can control it, but are rather programmed, in which case it does not make sense that we could have done something differently in the past for how our wills are shaped is determined by how we are programmed (which is obviously out of our control).

Now, let us take a look at the second portion. Harris states that "[f]ree will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which

we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have." (Harris, 2012:5) He goes onto ask "[h]ow can we be 'free' as conscious agents if everything that we consciously intend is caused by events in our brain that we do not intend and of which we are entirely unaware? We can't." (Harris, 2012:25) The second portion deals with the popular conception held by people that we can decide what we think and how we act. But as Harris eloquently claims, this popular conception is likely an illusion. It is easy to see this point by using introspection to discover how our thoughts are formed. The truth of the matter is that we do not determine what our next thoughts are going to be, but rather thoughts simply arise and present themselves to us. Similar idea has been proposed by Ekman concerning emotions. He states that "modular emotions take the form of affect programs: complex, coordinated, and automated responses involving many different physiological systems … The programs are opaque to consciousness: they "happen" to a person, rather than being "done" by them." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999 :346) He is claiming that some types of emotions present themselves to people and people cannot consciously control these events. If we can agree that our thoughts and actions must also have their roots in our brains and our programmed physical system, then it should not be surprising to see that thoughts and actions "happen" to a person, rather than being controlled by a person. Combining the first and second portion, and how they are both refuted by arguments listed above, I will claim that there is a strong case to be made for those who claim that we actually do not have free will. Therefore, I will claim (though not conclusively, as I have mentioned above of the

limitations of this article to serve as a conclusive refutation of the existence of free will) that position (1) which claims that we have feeling of free will because we actually have free will is unjustified.

Those who support position (2) claim that we do not actually have free will but agree that we have feeling of free will. We have seen how those who support position (2) criticize those in position (1) regarding the actual existence of free will. And let us grant for the sake of argument that it is indeed the case that we actually do not have free will. This cannot be the end of the story for those in position (2) because to give a complete account, they must be able to explain why we have feeling of free will in the absence of free will. We have seen that people in position (2) claim that we have feeling of free will not because we have free will but because of some other reasons. Now is the time to find out what those in position (2) think these other reasons are.

To reiterate, the question at hand is this: why do we have feeling of free will (feeling that we can control our thoughts, action, and etc) when we do not have free will? There seems to be 2 broad approaches that we can take. (a) feeling of free will is a product of evolution (b) feeling of free will is not a product of evolution. As one could guess by looking at the introduction of the article, I will focus entirely on (a). But I believe it is important to at least consider what it means when we say that feeling of free will is not a product of evolution. To understand what it means to say that feeling of free will is not a product of evolution, it is essential to know what it means to say that feeling of free will is a product of evolution. When we say feeling of free will is a product of evolution we are, broadly speaking,

saying two things. First, that brain is a product of evolution and second, that brain states control feeling of free will. Then, if it is the case that either brain is not a product of evolution or brain states do not control feeling of free will, then it could be argued that feeling of free will is not a product of evolution. I will claim that brain indeed is a product of evolution and that brain states do control feeling of free will and therefore that feeling of free will is a product of evolution.

Brain indeed is a product of evolution. In the field of biology, "sociobiologists have turned from the idea that each behavior evolved because it was selected to the idea that many different behaviors are caused by a relatively small number of cognitive mechanisms. It is these mechanisms that have evolved. (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:321) These cognitive mechanisms refer to the working mechanisms of the brains, and therefore what the statement amounts to is the claim that sociobiologists are now supporting the view that brain structure and mechanism are evolving, but not the behaviors themselves. David Buss also strongly supports the view that brain mechanisms have evolved in ways that helped our ancestors solve problems that they have faced. (see Buss, 2005) This indicates the growth of evolutionary psychology which can be captured in this statement: "[j]ust as physiological adaptations solve specific problems associated with survival and reproduction (e.g., the immune system has evolved as a defense against disease), psychological adaptations too have evolved because they solved problems related to survival and reproduction." (Confer et al, 2010:111) This is evolutionary psychology in a nutshell as it shows what the field studies in general, which is the evolution of psychology. If it can be demonstrated that psychological states are

the products of brain states, then it would not be a bizarre thing to say that evolutionary psychology is a study that supports the view that brain mechanisms evolve just as psychological mechanisms evolve. I will turn to this issue now.

With the advancement of neuroscience, it is now a near consensus that brain states do, indeed, control psychological states. Numerous studies are specifically focused on finding which brain states are correlated with which psychological states, such as emotion, memory, and etc (see Bear et al, 2006; Panksepp, 1990). What is more important is that there are now studies that seem to demonstrate that feeling of free will is correlated with and likely to be controlled by brain states. There is one interesting study that is directly connected to the issue at hand. Michael Desmurget and his team of neuroscientists have shown that when patients' parietal cortex is stimulated, patients felt a strong desire to move their body parts, such as arms, hands, and feet although they never actually did. And when the experimenters stimulated premotor cortex, patients moved their body parts without being aware of these movements. Desmurget concluded from this experiment that feeling of free will originate (at least partially) in the parietal cortex. Moreover, he concluded that sense of moving does not depend (at least not entirely) on actually moving. (see Desmurget et al, 2009). The study is extremely intriguing but even more significant in that it shows us that feeling of free will can be controlled by manipulating brain states. It seems quite safe to say that brain is a product of evolution and that brain states control feeling of free will. Thus we can conclude from this that position (b), which asserts that feeling of free will is not a product of evolution, is

unjustified and that therefore only viable option that is left is position (a), which claims that feeling of free will is a product of evolution. This will be our point of emphasis from now on.

IV. Evolution of feeling of free will in humans

How could such a thing as feeling of free will evolve? To see this, let us start from the view that feeling of free will evolved by natural selection: feeling of free will as an adaptation.

– Adaptation (=Evolution by natural selection)

Defining the word adaptation is not simple. But what is agreed by most, if not all, biologists is that adaptation is "a [trait] that enhances the survival or reproduction of organisms that bear it, relative to alternative character states (especially the ancestral condition in the population in which the adaptation evolved). Natural selection is the only mechanism known to cause the evolution of adaptations, so many biologists would simply define an adaptation as a characteristic that has evolved by natural selection." (Futuyama, 2009:279) Similar statements are made when Sterelny and Griffiths claim that a "trait that exists because natural selection has favored it is called an adaptation." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:217) Thus even though the definition of adaptation and its relationship with natural selection is not settled by any means, in this article, I will use the term adaptation as a trait that has evolved by natural selection which enhances the

survival or reproduction of the organisms that bear it compared to alternative trait states. Then, the natural question that follows is what natural selection is that brings about adaptation. It is a well-received view that for a trait to evolve by natural selection, trait must have variation, must be heritable, and variants of the trait must have differential fitness (i.e. leave different numbers of offspring). (Godfrey-Smith, 2014:30) One thing to remember here is that natural selection alone cannot bring about new things. This idea is echoed when Godfrey-Smith states that "selection alone cannot produce new things, though it can keep the good ones that are already around. Mutation alone can produce new things, but in an indiscriminate way. There is almost no chance of it producing eyes and brains. Selection and mutation together can produce eyes and brain." (Godfrey-Smith, 2014:30) Thus if feeling of free will (a trait) does not exist from the beginning, natural selection cannot somehow create it. When scholars claim that feeling of free will is an adaptation, what they mean is not that natural selection created this feeling of free will but that feeling of free will is a trait that helped organisms to enhance their chance of surviving and reproducing, and over time, this mechanism of natural selection made it possible for more organisms to possess this feeling of free will.

One last thing we need to mention is whether such a phenomenon as feeling of free will can be justifiably called as a trait. It is easy to see how shapes of the beak of different finches are deemed as a trait that is influenced by natural selection but can the same thing be said about feeling of free will? To address this question, we need to justify the working hypothesis of evolutionary

psychology. There is a great deal of discussions going on as to whether we should accept evolutionary psychology as a viable field of knowledge and this article has no intention of getting involved deeply in these debates. But I believe it is important to at least establish the fundamental idea of evolutionary psychology for much of what I will be discussing from now on is centered on the basic assumptions that are held by evolutionary psychologists. I agree with Sterelny and Griffiths when they state that "[w]e agree with the central idea of evolutionary psychology, namely, that we should look for the effects of natural selection on the psychological mechanisms that explain our behaviors, rather than on those behaviors themselves. Moreover, we agree that it is very likely indeed that selection has been one of the forces that has transformed our cognitive system." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:328) When we think about it, I believe it is not too hard to imagine that psychological mechanisms would be influenced by natural selection. After all, as we have seen earlier, if a trait has variation, is heritable, and gives rise to differential fitness, that trait can be said to evolve by natural selection, and it is difficult to think why a psychological phenomenon that has these components should not be considered as a trait. This sentiment is shared by Buss who states that "[w]hy do anatomists identify as separate mechanisms the liver, the heart, the larynx, the hand, the nose, the eyes, and the ears? What makes these divisions nonarbitrary compared with alternative ways of parsing the body? The answer is function… Evolutionary psychologists argue that similar principles should be applied to analyzing the mechanisms of the human mind." (Buss, 1995:6) Buss claims that various forms of psychological phenomena

can be included as being traits that are influenced by natural selection, and thus be classified as adaptations. He claims that "[a]lthough psychological mechanisms such as landscape preferences clearly differ in important ways from mechanisms such as snake fears, they share critical ingredients that qualify them as evolved psychological mechanisms – they solved specific adaptive problems in human ancestral environments; they are triggered only by a narrow range of information; they are characterized by a particular set of procedures or decision rules; and they produce behavioral output that presumably solved he adaptive problems in ancestral times." (Buss, 1995:7) Thus, it seems that the idea of feeling of free will as a trait, and therefore as a potential candidate of an adaptation sounds plausible. With that in mind, I will now show examples of scholars or ideas that support the view that feeling of free will is an adaptation.

Before getting into the crux of the discussion, we first have to establish what we want to focus on: idea that feeling of free will is an adaptation. This means that we are not focused on views that claim that free will is an adaptation. This is a view held by Baumeister when he states that "[w]e assume that the human psyche was shaped by evolution (though culture may have added new layers on top). Freedom of action would therefore have evolved, or at least the capacity for it was produced by natural selection... A scientific account of free will would have to be compatible with what is known about evolution. In particular, the capacity for free action would have to produce benefits to survival and reproduction." (Baumeister, 2014:9) Although it may be possible that free will is something that evolved by natural selection, the article is not going to deal with

evolution of free will itself. Rather, as mentioned before, the question I focus on revolves around the idea of evolution of feeling of free will, which I will turn to next.

The idea that feeling of free will is an adaptation is, by far, the most popular view held by contemporary scholars. But that does not mean that they all have same theories of explaining how natural selection favored this feeling of free will in humans. The most popular theory among competing ones seems to be the one that supports the idea that feeling of free will evolved by natural selection because it helped groups that possess individuals who have feeling of free will to flourish. In a typical evolutionary psychology's reasoning pattern, Godfrey-Smith introduces an evolution of humans that could serve to explain how feeling of free will could have evolved as an adaptation: "The Pleistocene is the period of about 2.5 million years prior to the development of farming and settled human communities about 12,000 years ago. The species Homo sapiens itself evolved in this period… [Homo sapiens] communities competed with each other, both directly in warfare and less directly in their attempts to make use of resources in a difficult environment. Societies with good social cohesion, with habits of helping and norms discouraging exploitation, were effective in this competition and survived while other groups did not. Cohesion in these societies was due to a combination of traits with different origins. These include psychological features such as the social emotions of shame and pride, which evolved by natural selection… The psychology that came out of this period was one featuring strong social preferences bolstered by emotions, and a tendency to internalize local norms about proper behavior." (Godfrey-Smith, 2014:132) On a

similar note, he goes onto state that humans have "evolved to take an interest in others and to internalize norms of fairness that play a strong motivating role." (Godfrey-Smith, 2014:136) What is noteworthy in the statement is that groups who had norms of helping other individuals and discouraging exploitation fared better, and that these norms of helping and discouraging exploitation was achieved by social emotions of shame and pride. Even though, it is not directly mentioned, we can question whether such social emotions of shame and pride would be possible without feeling of free will. If no one felt that they had free will, then no one would be ashamed for committing murder or feel proud that one has saved lives of children in the village. Thus, we can now see how feeling of free will can be an adaptation. If an individual has feeling of free will, then it would enable one to also feel such social emotions as shame and pride, and these emotions would then make it possible for the group to have norms of helping others and discouraging exploitation. Groups with well-established norms of this kind would outcompete other groups, and the population, over time, would consist of more individuals with feeling of free will, and if this picture is accurate, we would be justified in calling feeling of free will as an adaptation. Sterelny and Griffiths also claims that emotions such as loyalty, pride, and guilt (all of emotions that seem to require individuals to possess feeling of free will) can help the group who possess those individuals to fare better. (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:18) The idea that feeling of free will helps the group by allowing the group to form norms that help stabilize the group is also echoed when Feldman states that "[t]he close conceptual relationship that free will holds with moral responsibility supports the

view that free will is a notion embedded in societal considerations. The concept of free will may be regarded by societies and religions as a solution to the predicament of laypersons that associate determinism with inevitability, reduced accountability, and thus lower action control over socially undesirable behaviors. Based on the idea of free will as a social tool, the belief that a person could make different free choices in a given situation is considered essential to legal, moral, and political judgments." (Feldman, 2017:3) The idea of moral responsibility, which is connected to who we praise and blame seems deeply rooted in human nature. As Brigard claims, "when faced with a concrete bad action, participants experience an impulse to blame someone for that bad action." (Brigard et al, 2009:521) Once again, it seems plausible to claim that this impulse to blame is rooted in people's feeling of free will, and that this sort of impulse can help stabilization of the group. Chudek also claims that groups can benefit by having individuals who have such feeling of free will when he says that "[t]he final piece of the puzzle is intergroup competition. If some combinations of supernatural beliefs and rituals can galvanize cooperation and favor success in intergroup competition better than alternatives, then these can preferentially proliferate over centuries." (Chudek, 2015:19) If it is shown that feeling of free will can galvanize cooperation and favor success in intergroup competition (better than alternatives), then it seems likely that such a feeling would have been chosen by natural selection. In this case, we would call this feeling of free will an adaptation.

Similar, but slightly different view is introduced by Feldman when he states that "concept of free will has evolved to allow the self

to coexist with others in society as to override inherent immediate biological urges that mainly focus on the self… thus allowing for prospection, long-term planning, action control, and coordination with others in society… The belief in free will could have possibly evolved so that people would be able to a deal with a world of increasingly complicated choices and complex societal interactions that require coordination and inhibition of self." (Feldman, 2017:3) This view is also focused on the idea that feeling of free will is intricately connected to how individuals can live harmoniously in a group. But the view is slightly different from the ones mentioned above in that it suggests that feeling of free will allows for the individuals to fare better within the context of social life. This is connected directly to the issue of group selection vs. individual selection. But I will not delve into the details of the debate in this article. What is interesting is that Feldman also introduces some new tools (other than social emotions such as guilt) that people would have been allowed to have by having feeling of free will. It seems plausible that without feeling of free will, there could not be such phenomena as long-term planning, or action control. It seems plausible that these features would help individuals to survive and reproduce better, and if this picture is accurate, then feeling of free will can be called as an adaptation.

The views mentioned above, as can be seen, are focused on how feeling of free will is an adaptation which helped individuals to fare better within the social context or groups to fare better if they have more individuals who have feeling of free will. But there are also scholars who claim that feeling of free will is an adaptation but it has

not much to do with social context or groups getting the benefit. These scholars claim that feeling of free will benefits the individual without having to take into account the individual's social context. The great Edward O. Wilson claims that "[b]ecause the individual mind cannot be fully described by itself or by any separate researcher, the self··· can go on passionately believing in its independence and free will··· Confidence in free will is biologically adaptive. Without it the conscious mind··· would be cursed by fatalism. Like a prisoner confined for life to solitary confinement, deprived of any freedom to explore and starving for surprise, it would deteriorate. So, does free will exist? Yes, if not in ultimate reality, then at least in the operational sense necessary for sanity and thereby for the perpetuation of the human species." (Wilson, 2014:170) What Wilson is saying here is that without feeling of free will, individuals would be cursed by fatalism and would eventually deteriorate. A simple illustration would suffice to show this point. If I do not have any feeling of free will, how could I be motivated to do anything? If everything is already decided (i.e. fatalism), and I cannot do anything about it, then this sense of helplessness would certainly seem like a devastating blow for anyone's motivation to act. Even though, whether lack of feeling of free will would actually lead to curse of fatalism is debatable, we can see that a person with feeling of free will would be more motivated to act than a person without it. Thus, Wilson is claiming that individuals with feeling of free will would have fared better in terms of surviving and reproducing and therefore feeling of free will should be judged as an adaptation. Wuketits also claims that feeling of free will would not have evolved had it been the

case that feeling of free will is unproductive (i.e. lowers probability of passing on the possessor's genes) in biological terms. (Wuketits, 2007:209) Feldman also shares this view. (Feldman, 2017:3)

We now have seen numerous scholars claiming that feeling of free will is an adaptation, meaning that it evolved because it conferred biological advantages to the possessors of the feeling in direct or indirect ways. But is feeling of free will really an adaptation? When we witness that a trait has complexity, or design, we have good reasons to suspect that the trait might be an adaptation. (Futuyama, 2009:296) But we will not delve into the question of whether it is plausible to think of feeling of free will as something with complexity or design. But now at least we know that not every trait is an adaptation. The conundrum of how to view feeling of free will in the context of evolution gets trickier when we find out how many alternative explanations other than adaptation are possible for a given trait. There are many scholars who believe that there is a tendency to explain every trait as an adaptation while close examination would reveal that it is, in fact, not. Gould and Lewontin "argue that adaptationism is unscientific because it cannot be disproved by experiment. In their view, adaptationists tell 'just-so stories' about why a trait was selected in the evolutionary past and regard these stories as scientific explanation." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:225) Criticisms directed at those who speculate that most of the traits are adaptations without close examination also comes from Sterelny and Griffiths who claim that "[o]ur behavior is produced by mental mechanisms that play a role in many different behaviors. Some of the mental mechanisms used in hunting are also used in storytelling. So

speculations about the adaptive significance of rape, xenophobia, child abuse, or homosexuality seem to be at the wrong grain of analysis··· [I]ndividual behaviors are unlikely to have histories to call their own, or to have independent adaptive significances." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:321) We can see how these criticisms can be directed at scholars who claim that feeling of free will is an adaptation. Scholars' theories that claim feeling of free will as an adaptation can be viewed as "just-so-stories" and it might be implausible to argue that a phenomenon such as feeling of free will would have independent adaptive significance. We will now take a look at what alternative explanations are available.

Futuyama eloquently lists alternative explanations possible when he claims that "[n]ot all the traits of organisms are adaptations. There are several other possible explanations of organisms' characteristics. First, a trait may be a necessary consequence of physics or chemistry. Hemoglobin gives blood a red color, but there is no reason to think that red-ness is an adaptation; it is a by-product of the structure of hemoglobin. Second, the trait may have evolved by random genetic drift rather than by natural selection. Third, the feature may have evolved not because it conferred an adaptive advantage, but because it was correlated with another feature that did." (Futuyama, 2009:294) We will consider these alternative explanations (except for random genetic drift) in addition to exaptation and cultural evolution.

We will start with the claim that a trait may be a necessary consequence of physics or chemistry (i.e. by-product). Just as redness of hemoglobin is a by-product of the structure of hemoglobin, feeling of free will can also be a by-product of evolution. This idea is

captured lucidly when Sterelny and Griffiths states that "[n]o one doubts that some traits can evolve independently of the rest of the organism. The beaks of the Galapagos finches change under selection without everything else changing. But Gould and Lewontin deny that the picture of the organism as a mosaic of traits is always or usually accurate. They argue, for instance, that the human chin is an inevitable effect of the way the jaws grows, but does not have any particular evolutionary purpose of its own. Seeking to explain the chin as a separate feature is bad biology." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:225) We can see that a human chin is an inevitable effect of the way jaws grows. This analogy shows that not everything has an evolutionary purpose of its own. Some traits are just by-products and they are shaped in the way they are because laws of physics or chemistry dictates that they must be the way they are. Can this analogy be applied to the feeling of free will? What would it mean to say that the trait of feeling of free will is not an adaptation but a by-product that is necessitated by laws of physics and chemistry? It would mean that (1) feeling of free will does not confer any evolutionary advantages (e.g. increased reproductive success) and (2) laws of physics and chemistry necessitates this feeling of free will. Are (1), and (2) plausible? Let us tackle (1) first. Stamos cites Swinburne to make the claim that it is at least conceivable to claim that feeling of free will does not confer any evolutionary advantages when he states that "Swinburne says that 'it is not easy to see what the selective advantage of having a mental life is'. With sensation it is not clear to him what it adds to mere stimulus-response. With conscious awareness it is not clear to him what it adds to unconscious

disposition. This is the crux of his argument with regard to evolution. If it is not clear what the selective advantage of consciousness is, then evolutionary biology cannot possibly argue that consciousness evolved by natural selection." (Stamos, 2008:221) He goes onto claim that "[p]erhaps before asking what consciousness is we should begin by asking what it does. This is the kind of question that would immediately occur to an evolutionist. Maybe consciousness is an adaptation. But immediately we are faced with a problem, namely, evidence which suggests that consciousness does nothing but is a mere byproduct of something else." (Stamos, 2008:224) As a final blow to the question of whether feeling of free will confers any evolutionary advantage, Stamos states that "[o]ne powerful piece of evidence suggesting that consciousness does nothing, that it is a mere epiphenomenon (a non-causal byproduct) of the brain, comes from the work of the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet." (Stamos, 2008:8; see also Libet, 1985) Granted that we are still far away from declaring that consciousness gives no selective advantage, we can see the point of the argument made in these statements. If the universe is materialistic, and therefore every phenomenon can be explained in terms of stimulus-response of particles, then it is questionable what function consciousness plays. If consciousness does not affect matter, then consciousness does not seem to have any causal efficacy. Feeling of free will is also included in the realm of consciousness. But this would mean that feeling of free will also does not have any causal efficacy and is merely a by-product. If it does not have any causal efficacy, then it certainly cannot confer any advantages to the organism that possesses it. We can now see how (1), which claims

that feeling of free will does not confer any evolutionary advantages can be justified. Now we should move on to (2), which states that laws of physics and chemistry necessitates this feeling of free will. As we have seen from Desmurget experiment, we can at least see the plausibility in the claim that laws of physics and chemistry necessitates this feeling of free will. (see Desmurget, 2009) Thus, if we accept both (1) and (2), it amounts to the claim that feeling of free will is more like the red-ness of hemoglobin than it is like the beaks of finches. Feeling of free will exists, just as red-ness of hemoglobin exists, but it does not exist because it served some useful purpose in terms of evolutionary fitness. Feeling of free will exists merely because laws of physics and chemistry somehow necessitated its existence (how laws of physics and chemistry necessitate such phenomena of consciousness and feeling of free will is famously dubbed as "hard problem of consciousness" and this article will not delve into the matter). Whether feeling of free will really is a by-product just as red-ness of hemoglobin is remains to be seen, but I hope to have persuaded the readers that this view should be regarded as a powerful alternative explanation to those who claim that feeling of free will is an adaptation.

Similar, but a different theory revolves around the idea that feeling of free will is a side-effect, meaning that it exists because it is correlated with another feature which is actually an adaptation. Sober eloquently puts this idea of how a trait can be a side-effect when he claims that "[t]he heart makes noise, but that is not why the heart evolved – it evolved because it pumps blood. Making noise is a side effect… We must not lose sight of this distinction when we consider

the human mind/brain. Although the organ evolved because of some of the traits it has, this should not lead us to expect that every behavior produced by the human mind/brain is adaptive. The brain presumably has many side effects; it generates thoughts and feelings that have nothing to do with why it evolved." (Sober, 2000:219) Sterelny and Griffiths gives us another example of a trait that is likely to be a side-effect when they state that "the ability to read is adaptive without being an adaptation. Literacy is highly adaptive in most modern human societies, as the disadvantages suffered by dyslexic people testify. But the ability to read is probably a side effect of other, more ancient cognitive abilities." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:218) The difference between by-product and side-effect is subtle but crucial. If a trait is a by-product, then it means that the trait has no relationship to the function of the other trait which necessitates the trait. Red-ness of hemoglobin has no relationship to the function of the hemoglobin. If feeling of free will is a by-product, it means that feeling of free will has no relationship to the function of physical and chemical states that necessitates feeling of free will. This is not the case if feeling of free will is a side-effect. Noise that the heart makes is certainly not why heart evolved. But noise that the heart makes is certainly related to the function of the heart, which is to pump blood. Likewise, if feeling of free will is a side-effect, then it means that feeling of free will would be related to the function of what creates feeling of free will. If this "what" is an adaptation, then feeling of free will would be correctly called as a side-effect. For instance, let us say that our brain structure evolved to distinguish objects that behave in more unpredictable ways and those that behave in less unpredictable

ways in order to be more skillful in predicting what the predator might do next. Adaptation in this case is the trait of being able to differentiate objects in regards to how unpredictable their behaviors are. But we can imagine that, as this adaptation evolves, a side-effect of attributing free will also emerges. In order to differentiate objects' unpredictability we might assign each object that we see different degrees of free will. And it seems to follow naturally that we could also assign degree of free will to not only objects that we see, but to ourselves as well. If this is how feeling of free will evolved, then feeling of free will is not an adaptation because it did not evolve because it conferred a certain biological advantage. Rather, it should be called as a side-effect of an adaptation (i.e. ability to differentiate different objects' different unpredictability). This is reflected when Baumeister states that "[p]eople seem to infer free will from someone's unpredictable behavior. The underlying assumption is presumably that lawfully doing what is expected indicates that one is under control of events, whereas acting in seemingly unexpected ways indicates greater independence of the environment, suggestive of the autonomy aspect of free will. Ebert and Wegner had participants view of a fictionalized film observing an alien on another planet (denoted by a featureless triangle on a brown background). The alien's actions were either repetitive (the agent conducted exactly the same series of moves nine times) or random (the agent conducted nine different, but well-ordered actions). Participants attributed more freedom, choice, soul, consciousness, and other trappings of free will to the randomly acting agent than to the predictable one." (Baumeister, 2014:25) Once again, it remains to be

seen whether feeling of free will is an adaptation or a side-effect. But the notion that feeling of free will exists as a side-effect should be considered as a viable alternative explanation to the claim that feeling of free will evolved as an adaptation.

There is an interesting concept that has been popularized mainly by Stephen Jay Gould: exaptation. Definition of exaptation is as follows: "[a] trait is an exaptation if it is an adaptation for one purpose but is now used – often in a modified form – for a different purpose." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:219) Example of this is feathers of birds, which were first evolved to assist in thermoregulation but are now found to be useful for flight. Can feeling of free will fall under this category? Rakos raises an interesting point when he claims that "[w]e may over-assign agency because of the evolutionary advantage that once came with always suspecting there might be an agent doing something (e.g. predator)." (see Rakos, 2004) What he is claiming here is that feeling of free will is an exaptation. In this case, assigning free will to objects (thus, thinking that objects have feeling of free will) is an adaptation for it would help us better avoid predators, but is now used (usually) for a different purpose (e.g. assigning moral blame). Again, this is only a hypothesis, but one that is worthy of pursuing.

Lastly, I want to touch on what cultural evolution can say about evolution of feeling of free will. What is cultural evolution? Elliot Sober captures the idea of cultural evolution beautifully when he states that "[t]he mode of transmission is not genetic, and fitness is not measured by how many babies an organism has. According to this pattern, individuals acquire their ideas because they are exposed to

the ideas of their parents, of their peers, and of their parents' generation; transmission patterns may be vertical, horizontal, and oblique. An individual exposed to this mix of ideas need not give them all equal credence. Some may be more attractive than others. If so, the frequency of ideas in the population may evolve." (Sober, 2000:214) Sober is claiming that idea of something can spread in a population not by biological means but by cultural means. Furthermore, Sterelny and Griffiths states that "[i]deas, fashions, inventions, and the like can spread through society. We can see these as replicators, variants competing with differential success. Ideas are replicators because they are potentially copied from human brain to human brain through indefinitely deep lineages… In Dawkins' language, ideas are memes, and mem lineages compete and grow differentially… An account of meme lineages, their phenotypic effects, and their environment is an account of human culture." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:332) This sentiment is echoed by Losos when he states that "[m]emetics [study of mems] proposes that ideas, skills, practices, and so on, are entities that can be understood to hop from mind to mind, making copies of themselves as they go." (Losos, 2014:288) Even though analogy used between meme and gene is criticized often, we get the general idea once again that "ideas" can be transmitted by cultural evolution. The question now becomes this: what kind of ideas? Can belief of free will be included? It seems like the answer is a powerful yes. Confer states that "[t]ransmitted (or adopted) culture describes a second form of cultural phenomena. Examples of transmitted culture include beliefs about the afterlife, local moral repugnance at the thought of ingesting certain foods such

as beef or pork, the content of certain stereotypes about outgroup members, and information transmitted through gossip." (Confer et al, 2010:118) The basic tenet of cultural evolution seems harmless. The idea that cultural things (e.g. ideas) can be transmitted to others that come into contact sounds natural. In fact, we see this everyday. The idea of Santa Claus did not exist (or at least did not spread among people) in Korea until 1900s when "Western" people introduced the idea to the nation. And now, everyone from infant to older generations knows what Santa Claus is. This is definitely not a biological transmission. The only viable explanation, it seems to me, is that cultural items (in this case, an idea of Santa) can be transmitted in non-biological way. And it seems that idea of free will can also be transmitted in this way. But there are two problems we have to deal with. First of all, saying that idea of free will can be transmitted in this way does not mean that it actually was transmitted in this way. Secondly, the focus of the article is feeling of free will, not idea of free will. Let us address the first question. Is it likely that idea of free will was spread among the world population in this way (i.e. cultural evolution)? The most important criterion that we have to take a look at when saying something is culturally transmitted is whether the item is present only in certain cultures and not in others. For instance, idea of Santa Claus is a good candidate of something that is culturally transmitted because the idea was known by most people in the United States in 1800, but almost no one has heard anything about Santa at the same period of time in Korea. This idea is presented when Sterelny and Griffiths states that according to those who subscribe to the positions of cultural evolution, since "every human group has a

similar set of biological resources, the great differences between groups must be explained in terms of differing cultural resources." (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999:325) This idea is echoed by Confer who states that "[c]ulture is sometimes advanced as competing with explanations that invoke evolved psychology, most frequently when cross-cultural variability is observed. Cultural explanations sometimes invoke the notion that differences between groups are prima facie evidence that "culture" is an autonomous causal agent that creates the content of the human mind." (Confer et al, 2010:118) Both of the statements are referring to the notion that if two cultures differ greatly in regards to a single item, then there is a great chance that the item is a culturally transmittable item. And this is an interesting idea because different cultures do seem to differ in how much they actually refer to the term 'free will.' Even though further study is required, it seems that Eastern cultures have not been as focused on the concept of 'free will' as Western cultures have been (this is a very crude point that needs to be refined in the future). Thus, it may be of significance that idea of free will is actually something that is actually culturally transmitted. Now, let us deal with second question which is a question about the difference between feeling of free will and idea of free will. Now that we have established that it might actually be the case that idea of free will has been culturally transmitted, does it follow that feeling of free will has been culturally transmitted as well? To this question, I would, with little hesitation, say no. Even if it is true that Eastern cultures have not been focused on the concept of free will, it is obvious that most, if not all, people of Eastern cultures feel that they could have done something

differently in the past and that they are the conscious authors of their thoughts and actions. Even if some people do not 'believe' in free will, most, if not all, people would attest that they cannot help but feel that they have free will when they raise their arms. Thus, I would claim that even if idea of free will has been proven to be something that was culturally transmitted, the feeling of free will is present universally among humans. This is a powerful refutation to the claim that feeling of free will might be something that can be explained by cultural evolution. Now, I do not deny that there are scholars who would claim that culture is a powerful thing that can shape even what we feel. (see Chudek, 2015) But if feeling of free will is universally present in humans, then I believe the burden of proof is on the cultural evolutionists' shoulders and not mine to show that feeling of free will is an item that is culturally transmitted.

To conclude, scholars differ greatly in how feeling of free will evolved. Some would claim that feeling of free will is an adaptation while others would claim that it is not. Even those who claim that it is an adaptation would have different theories about what advantages feeling of free will might have conferred to the organisms that possessed it while those who claim that it is not an adaptation have even more distinct theories on how feeling of free will has evolved.

V. Conclusion

Humans have unavoidable feeling of free will. I have tried to show that this feeling exist but it may be caused not by the actual

existence of free will but by brain mechanisms that have evolved to produce this sort of feeling in humans. I have dealt with some of the scholars who have proposed theories about how feeling of free will might have evolved.

The limitations of the study include assuming some of the big claims that are the driving force of the article. For instance, I do not delve into the debate of whether free will actually exists or not in detail even though this is a huge assumption to make. Finally, I understand that the issue of free will is greatly elusive and mysterious. So much so that it might not be solved during my life time, or ever for that matter. While the idea is formidable, in a strange way, I am relieved to know that the debate is meant to last for a possible eternity. John Searle's words would be a perfect ending to the article: "for reasons I don't really understand, evolution has given us a form of experience of voluntary action where the experience of freedom, that is to say, the experience of the sense of alternative possibilities, is built into the very structure of conscious, voluntary, intentional human behavior. For that reason, I believe, neither this discussion nor any other will ever convince us that our behavior is unfree." (Searle, 1984:98)

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Key words

Free will, evolution, feeling, homo sapiens, mind

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Abstract

Evolution of Feeling of Free Will

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In this article, I will first make a distinction between belief of free will and feeling of free will and claim that even though it seems plausible to say that only humans have belief of free will, feeling of free will might be something different and therefore might exist in nonhuman animals as well. To illustrate this point, researches from psychologists, such as Baumeister to those from neuroscientists are dealt. Then, I will delve further into the feeling of free will and make the case that humans have feeling of free will not because we actually have free will but because this type of feeling evolved. I will then present possible theories including various evolutionary theories that try to explain how feeling of free will has evolved in humans. I will conclude the article by mentioning the implications and limitations of the study and end it with suggestions for further researches.

Key words

Free will, evolution, feeling, homo sapiens, mind

논문게재일

○투고일: 2018년 7월 15일 ○심사일: 2018년 8월 3일 ○게재일: 2018년 8월 31일

『영어권문화연구』 발간 규정

제1조 (학술지 발간의 목적과 성격)

(1) 동국대 영어권문화연구소(이하 '연구소'라 칭함)는 영어권 문화와 문학을 연구하고 교육하는 학자들의 연구활동과 정보교환을 촉진하기 위해 정기적으로 학술지 『영어권문화연구』(*The Journal of English Cultural Studies*)를 발간한다.

(2) 본 학술지는 영어권문화연구와 관련된 논문들을 게재함을 원칙으로 하며 논문의 내용은 영어권의 인문, 철학, 문학, 문화 연구나 학제적 연구의 범위 안에 포괄될 수 있는 독창적인 것이거나 그러한 연구에 도움이 될 수 있는 것이어야 한다.

제2조 (학술지 발간 일정)

(1) [학술지 발간] 학술지는 매년 4월 30일, 8월 31일, 12월 31일 연 3회 발간한다.

(2) [원고 접수와 심사] 원고는 수시 접수를 원칙으로 하며 기고자에게 게재 희망호를 명시하도록 요구한다. 논문 접수 마감은 1권은 2월 28일, 2권은 6월 30일, 그리고 3권은 10월 31일로 하고 이때까지 접수된 논문에 대해 해당호 게재 여부를 위한 심사를 진행한다. 기한 보다 늦게 투고된 논문들에 대해서는 편집회의를 통해 심사 여부를 결정한다. 투고 및 심사일정은 다음의 표와 같다. 투고 및 심사 일정에 변경이 필요할 경우에는 편집회의를 통해 결정한다.

제3조 (학술지의 발간규정에 대한 심의 및 제/개정)

(1) 학술지의 발간규정에 대한 심의 및 제/개정은 편집위원 2/3 이상의 동의를 얻어 편집위원회에서 확정하고 편집위원장이 이사회에 보고한다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 31일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2013년 10월 31일부터 시행한다.

『영어권문화연구』 편집위원회 운영 및 심사 규정

제1조 (편집위원회의 설치목적과 구성)

(1) 연구소에서 발행하는 학술지 『영어권문화연구』의 편집과 출판에 필요한 업무를 담당하기 위해 편집위원회를 설치, 운영한다.

(2) 편집위원회는 학술지에 수록될 논문의 심사 및 발간에 관한 제반 사항을 수행한다.

(3) 편집위원회는 편집위원장과 편집위원들로 구성한다.

(4) 편집위원장은 연구소 운영위원 중에서 선임한다.

(5) 업무수행의 효율성을 위해 편집위원 중에서 편집 간사를 선임할 수 있다.

(6) 편집위원회는 10인 내외로 구성한다.

(7) 편집위원은 학문적인 조예가 깊고, 연구소활동에 적극적으로 참여하는 회원 중에서 전문성, 대내외적 인지도, 경력사항, 연구실적, 연구소기여도, 지역 등을 고려하여 이사회에서 선임한다.

(8) 편집위원은 연구실적이 우수한 상임이사나 회원 가운데서 추천을 받아 이사회 2/3 이상의 동의를 얻어 연구소장이 임명한다.

(9) 편집위원의 임기는 최소 2년으로 하고 연임할 수 있다.

(10) 편집위원회는 연구소에서 추진하는 기타 출판 사업과 관련하여 연구소이사회의 요청이 있을 경우, 이를 지원하도록 한다.

(11) 편집위원은 전공 영역을 고려하여 투고 논문을 세부 전공에 맞게 심사할 수 있도록 각 분야의 전문가들로 고루 선정한다.

제2조 (편집위원회 구성원의 임무)

(1) 편집위원장은 『영어권문화연구』의 편집과 출판에 관련된 제반 업무를 총괄 조정하고 편집위원회의 원활한 운영을 도모한다. 또한, 학술지와

관련하여 제반 대외 업무를 수행한다.

(2) 편집위원장은 학술지의 편집 및 출판회의를 주관하고, 원고를 투고 받아 관리하며, 심사를 진행한다. 편집회의에 투고된 원고를 보고하면서 각 논문마다 전공분야에 맞는 심사위원을 추천받아, 해당 논문에 대한 3인 이상의 심사위원회를 구성하여 규정에 따라 심사를 진행하고 관리한다.

(3) 편집위원은 편집위원장의 요청에 따라 편집회의에서 논문심사위원을 추천하고 위임받은 논문에 대한 심사를 수행한다.

(4) 편집위원장과 편집위원은 연 2회 이상 학술지의 편집방향과 특성에 대해 협의한다. 특히 특집호를 기획할 경우, 편집위원장은 편집위원 전원의 의견을 수렴하고 편집위원 과반수 이상의 동의를 얻어 예정 발행일 8개월 전까지 편집계획을 수립하고 연구소의 이사회에 보고한다.

제3조 (원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)

(1) [접수 및 관리] 원고는 공정한 투고 시스템을 사용해 모집한다. 투고된 원고의 접수 및 심사와 관련된 제반 사항과 절차는 편집위원장이 총괄한다. 편집위원장은 접수된 원고마다 투고자의 인적 사항, 논문 투고 및 심사 현황, 출판 등 사후 관리를 일람할 수 있는 원고 대장을 작성하여 관리한다.

(2) [심사 송부] 논문의 심사는 심사의 합리성, 투명성, 공정성을 위해 투고자와 심사자의 인적 사항을 공개하지 않고(blind test) 인비로 진행한다. 편집위원장은 접수한 논문의 저자에 관한 모든 사항을 삭제한 후 심사위원회에 송부한다.

(3) [심사위원 위촉] 각 논문의 심사위원은 그 논문에 적합한 전공분야 3인의 편집위원으로 연구 기여도, 심사경력 등을 고려하여 편집위원회의 편집회의에서 선정하여 위촉한다. (편집위원 중에 해당분야 적임자가 없을 시에는 다른 회원에게 심사를 위촉할 수 있다.)

(4) [심사 일정] 심사위원은 심사를 위촉받은 후 20일 이내에 심사 결과를 심사결과서와 함께 편집위원장에게 통보한다.

(5) [심사 기준] 논문심사는 1) 학회게재 형식 부합성, 2) 내용의 창의성, 3) 논지의 명확성, 4) 논증과정(문단간 연계성, 인용근거의 정확성, 구성의 밀도, 문장의 명증성, 설득력 등), 5) 주제의 시의성, 6) 논리적 논지전개, 7) 학문적 기여도와 같은 논문의 질적 심사와 8) 논문 형식, 9) 참고자료의 적합성, 10) 영문초록과 주제어가 적절한지 등과 같은 형식 평가를 중심으로 평가한다.

심사자는 평가결과를 연구소의 심사결과서 양식에 따라 서술식으로 평가하고 종합평가 결과를 '게재 가', '수정 후 게재', '수정 후 재심사', '게재 불가' 중 택일하여 판정한 후 논문심사결과서를 편집위원회로 송부한다. '게재 가' 판정이 아닐 경우 그 이유나 수정-보완 지시 및 게재 불가 사유를 구체적으로 서술하도록 한다.

(6) [게재 판정] 논문의 게재여부는 해당 분야에 학문적 조예가 깊은 전공자 3인으로 구성된 심사위원회의 심사결과를 기준으로 결정한다. 심사위원 2인 이상이 '게재가' 혹은 '수정 후 게재'로 평한 논문만을 원칙적으로 게재 대상으로 한다. 각 논문에 대해 2인 이상의 심사위원이 '게재 불가'로 판정하면 그 논문은 해당호에 게재할 수 없다. 그 구체적인 판정기준은 다음과 같다.

가) 게재 가 : 논문 심사 결과 편집위원(심사위원) 3인 중 2인 이상의 "게재 가" 판정이 나왔을 경우.

나) 게재 불가 : 논문 심사 결과 편집위원(심사위원) 3인 중 2인 이상의 "게재 불가" 판정이 나왔을 경우.

다) 수정 후 게재 : 사소한 문제점들이 있어 약간의 수정이 필요한 경우로서, 시사위원 3인 중 2인 이상이 "수정 후 게재" 혹은 그 보다 상위의 종합평가결과로 판정하는 경우.

라) 수정 후 재심사 : 크고 작은 문제점들이 많아 대폭적인 수정을 한

후에 재심사가 요구되는 경우로서, 심사위원 3인 중 2인 이상이 “수정 후 재심사” 혹은 그보다 하위의 종합평가 결과로 판정하는 경우.

(7) [심사 결정 및 보고] 편집위원장은 심사위원 3인의 논문심사 보고가 완료되면 편집위원회를 소집하여 심사보고서를 검토한 후 게재 여부를 최종 결정한다. 편집위원장은 해당 논문에 대한 편집위원회의 결정을 투고자에게 통지하며, 이때 심사위원 3인의 심사평 사본을 심사자 인적 사항을 삭제한 후 첨부한다.

(8) [논문 수정 및 재심사] 심사위원이 ‘수정 후 게재’ 또는 ‘수정 후 재심사’로 판정한 때는 수정해야 할 사항을 상세히 적어 논문 필자에게 즉시 통보하여, 빠른 시일 내에 수정 보완 혹은 재심을 위해 다시 제출하도록 한다. 재심사는 1차 심사 위원 1인이 참여하고 2인의 신규 심사위원을 위촉하여 진행한다. 재심사의 경우 심사위원 2인 이상이 ‘수정 후 재심’이나 ‘게재 불가’로 판정하면 그 논문은 해당 호에 게재할 수 없다.

(9) [심사결과 통보] 접수된 모든 논문은 연구소 일정에 따라 40일 이내에 필자에게 그 결과를 통보한다. 게재가 확정된 논문은 필자에게 유선이나 전자우편으로 게재 확정을 통보하고, 논문의 집필자가 학술지 발행 전에 〈논문 게재 예정 증명서〉 발급을 요청하면 편집위원장은 이 증명서를 발급한다. ‘게재 불가’로 판정된 논문은 집필자에게 〈게재 불가 통지서〉를 발송한다. ‘수정 후 게재가’나 ‘수정 후 재심사’로 판정받은 논문은 편집위원(심사위원)의 심사평과 함께 수정 후 다시 제출할 일시를 적시하여 수정제의서를 발송한다.

(10) [심사결과에 대한 이의 신청] 논문 심사결과에 이의가 있을 경우, 편집위원장에게서 심사결과를 통보받은 후 5일 이내에 서면 혹은 전자메일로 이의신청을 할 수 있다. 논문 제출자의 이의 신청이 접수되면 편집위원회는 해당 심사위원에게 재심을 요청하고, 해당 심사위원은

5일 이내에 재심사 결과를 편집위원회에 통보한다. 단, '게재 불가'로 판정된 논문은 투고자가 이의를 제기하는 경우 편집위원회 ⅔이상의 동의를 얻는 논문에 한해 재심을 진행한다.

(11) [수정제의 수용원칙] 논문 집필자는 편집위원회의 수정제의가 있을 경우 이를 존중하는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 단, 수정제의를 수용하지 않을 경우 반론문을 서면이나 전자우편으로 편집위원장에게 반드시 제출한다. 수정제의를 수용하지 않고 재심요구도 없는 경우와 답변이 없는 경우에는 편집위원회에서 해당 논문의 게재를 거부할 수 있다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 18일부터 시행한다.

『영어권문화연구』 편집 및 교정 기준

1. 논문의 구성

(1) 제목 : 제목은 논문보다 큰 글자(14 포인트)를 사용하고 부제목 (12 포인트)이 있는 경우에는 주제목 다음에 콜론을 찍고 부제목을 쓴다. 작품제목은 영어로 쓴다.
예: 브라이언 프리엘의 휴메니티 이념: Translations를 중심으로

(2) 논문의 소제목
로마 숫자를 원칙으로 하고, 다음의 방법으로 표기한다.
- 서론부분: I. 서론 (영문논문의 경우, I. Introduction)
- 본론부분: II, III, IV. . . (구체적 소제목 명기는 저자의 필요에 따른다)
- 결론부분: V. 결론 (영문논문의 경우, V. Conclusion)

(3) 필자이름
- 논문 서두 우측 상단에 위치. 한글 성명을 쓴다.
  예 : 홍길동
- 논문 본문 마지막, 주제어 전에 소속 학교 명칭을 넣는다.
  예 : 동국대
- Abstract 경우에는 영문 성명 아래 영문 학교 명칭을 쓴다.
  예 : Hong, Kil Dong (or Kil-Dong)
  (HanKuk University)
- 영문 성명은 Hong, Kil Dong으로 한다.
- 공동필자의 경우: 맨 앞에 위치한 필자가 제1필자이고, 그 다음의 공

동필자는 가나다 순 (영어 이름의 경우 알파벳순)으로 기재한다.

(4) 참고 / 인용 문헌(References / Works Cited)

본문이 끝난 뒤 반드시 인용 문헌(11 포인트)이라는 제목 하에 참고 및 인용 자료의 서지사항을 열거하고 인용 문헌이 끝나면 200 단어 내외의 영문 요약을 붙인다.

(5) 영문 요약

논문제목(14 포인트)은 영어로 쓴다. 제목 1줄 밑 오른쪽 끝에는 필자의 영문이름을 쓴다.

예: Myth-seeking Journey in Brian Friel

Hong, Gil Dong
(Dongguk University)

The theme of rebirth in Brian Friel is well expounded in many aspects : . . .

Its main objective is. . . .

(6) 주제어

본문이 끝나면 2줄을 띄고, 한글 논문인 경우 "주제어"를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 한글로 명기한다. 그리고, 영문초록이 끝나고 "Key Words"를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 영어로 기입한다. 영어 논문의 경우 "Key Words"를 제목으로 하여 5개 이상의 주제어를 영어로 기입한다.

(7) 본문

본문의 글자 크기는 10 포인트로 하되 줄 사이의 간격 비율은 160으

로 한다.

2. 한글 논문에서의 외국어 사용

- 고유명사의 경우 작품명은 우리말로 번역하고 인명은 우리말로 옮겨 적되 교육인적자원부 제정 외국어 발음 규정을 따른다.
- 처음 나오는 모든 외국어는 괄호 속에 원어를 제시하되, 두 번째 부터는 원어제시가 필요 없다. 작품명과 번역된 저서명은 처음에 번역한 제목을『 』안에 쓰고 이어서 ( ) 안에 원어 제목을 병기하고, 그 다음에는 번역된 제목만 쓴다. 한글 논문 제목은「 」안에 쓴다.
  예:『욕망이라는 이름의 전차』(A Streetcar Named Desire)

3. 강조와 들여쓰기 (Indentation)

(1) 본문 중에서 강조하고자 하는 부분이 있을 때에는 방점 혹 밑줄을 사용하지 아니하고 ‘ ’안에 쓰며, 인용문 중 강조 부분은 원저자의 명기에 따르고, 논문 필자의 강조는 이탤릭체로 쓰며 인용문 끝 출처 표시 다음에 한 칸을 띄고 (원문 강조) 혹은 (필자 강조)를 명시한다.

(2) 모든 새로운 문단은 두 글자만큼(타자 철자 5칸) 들여쓰기를 한다.

4. 인용 및 출처 밝히기

모든 인용문은 한글로 번역하고 바로 뒤의 괄호 안에 원문을 덧붙인다.

(1) 직접인용의 경우

- 한글로 된 번역본에서 인용할 경우에는 “ ” 안에 인용문을 쓰고 이어서 ( )안에 출처를 밝히고 괄호 밖에 마침표를 찍는다.

예: 레이몬드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이, “주인공은 죽지만 비극 의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다” (55-56).

- 외국어 원본에서 인용할 경우 “ ” 안에 한글로 번역된 인용문을 쓰고 이어서 ( )안에 원문을 쓴 후에 적절한 문장부호를 사용하고 출처를 밝힌다.

예: “역설적으로, 오닐의 등장인물들은 저급하다고 여겨질 수도 있는 열정을 통해서 자신들의 위대함을 구축한다” (Paradoxically, O'Neill's characters achieve their greatness through passions that might be thought of as base. 428-29).

예: “어제의 고통”(yesterday's pain, 471)

(2) 간접인용의 경우 출처는 문장의 마지막에 칸을 띄우지 않고 바로 이어서 ( )안에 쪽수를 밝히고 괄호 다음에 마침표를 찍는다.

예: 레이먼드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이 주인공은 죽지만 비극의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다고 할 수 있다(55-56).

(3) 독립인용문

- 두 줄 이상의 인용의 경우 독립인용을 원칙으로 하며 이 때 독립인용문의 위쪽과 아래쪽은 한 줄씩 비워 놓는다. 독립인용문의 첫 줄은 어느 경우에도 들여쓰기를 하지 않으나 두 개 이상의 연속된 문단을 인용할 경우 두번째 문단부터 들여쓴다. 또한 독립인용문은 본문보다 작은 9 포인트의 글자를 사용하고 전체적으로 좌우를 5칸 정도 본문보다 들어가게 한다.
- 괄호를 사용하여 독립인용문의 출처를 밝힌다. 본문중 인용과 달리 인

용문 다음에 마침표를 찍고 한 칸 띈 다음 괄호를 시작한다.
예: 길을 가다 영희를 만났다고 그가 말했다. (15)

(4) 인용문중 논문 필자의 첨삭
- 인용문의 중간부분을 논문필자가 생략할 경우 마침표 세 개를 한 칸씩 띄운다.
  예: 길을 가다 . . . 만났다고 그가 말했다.
  길을 가다 영희를 만났다. . . . (뒤를 완전히 생략하는 경우에)
- 인용문의 대명사나 논문의 맥락에 맞춰 의미를 논문 필자가 지칭하여 밝힐 때 대명사나 어구 다음 [ ]안에 쓴다.
  예: In his [John F. Kennedy's] address, "new frontier" means . . .

(5) 구두점과 인용문
- 따옴표와 함께 마침표(또는 쉼표)를 사용할 때 마침표(또는 쉼표)는 따옴표 안에 오는 것이 원칙이지만 출처를 병기하여 밝힐 때는 '출처 밝히기' 원칙에 먼저 따른다.
  예: 인호는 "영어," "불어"에 능통하다고 "철수가 주장했다."
  레이몬드 윌리엄즈(Raymond Williams)도 말하듯이 "주인공은 죽지만 비극의 종말은 항상 삶의 가치를 더욱 확인시켜 준다" (55-56).

5. 영문원고 및 영문요약을 제출하기 전에 반드시 영어를 모국어로 사용하는 사람의 교정을 받은 후 제출한다.

6. 서지 사항

(1) 인용 문헌이라는 제목 하에 밝히되 모든 출전은 저자 항목, 서명 항목,

출판 배경 항목, 쪽수 항목 등의 순서로 적는다. 그리고 항목 내의 세부 사항은 MLA 최신판의 규정을 따른다.

(2) 단 한국어로 번역된 외국 문헌을 명기할 경우 다음의 순서에 따른다.
- 저자 항목: 원저자의 한국어 발음 이름 중 성, 쉼표, 이름 순으로 기재한다.
- 번역자 항목: 번역자 이름을 쓰고 "역"을 붙인다.
- 서명 항목: 번역된 책 명을 겹낫표 안에 쓰고 괄호 안에 원서 명을 이탤릭체로 쓴다.
- 출판 배경 항목: 번역서의 출판 도시, 출판사, 출판 연도 순으로 쓴다.

예: 윌리암스, 레이몬드. 이일환 역. 『이념과 문학』(Marxism and Literature). 서울: 문학과 지성사, 1982.

(3) 하나의 문헌에 관한 서지항목의 길이가 길어서 한 줄 이상이 될 때 두 번째 줄부터 6칸 들여 쓰도록 한다.

예: Lewis, C. S. "View Point: C. S. Lewis." Twentieth Century Interpretations of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Ed. Denton Fox. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. 110-22.

(4) 외국문헌 서지목록에 국내문헌도 함께 포함시킬 때는 국내문헌을 가나다순에 의해 먼저 열거한 다음 외국문헌을 알파벳 순으로 열거한다.

(5) 외국대학 출판사의 경우 University는 U로 Press는 P로 줄여쓴다. 외국출판사의 경우 Publishers, Press, and Co., 등의 약호는 모두 생략하고 하나의 머리 이름만 쓴다.

예: Harper, Norton, Houghton, Routledge 등.

예외로 Random House로 표기한다.

(6) 같은 저자의 2개 이상 출판물을 명기할 때는 두 번째부터 저자이름은 다섯칸의 밑줄로 처리한다. (_____.)

(7) 공동저자의 경우, 맨 앞에 위치한 저자가 제1 저자이고, 그 다음의 공동 저자는 가나다 순 (영어 이름의 경우 알파벳 순)으로 기재한다.

(8) 기타 상세한 논문 작성법은 MLA 최신판을 따르고 그 기준을 한국어 논문 작성법에 응용하도록 한다.

『영어권문화연구』 투고 규정

1. [학술지 발간] 매년 4월 30일, 8월 31, 12월 31일 연 3회 발행하며, 한글논문은 앞부분에 외국어 논문은 뒷부분에 게재한다.
2. [원고 제출시한] 1권은 2월 28일, 2권은 6월 30일, 그리고 3권 10월 31일까지 편집위원장에게 투고 예정논문을 제출한다.
3. [논문의 내용] 투고 논문의 내용은 영어권의 인문, 철학, 문학, 번역, 문화 연구나 학제적 연구의 범위 안에 포함될 수 있는 독창적인 것이거나 그러한 연구에 도움이 될 수 있는 것이어야 한다.
4. [기고 자격] 논문투고 자격은 원칙적으로 영어권문화연구에 관심 있는 대학원 박사과정 이상의 전공자나 연구자로 한다. 다만 석사과정생의 경우는 지도교수의 추천과 연구소장의 결정을 필요로 한다.
5. [원고 작성 및 기고 요령] 『영어권문화연구』 원고 작성 및 기고 요령을 따른다.
6. [편집요령] 『영어권문화연구』 편집 및 교정 기준에 따른다.
7. [심사기준] 『영어권문화연구』 발간 및 편집위원회 운영 규정 제4항 (원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)을 적용한다.
8. [논문 게재료] 논문 게재 시 연구비를 지원 받은 논문은 30만원, 전임 논문은 20만원, 비전임 논문은 10만원을 논문 게재료로 납부하여야 한다.
9. [저작권 소유] 논문을 포함하여 출판된 원고의 저작권은 영어권문화연구소가 소유한다.
12. [규정의 개폐 및 수정] 본 규정의 개폐 및 수정은 편집위원회의 요청에 따라 이사회에서 개폐 및 수정을 의결한다.

『영어권문화연구』 원고 작성 및 기고 요령

『영어권문화연구』에 기고하는 논문은 아래의 원고 작성요령을 따라야 한다.

1. 논문은 제목을 포함하여 우리말로 쓰는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 한글로 된 논문은 본문에 한자와 영문 등을 쓰지 않기로 하되, 꼭 필요한 경우 괄호로 처리하는 것을 원칙으로 한다. 외국어로 쓰는 경우 보편적으로 많이 사용되는 언어를 사용한다.
2. 외국어 고유명사는 한글로 표기하되, 처음 나올 때 괄호 속에 원어 표기를 제시한다. 작품명은 한글로 번역하되, 처음 나올 때 괄호 속에 원어 표기를 제시한다. 인용문은 번역하되, 필요에 따라 원문을 괄호 속에 병기한다. 운문의 경우에는 원문을 번역문 바로 아래에 제시한다. (인명이나 지명의 경우 해당 언어권의 발음을 존중하되, 결정이 어려울 때는 교육부 제정 외국어 발음 규정을 따르기로 한다.)
3. 각주는 연구비 관련 내용 및 재인용 사실을 밝히거나 본문 내용의 필수적인 부연 정보를 위해서 간략히 사용하고, 인용문헌의 명시에는 사용하지 않는다.
4. 미주는 가능한 사용하지 않는다. 실용논문의 경우 조사 및 실험 내용을 미주의 부록으로 첨부할 수 있다.
5. 컴퓨터를 사용하여 논문을 작성하되, 우리말 논문은 45자×450행, 영문논문은 70자×500행 (출판지면 약 20쪽) 내외로 한다. 논문의 작성은 가능하면 〈아래한글〉프로그램(hwp)으로 하고, 문단 모양, 글자 모양 및 크기 등은 기본양식으로 한다.
6. 직접, 간접 인용 부분의 마지막 구두점이 마침표의 경우에는 출처 표기 원칙을 적용 받아 (따옴표 다음의) 괄호에 이어서 표기한다.

7. 국내 서적이나 논문을 인용하는 경우 본문 중에 괄호를 이용하여 미국현대어문협회(MLA) 『지침서』(MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers)의 규정에 따라 저자와 쪽수를 명시하고, 논문 말미에 다음과 같은 방법에 따라 인용문헌(Works Cited)으로 밝힌다.
   - 필자(또는 저자). 「논문제목」. 『책 이름』. 편자. 출판지: 출판사, 출판연도.
   - 영문문헌의 경우에는 다음과 같이 하고 책 이름은 이탤릭체로 한다.
   - 필자(또는 저자). 「논문제목」. 책 이름. 편자. 출판지: 출판사, 출판연도.
8. 국내문헌과 외국문헌을 함께 인용문헌으로 처리하는 경우, 국내문헌을 '가나다' 순에 의해 먼저 열거한 다음, 외국문헌은 'ABC'순으로 열거한다. 인용문헌은 본문 중에 직접, 간접 인용된 문헌만을 명시하고 참고(references)로만 연구에 사용된 문헌은 (피)인용지수(impact factor)에 해당되지 않으므로 명기하지 않는다.
9. 기타 논문 작성법의 세부 사항은 미국현대어문협회(MLA)의 『지침서』(*MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*) 최근판 규정을 따르며, 한글 논문의 경우에도 미국현대어문협회 『지침서』의 세부 사항을 응용하여 따른다.
10. 심사의 공정을 위하여 필자의 이름과 대학 이름을 논문에 표기하지 아니하고, 본문에 필자의 이름이 나타나지 않도록 한다. 원고 제출시 필자의 신원은 '논문게재 신청서'에 적어서 제출한다.
11. 원고는 편집위원장 혹은 편집간사에게 이메일로 전송하고, 3부의 인쇄본을 동시에 우송한다. 제출할 때, 다음의 기본사항을 명시한 표지를 붙이고, 원고(영문요약 포함)에는 일체 필자의 인적 사항을 밝히지 말아야 한다. 게재 확정 이후 출판 교정 시에 필요에 따라 인적 사항을 첨부한다.
    - 논문 제목 (한글 및 영문)

- 필자 이름 (한글 및 영문) 및 필자 정보
- 공동 연구의 경우 제1저자 및 교신저자가 있을 때 명시
- 필자 소속단체(학교)명(한글 및 영문)
- 필자 연락처 (주소, 전화번호, 이동전화번호, 이메일 주소)
- 게재 희망호

12. 모든 논문의 말미에 5개 내외의 어구로 주제어를 명시한다. 한글논문의 경우 논문 말미에 2줄 띄고 “주제어”를 제목으로 한글 주제어를 한글로 명기하고, 영문초록 말미에 2줄 띄고 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 내외의 주제어를 영문으로 제시한다. 영어논문의 경우 논문과 영문요약 말미에 2줄 띄고 “Key Words”를 제목으로 하여 5개 내외의 주제어를 영어로 명기한다.
13. 모든 논문 뒤에는 20행 내외의 영문요약을 붙인다.
14. 원고는 접수 순서에 의해 편집위원회에서 각 논문의 심사위원회를 위촉하여 심사하고 게재여부는 원칙적으로 편집위원회 운영 규정 제4조(원고 접수, 논문 심사, 사후 관리)에 의거하여 결정한다.
15. 편집위원회는 논문을 포함한 원고 필자에게 출판 최종 송고 이전에 논문 형식과 맞춤법에 대한 교정을 의뢰할 수 있고, 의뢰받은 논문의 경우 최종 교정 및 편집의 책임은 필자에게 있다.

원고작성 세부 지침

1. 용지규격: A4
2. 용지여백: 위 쪽: 56.00 mm 머리말: 10.00 mm
   왼 쪽: 49.99 mm 오른쪽: 49.99 mm
   아래쪽: 60.00 mm 꼬리말: 0.00 mm

3. 아래의 사항은 편집 메뉴 중 “모양 → 스타일”을 이용하여 정하시오.

구 분	정렬 방식	행간	왼쪽 여백	오른 여백	들여 쓰기	글자 크기	글자 장평	글자 간격	글자모양
논문제목	가운데	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	14pt	90%	0%	한글: HY신명조 영문: Times New Roman 한자: HY신명조
부-소제목	가운데	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	12pt			
필자명	오른쪽	160%	0글자	0글자	0글자	10pt			
본문/바탕글	혼합	160%	0글자	0글자	2글자	10pt			
인용문	혼합	150%	2글자	0글자	2글자	9pt			
각주	혼합	130%	0글자	0글자	2글자	9pt			
머리말-홀수	오른쪽	150%	0글자	0글자	0글자	9pt			
머리말-짝수	왼쪽	150%	0글자	0글자	0글자	9pt			

* 논문의 시작 쪽에서는 머리말 감추기를 하시오.

접수 제 호
(심사) 호

수정·보완 의뢰서

심사 위원 ( )명의 심사와 편집위원회의 의결을 거쳐 회원님의 논문을 『영어권문화연구』 제 ( )호에 개재하기로 결정되었음을 통보합니다.
아래의 심사위원들의 지적사항을 수정·보완하고 교정을 거쳐서 ( )년 ( )월 ( )일까지 반드시 제출해 주시기 바랍니다.

– 수정시 필수 기입 사항

1. 수정·보완 사항의 항목별로 심사위원의 지적사항을 어떻게 고쳤는지 기록해 주시기 바랍니다.
2. 심사위원의 지적사항에 동의하지 않으시면 그 이유를 상세히 밝혀주시기 바랍니다.

– 제출방법

1. 수정·보완이 완료된 논문과 수정·보완 의뢰서를 영어권문화연구소 이메일 계정(esc8530@dongguk.edu)으로 보내주시기 바랍니다. 출력물의 우편송부는 편집시 그림이나 도표가 손상될 우려가 있을 때에만 한합니다.

년 월 일

영어권문화연구 편집위원장

수정·보완 확인서

논문 제목		
수정 및 보완 사항	논문 형식	
	논문 내용	

영어권문화연구소 연구윤리규정

제1장 총 칙

제1조(목적) 이 규정은 동국대학교 영어권문화연구소(이하 '연구소')의 학술 연구 활동 및 연구소가 간행하는 학술지에 게재되는 논문 등의 성과물을 대상으로 한 연구 윤리와 진실성의 확보를 목적으로 하며 연구원 및 투고자는 학술연구자의 위상을 높이고 연구자에 대한 사회적 신뢰가 증진되도록 본 규정을 성실히 준수하여야 한다. 본 학술지는 학술연구 저작들을 엄정하게 심사하여 선정하고 게재한다. 이에 따라 학술지에 게재를 희망하는 논문 저자뿐 아니라 편집위원(장)과 심사위원들의 연구윤리규정을 명학하게 아래와 같이 정한다.

제2조(적용 대상) 이 규정은 본 연구소의 학술지, 학술행사 발표문, 단행본, 영상물을 포함한 모든 간행물과 출판물 및 심사행위를 적용대상으로 한다.

제3조(적용범위) 특정 연구 분야의 윤리 및 진실성 검증과 관련하여 다른 특별한 규정이 있는 경우를 제외하고는 이 규정에 의한다.

제4조(연구부정행위의 범위) 이 규정에서 정하는 연구부정행위는 연구개발과제의 제안, 연구개발의 수행, 연구개발결과의 보고 및 발표 등에서 행하여진 위조·변조·표절·자기표절·부당한 논문저자 표시행위 및 위 행위를 제안하거나 강요하는 행위 등을 말하며 다음 각 호와 같다.

1. "위조"(forgery, fabrication)는 존재하지 않는 논문, 자료, 연구

결과 등을 허위로 만들어 내는 행위를 말한다.

2. “변조”(alteration, falsification)는 참고문헌 등의 연구자료, 연구과정 등을 인위적으로 조작하거나 임의로 변형, 삭제함으로써 연구 내용 또는 결과를 왜곡하는 행위를 말한다.
3. “표절(plagiarism)”이라 함은 타인의 아이디어, 연구결과 및 내용 등을 정당한 승인 또는 인용 없이 도용하는 행위를 말한다.
4. “자기표절”은 자신이 이미 발표한 논문 및 연구결과물(비학술단체 발간물, 학술대회 발표문, 연구용역보고서 등 국제표준도서번호(ISBN)가 붙지 않는 발표물은 제외)을 다른 학술지에 다시 게재하거나 그 논문 및 연구결과물의 일부나 전부를 출처를 밝히지 않고 자신의 다른 논문 및 연구결과물에 포함시키는 행위를 말한다.
5. “부당한 논문저자 표시”는 연구내용 또는 결과에 대하여 학술적 공헌 또는 기여를 한 사람에게 정당한 이유 없이 논문저자 자격을 부여하지 않거나, 학술적 공헌 또는 기여를 하지 않은 사람에게 감사의 표시 또는 예우 등을 이유로 논문저자 자격을 부여하는 행위를 말한다.
6. 기타 본인 또는 타인의 부정행위의 의혹에 대한 조사를 고의로 방해하거나 제보자 또는 제보대상자에게 위해를 가하는 행위 등도 포함된다.

제2장 연구윤리위원회

제5조(설치) 연구소를 통해 연구를 수행하거나 발표하려는 자의 연구부정행위를 예방하고, 연구윤리규정 준수 여부에 관한 문제제기, 조사, 심의, 판정 및 집행에 관한 업무를 총괄하기 위하여 연구윤리위원회

(이하 “위원회”라 한다)를 둔다.

제6조(구성)

1. 위원회는 위원장 1인을 포함하여 10인 이내의 위원을 둔다.
2. 위원회 위원은 연구소장, 편집위원장, 운영위원장, 연구소 전임연구원을 당연직으로 하고, 임명직 위원은 편집위원회의 추천에 의해 소장이 위촉한다.
3. 위원장은 임명직 위원 중에서 선출한다.
4. 위원회의 위원장 및 임명직 위원의 임기는 2년으로 하되, 연임할 수 있다.
5. 위원장은 위원 중에서 1인의 간사를 선임할 수 있다.

제7조(회의)

1. 위원회는 위원장의 소집으로 개회하며 과반수 출석에 출석위원 과반수 찬성으로 의결한다.
2. 연구부정행위로 제보, 또는 기타 경로를 통하여 연구기관에 의해 인지된 사안이 있을 경우 위원장은 지체 없이 위원회를 소집하여야 한다.
3. 위원회는 연구부정행위로 인지된 사안에 대한 조사의 적부 판단, 조사위원회의 설치, 조사위원회의 조사결과, 사안에 대한 조치 등에 대하여 심의·의결한다.
4. 간사는 회의록을 작성하고 관리한다.

제8조(조사위원회의 설치)

1. 위원장은 위원회에서 연구부정행위라고 판단한 사안에 대하여 그 진실성을 검증하는 과정의 전문성을 고려하여 연구윤리위원과 외부전문가 약간 명으로 구성된 조사위원회를 설치할 수 있다.

2. 조사위원회는 위원회의 의결에 의해 활동을 시작하며 조사결과에 대한 조치가 완결된 후 해산한다.
3. 조사위원회의 위원장은 연구윤리위원장으로 한다.
4. 연구소는 조사위원회의 활동에 필요한 비용을 지출할 수 있다.

제9조(조사위원의 의무와 자격정지)

1. 조사위원은 심의에 있어 진실함과 공정함에 기초하여야 한다.
2. 조사위원은 심의 안건과 관련하여 인지한 내용을 사적으로 공표하지 않아야 하며, 검증과정에서 제보자 및 피조사자의 명예나 권리가 부당하게 침해당하지 않도록 유의하여야 한다.
3. 조사위원은 심의에 있어 외부의 부당한 압력이나 영향을 거부하여야 한다.
4. 조사위원은 자신과 사안사이에 심의의 공정함을 침해할 정도의 관련성이 있을 경우 지체 없이 이를 위원장에게 통보하여야 한다.
5. 조사위원의 연구 결과 혹은 행위가 심의 대상이 될 경우, 당사자는 즉시 해당 심의 안건의 조사위원 자격이 정지된다.

제3장 연구윤리의 검증

제10조(검증 시효)

1. 연구 윤리성 및 진실성 검증 필요성이 제기된 때로부터 5년 이상이 경과한 연구부정행위는 심의하지 않음을 원칙으로 한다.
2. 5년 이상이 경과한 연구부정행위라 하더라도 그 대상자가 기존의 결과를 재인용하여 후속 연구의 기획 및 수행, 연구 결과의 보고 및 발표 등에 사용하였을 경우 혹은 사회적으로 연구소의 학술

연구 활동의 신뢰성에 심각한 위해를 가한 경우에는 이를 심의하여야 한다.

제11조(검증절차)

1. 연구부정행위를 인지하였거나 또는 제보가 접수되면 위원장은 즉시 위원회를 소집하여 심의를 개시하여야 한다.
2. 위원회는 사안이 접수된 날로부터 60일 이내에 심의·의결·결과조치 등을 완료하여야 한다. 단, 위원회가 조사기간 내에 조사를 완료할 수 없다고 판단할 경우, 위원장의 승인을 거쳐 30일 한도 내에서 기간을 연장할 수 있다.
3. 위원장은 심의대상이 된 행위에 대하여 연구윤리와 진실성 검증을 위해 조사위원회를 설치할 수 있다.
4. 위원회 혹은 조사위원회는 필요에 따라 제보자·피조사자·증인 및 참고인에 대하여 진술을 위한 출석을 요구할 수 있으며, 피조사자에게 자료의 제출을 요구할 수 있다. 이 경우 피조사자는 반드시 응하여야 한다. 단, 사정에 따라 위원장의 판단으로 인터넷이나 전화, 서면 등을 활용한 비대면 출석도 허용할 수 있다.
5. 위원회는 심의를 완료하기 전에 피조사자에게 연구 윤리 저촉 관련 내용을 통보하고 충분한 소명의 기회를 제공한다. 당사자가 이에 응하지 않을 경우에는 심의 내용에 대해 이의가 없는 것으로 간주한다.
6. 위원회는 심의 결과를 지체 없이 피조사자와 제보자에게 통보하여야 한다. 피조사자 또는 제보자는 심의 결과에 대해 불복할 경우 결과를 통보받은 날로부터 14일 이내에 위원회에 이유를 기재하여 서면으로 재심의를 요청할 수 있다.
7. 피조사자 또는 제보자의 재심의 요청이 없는 경우 위원장은 심의·의결 결과에 근거하여 조치를 취하며 조사위원회는 해산한다.

제12조(제보자와 피조사자의 권리보호)

1. 제보자의 신원 및 제보 내용에 관한 사항은 비공개를 원칙으로 한다.
2. 제보자는 위원회에 서면 또는 전자우편 등의 방법으로 제보할 수 있으며 실명으로 제보함을 원칙으로 한다.
3. 연구부정행위에 대한 제보와 문제 제기가 허위이며 피조사자에 대한 의도적인 명예 훼손이라 판단될 경우 향후 연구소 활동을 제한하는 등 허위 제보자에게 일정한 제재를 가하여야 한다.
4. 위원회는 연구부정행위 여부에 대한 검증이 완료될 때까지 피조사자의 명예나 권리가 침해되지 않도록 주의하여야 한다.
5. 연구소와 위원회는 조사나 검증 결과 연구 관련 부정행위가 일어나지 않은 것으로 판명되었을 경우 피조사자의 명예 회복을 위한 노력을 성실하게 수행하여야 한다.
6. 연구부정행위에 대한 조사 내용 등은 위원회에서 조사 결과에 대한 최종 심의를 완료하기 전까지 외부에 공개하여서는 안 된다.

제13조(조치) 연구윤리 위반에 대한 조치는 그 경중에 따라 다음 항목 중에서 취하며 하나 또는 몇 개의 항목을 중복하여 처분할 수 있다.

1. 해당 논문 혹은 연구결과물 게재 취소 및 연구소 홈페이지 서비스에서 해당 자료 삭제
2. 해당 지면을 통한 공개 사과
3. 논문 투고 금지
4. 연구소의 제반 간행물과 출판물 투고 및 연구소의 학술활동 참여 금지
5. 해당자의 회원자격 정지

제14조(후속조치)

1. 연구 윤리 위반에 대한 판정 및 조치가 확정되면 조속히 이를 제

보자와 피조사자에게 문서로 통보한다.

2. 조치 후 그 결과는 인사비밀 문서화하여 연구소에 보존한다.
3. 필요한 경우 연구지원기관에 결과조치를 통보한다.

제4장 기타

제15조(행정사항)

1. 연구윤리 위반 사실이 인정된 경우, 논문 투고 및 심사 등에 사용하기 위하여 받은 제반 경비는 반환하지 않는다.
2. 이 규정에 명시되지 않은 사항은 연구윤리위원회에서 정한다.

부 칙

본 규정은 2010년 8월 30일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2012년 12월 18일부터 시행한다.

본 규정은 2013년 10월 31일부터 시행한다.

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영어권문화연구 The Journal of English Cultural Studies

2018년 8월 31일 / 31 August 2018
11권 2호 / Vol.11 No.2

발행인 한태식
편집인 김애주
발행처 영어권문화연구소/Official Publication by
Institute for English Cultural Studies
30, Pildong-ro 1-gil, Jung-gu
Seoul, Republic of Korea, 04620

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